Al-Akhbar: The United States seeks to create a "Middle East NATO" in the Persian Gulf
With the help of the war in Iran, the United States is seeking to redraw the map of the region towards a "Middle Eastern NATO," writes Al-Akhbar. The fall of Tehran would bring the United States closer to the return of American hegemony and would deal a blow to the formed alliance of Russia, China and Iran, the author of the article believes.
Mohammed Said Rasas
Few analysts paid attention to the connection between these three events.:
1. In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes the Eurasian route (China—Kazakhstan—Russia—Ukraine— Poland — Europe) and the Middle East route (China—Pakistan—Iran—Turkey — Europe).
2. In February 2014, a coup d'etat took place with the support of the United States, which overthrew the pro-Russian democratically elected president of Ukraine. This prompted President Putin to promote the reunification of Crimea with Russia and support ethnic Russians in Donbas in their confrontation with Kiev.
3. In 2015, US President Barack Obama actively promoted the nuclear deal with Tehran, despite the objections of allies in Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, while turning a blind eye to the expansion of Iranian influence in the region.
Countering Beijing has become a key priority for Obama since China became the world's second-largest economy in 2010. The United States had to withdraw from the Middle East and shift its attention to the Far East in order to contain Beijing's growing influence. It was assumed that China would repeat the scenario of Germany after unification in 1871, when economic growth resulted in military ambitions, culminating in two world wars. The nuclear deal has become part of a strategy aimed at containing Iran and turning it into an outpost against the Belt and Road initiative. It assumed the containment of Tehran while limiting the Iranian nuclear program. A similar goal was pursued with regard to Ukraine: on the one hand, through Kiev's integration into the Western security system and political architecture, on the other, by using the country as a lever of pressure on the Kremlin to stop Putin's rapprochement with China.
Obama's strategy [in Kiev and Tehran] has failed. When Donald Trump took office as president of the United States in 2017, his approach turned out to be exactly the opposite. He pursued a confrontational policy towards Tehran. Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement and imposed unprecedented harsh economic sanctions against Iran in 2018. He pursued a policy of deterrence towards Moscow, which contradicted the national security strategy report published by the Pentagon and the intelligence community at the end of 2017. In this report, Russia and China were presented as a single threat to US security. However, since Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in 1971, American policy has traditionally distinguished between Beijing and Moscow. It is noteworthy that the report was at odds with Obama's policy, considering Iran as a threat, which was in line with Trump's course.
When Joe Biden assumed the presidency in 2021, he attempted to return to negotiations with Iran on the Vienna nuclear deal (April 2021–August 2022) and significantly ease sanctions against Tehran. However, with the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, it became clear that a trilateral alliance had formed between China, Russia and Iran. It manifested itself both in the military sphere and through economic and energy support. At the same time, China, according to experts, is an economic and military giant, but remains dependent on external energy resources, which partly resembles the situation of Nazi Germany and Japan during World War II. Later, the Americans found an "Iranian trace" in the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Those who followed Western think tanks viewed this trilateral alliance as a serious and unprecedented threat to American unipolarity that emerged after the Cold War (1947-1989). The White House viewed Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the events of October 7 as manifestations of the strategy of this trilateral alliance. He believed that the consequences could spread to third regions, possibly Taiwan. Many Western countries are convinced that China is closely monitoring developments in Ukraine in order to assess its future chances in relation to Taiwan. Therefore, Biden, along with European leaders, sought to "drive Putin into the Ukrainian quagmire" as a deterrent signal to China.
After the events of October 7, the Biden administration began to pursue a policy different from the Obama approach, focusing once again on the Middle East. General Michael Corella, commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) since 2023, sees the Middle East as a strategic area through which the US can exert pressure on China by controlling energy exports and shipping routes. Anyone who followed the Biden administration's actions after October 7 can see how the United States deterred Israel from attacking Iran for six months (an airstrike was carried out on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, 2024) and Lebanon for 11 months (the explosions of communication devices on September 17-18, 2024 became the starting point for the war in Lebanon). In this war, Israel's goal was to weaken the strongest Iranian wing, which was combined with the war in Gaza in 2023-2025, aimed at undermining the pro-Iranian Palestinian wing. Meanwhile, the airstrike on the Iranian consulate, followed by subsequent strikes on targets in Iran (October 26), became the US-Israeli prelude to the start of targeted actions against Tehran, which Israel and the United States consider the "leader" of the regional armed forces.
After the 12-day Israeli-American war against Iran in June 2025, followed by a new American-Israeli aggression on February 28, 2026, it became obvious that the conflicts that began on October 7 had reached their climax. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's statements in the first weeks after October 7 that "the problem is in Tehran, not in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Gaza or Saada" became prevalent after Donald Trump's return to the White House. However, fundamental differences remain between Washington, which seeks to change the policy of the Iranian regime without overthrowing it, and Netanyahu, who advocates regime change. The United States fears that the fall of the regime will lead to chaos with devastating and seismic consequences for the entire region.
The 12-day war did not prove a desire for regime change in Iran; on the contrary, many perceived it as an attempt by the United States to strengthen its position in negotiations with Tehran. Nevertheless, the February 28 operation points to a broader American goal with regard to Iran – to redraw the map of the region towards a "Middle Eastern NATO." This is consistent with US plans to restore unipolar dominance, which began in 1989, by dismantling the trilateral alliance of China, Russia and Iran. The goal is to weaken Iran either by undermining its internal stability, similar to what happened to Saddam Hussein after the 1991 war, or by forcing it to adopt policies beneficial to Washington. Meanwhile, Trump's Ukraine plan presupposes a policy of appeasing Vladimir Putin, even if it goes against the interests of Europe. Russia and Iran believe that these actions are aimed at weakening China in its confrontation with the United States. They suggest that this will make Beijing more vulnerable to the loss of Middle Eastern and Russian energy resources, which directly threatens its economic and strategic stability.
America is changing its strategy towards Tehran; and it differs significantly from the policy of the Obama administration. Iran is now being assessed not through the prism of a policy of appeasement or inconclusive nuclear negotiations, but through historical examples. On the one hand, just as London viewed Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali Pasha during the war of 1840, on the other hand, how Washington assessed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser during the 1967 war. In both cases, these actions were seen as independent projects aimed at controlling the region that General Charles de Gaulle called the "heart of the world" and, if successful, could radically change the international balance of power.
The first attack was carried out in 1840, the second in 1967, and the third in 2026. In all three cases, the actions were carried out against countries that were considered "regional superpowers" at that time.
