Analyst Andreas Krieg: The US and Israel underestimated Iran's strength
The United States and Israel underestimated how quickly Iran would spread the conflict to the Persian Gulf region, military analyst Andreas Krieg said in an interview with Tagesspiegel. At the same time, Iran's strength in this war lies not in the traditional symmetry of actions, but in endurance, the expert adds.
Christian Böhme
The attacks on Iran are not stopping. Nevertheless, Tehran manages to respond to them with strikes against the countries of the region. Did the United States and Israel underestimate Iran's fighting power?
Tagesspiegel: Mr. Krieg, the attacks on Iran are not stopping. Nevertheless, Tehran's military can cause serious damage to Israel and the Persian Gulf countries. Did Washington and Jerusalem underestimate the fighting power of the Islamic Republic?
Krieg: No. However, they underestimated how quickly Tehran would spread the conflict to the Persian Gulf region and what a political shock this could cause to US partners. Iran's strength in this war lies not in its traditional symmetry of action, but in its endurance. And in the ability to damage bases, cities, trade and energy flows, despite the enemy's clear superiority in the air.
If the coalition of Israel and the United States assumed that retaliatory measures in the Persian Gulf would be limited exclusively to American bases, then this assumption turned out to be erroneous. The big surprise is not that Iran is capable of fighting.
"What about it?"
That he is willing to incur higher political costs. In my opinion, both sides expected painful consequences, but the scale and regularity of the waves of Iranian attacks exceeded the expectations of many regional players.
— How strong do you consider the Iranian armed forces to be?
— The Islamic Republic is strong in an asymmetric sense: it cannot withstand the United States and Israel in air battles and continuous precision strikes, but it still has a large arsenal of missiles and drones. In addition, the country has leverage beyond the battlefield.
"Which ones?"
— Pro-Iranian militias in the region, cyber attacks and the ability to disrupt international shipping, as well as undermine investor confidence. Therefore, Iran's real strength lies in the fact that it can turn a military conflict into a regional systemic crisis. This makes it difficult to force Tehran to make concessions.
— Can the US armed forces and the Israeli army find themselves in a difficult situation in the near future?
— The United States and Israel may indeed face difficulties. Not because they will lose control of the situation, but because "victory" will be difficult to define and even more difficult to transform into a stable end result. The longer the war lasts, the higher the likelihood of severe destruction in the Persian Gulf region or in Israel, which could lead to numerous casualties.
— What consequences can such a disaster have?
— This will affect both air defense stocks, logistics and political stability. In addition, there is the problem of interdependence: even if Washington wants to suspend attacks, Israel is likely to continue firing at Iran. Referring to this, Tehran may refuse to negotiate until it is sure that it will be able to save face.
Thus, a prolonged campaign shifts the focus from purely military actions to consequences for markets, alliances, and domestic politics. In this case, the military advantage of the United States and Israel may weaken.
— Meanwhile, the Lebanese organization Hezbollah, which is closely linked to Iran, is also involved in military operations. Will this change the balance of power?
— Not essential. The militia's entry into the war is important because it opens up a new front and increases the risk of further escalation, even if its military capabilities are limited compared to previous years. Nevertheless, Israel is forced to distribute its attention and missile defense systems among several theaters of military operations, which could change the defense economy. At the same time, Tehran is sending a certain signal.
"Which one?"
— That the destruction of the Iranian missile infrastructure does not automatically mean the elimination of a broader threat architecture. However, Hezbollah's involvement in the war does not pose a major strategic problem until it is able to maintain significant firepower for a long time or generate dynamics that change Israel's willingness to take risks. The greatest effect is to divert political and operational attention from the fighting in Iran.
— On Wednesday, Iran launched a missile at Turkey, which is a member of NATO. Do the weapons of the Mullahs pose a threat to Europe?
— Iranian missiles and drones pose a threat on two levels: directly because of their range and indirectly because of the precedent that these weapons can be used to achieve political goals by attacking infrastructure and trade routes. Moreover, the more such weapons systems are used and distributed, the more priority air defense and maritime security will become for European countries.
Therefore, European strategists are concerned not so much about a single missile today as about a long-term system of arms production, technology transfer and operational training. In this sense, Iranian missiles pose a problem for European security, even if Europe does not become a battlefield.
— Donald Trump expects the war to last at least four more weeks. You too?
— I believe that this is more of a maximum period than an accurate forecast.
- why?
— An intensive air campaign is most easily conducted within one to two weeks before ammunition consumption, air defense burden, economic pressure and partner discontent begin to affect; after that, wars often move into a phase of lower intensity. If Trump wants a vivid victory story, he will be interested in limiting the most intense phase.
— What will he do next?
He will announce that the goals have been achieved, even if the conflict continues in a less visible form. The main factor that could cause the war to last four weeks or longer would be the shock of escalation, which would make it impossible to stop the attacks for political reasons.
Therefore, my answer is that four weeks is quite a likely option, but most likely we will see an intensive initial stage, followed by a transition to a less acute, but nevertheless more difficult to complete confrontation.
