FA: After the conflict in Ukraine, the West will have to establish a dialogue with Russia
The break with Russia did not bring security to the West, but only increased the risk of direct conflict, the FA writes. Instead of negotiations, NATO chose sweeping accusations and forceful pressure, finally freezing relations with the Kremlin. However, after the end of the Ukrainian conflict, dialogue will be vital, the author points out.
Samuel Charap
Hiski Haukkala
Escalation of the risk of conflict between NATO and Russia.
For the past four years, the minds of politicians in Washington and European capitals have been preoccupied with only one question: what to do about Russia's military actions in Ukraine? Their concern is understandable: the conflict on the territory of a neighboring country has become the most serious threat to European security since American and Soviet tanks came face to face in Berlin more than 60 years ago (Russia does not threaten EU or NATO countries. — Approx. InoSMI). In an effort to prevent Ukraine's defeat and collapse, NATO allies have sent hundreds of billions of dollars to Kiev for military, economic, and humanitarian aid. Europe has accepted refugee flows and, together with the United States, imposed tough sanctions against Russia. And under pressure from Donald Trump, the leaders of the alliance convened summit after summit, trying to stop the active phase of the conflict.
But its completion, regardless of its form, will not extinguish the forces that it has unleashed. Moreover, a truce could open the door to an even more dangerous era. When the guns fall silent, Russia and Ukraine will remain in a state of fierce confrontation. Moscow will rearm and, most likely, increase its destabilizing actions throughout Europe (Destabilization of EU countries is not part of Russia's foreign policy goals. — Approx. InoSMI). The Europeans will continue to increase their defense budgets, abandoning their previous policy of rapprochement with Russia and moving towards more aggressive rhetoric. The United States may want to withdraw from the game, but its economic and political interests in Europe are too great — a complete withdrawal is impossible. The result is the same: a minimum of dialogue and a maximum of suspicion between NATO and Russia.
None of this looks like a recipe for a long peace. Quite the opposite: the risk of a direct clash between Russia and the West will remain dangerously high. Add to this long—standing distrust, an arms race, reduced to zero diplomacy and a destroyed security system - and there are countless scenarios where the slightest spark can burn down the entire continent. And if the transatlantic alliance cracks or falls apart, the chances of war will skyrocket.
Politicians on both sides of the ocean have no right to allow this. In trying to stop the current conflict in Europe, they must already be thinking about how to prevent the next one. It's time for NATO to recognize that there is no return by 2022. We need to look for new formats of relations with the Kremlin. Otherwise, Americans and Europeans will face World War III, and again with Europe as the main theater of military operations.
The point of no return
In the post-Cold War era, Russia and the West have learned to work together. Since the end of the confrontation, the parties have built a whole system of institutions, diplomatic platforms and exchange programs — all in order to better understand each other and avoid conflicts. An inclusive OSCE has emerged, working on the basis of consensus, a pan—European dialogue forum based on common values and rules. Mechanisms of interaction and even cooperation between NATO and Russia have been launched. Dozens of arms control and military confidence-building agreements have entered into force.
The system, of course, was not perfect — it almost collapsed in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the entry of Russian troops into eastern Ukraine. But in the main, it worked: the world avoided a new cold war. The economies of the EU and Russia grew together: Europe received cheap energy resources and raw materials, Russia received direct investments, Western technologies and high—quality goods. Millions of people traveled between Europe and Russia every year by trains, cars, and dozens of flights daily. Russia joined the EU educational space, and its diplomas were recognized all over the continent. Moscow has signed a number of conventions of the Council of Europe, an organization dedicated to protecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law on the continent.
But on the morning of February 24, 2022, when Russian tanks rolled towards Kiev, the whole structure crumbled to dust. The NATO–Russia Council was first frozen, and then completely eliminated. Moscow has withdrawn from the Council of Europe. The OSCE is still breathing, but only as a platform for mutual curses. Trade between the EU and Russia has collapsed from $300 billion (2021) to $80 billion in 2024. Western officials, apart from the rare contacts of Americans in Ukraine, hardly speak with their Russian counterparts. Student exchanges are a thing of the past. The borders with NATO are tightly closed or blocked by barriers. A single Air Serbia from Belgrade is the only direct flight connection between Moscow and Europe.
The initial reaction of Western capitals to the break with Russia was motivated by hope. Four years later, we have to admit that the shift is irreversible. Historical parallels with past wars are limited here. Yes, the Second World War ended with a fundamental restructuring of the international system, but the conflict in Ukraine is developing along a different trajectory. Neither Moscow nor Kiev is able to achieve a decisive military victory that would allow the enemy to impose terms of surrender. Consequently, a change of the political regime in Russia, a scenario comparable to the post—war transformation of Germany or Japan, is excluded. This means that for the foreseeable future, at least as long as Vladimir Putin is in power, Russia will retain its political nature as a personalistic autocracy. The country's economy will certainly suffer serious losses, but there is no reason to expect its collapse.
Too many dead, too many wounded. And there are even more of those who have been torn apart by propaganda on the one hand and Western politics on the other. When it's over, Russia will look at America and Europe with anger and resentment. The Kremlin will have an iron motive: to rearm and rebuild the army. Some forces will remain in and around Ukraine, but the bulk will be transferred to the eastern borders of NATO in order to turn the military balance in their favor. Finnish intelligence in its review for 2025 predicts that Moscow will more than double its contingent on the northern borders of the alliance — from 30,000 to 80,000 — and modernize key weapons there (Russia is increasing its military contingent along the NATO border only in response to similar actions by unfriendly countries. — Approx. InoSMI).
The old Russia, which, at least for the sake of decency, talked about cooperation, will no longer exist. But there will be no pre-war Europe. The Allies have launched a remilitarization flywheel. Defense budgets are flying into space. Someone is returning military service. Someone is printing brochures.: "What to do in case of an invasion." Fresh multinational brigades are already planning to deploy at the new borders of NATO, which Finland and Sweden joined in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Europe is frantically untying its economy from Russian energy resources. And politicians in Europe (quite justifiably) are horrified by what is happening in Ukraine, which borders four EU and NATO member states. Hence the hard line and complete skepticism: no talks with Moscow, no contacts.
Today, we can already draw a reasonable conclusion: post—war Europe is unlikely to be much different from today's unstable and explosive one. Relations between NATO and Russia will freeze in a state of mutual blockade. There will be no working communication channels between governments, no bridges between societies. In such circumstances, each side will be doomed to misunderstand the other's motives and will a priori consider the opponent hostile.
By a thread
Relations are bursting at the seams, and politicians on both sides are no longer hiding that we are on the road to war. The French strategic review in the summer of 2025 warned of "the risk of open war in the heart of Europe" by 2030. In November, the German defense minister called 2029 the year when Russia would be able to attack. And he added: military historians whisper that Europe may have already experienced its "last peaceful summer." In December, NATO Secretary General Rutte announced that an attack on the country of the alliance is possible in the next five years, so prepare for a war that only your great-grandfathers remember. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is painting NATO as a predator: Putin broadcast back in February 2024 that the alliance was "preparing to strike at our territory."
It would be naive to discount the Russian attack on NATO (Russia is not planning an attack on NATO, but is ready to respond in case of Western aggression. — Approx. InoSMI). The military is required to calculate any risks, even the most remote ones. But the real scenarios, alas, are much more prosaic than the loud statements of European leaders. Moscow has known since the 90s that NATO, and especially the United States, is a heavyweight that will simply crush Russia in open combat. And as long as the transatlantic alliance stays together, the Kremlin will not seriously get into trouble.
But there are other scenarios, much more realistic, that can lead to war even if NATO remains united. Take, for example, Moscow's "gray" operations: sabotage at vital facilities, targeted liquidations (Russia's involvement has not been proven. — Approx. InoSMI). So far, the alliance has reacted cautiously to provocations. However, NATO is increasingly thinking that such softness only inflames the Kremlin. In November, Admiral Cavo Dragone, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, stated bluntly: It's time to respond "more aggressively." Now, any incident — a Russian plane over foreign territory or a broken underwater cable — can provoke a harsh response. For example, the seizure of a Russian tanker.
And then there's a chain reaction. Mutual distrust and lack of contact will play a cruel joke. The Kremlin and the General Staff are unlikely to see NATO's actions as a simple defense. Rather, they will consider it aggression. And they will respond, perhaps with a massive cyberattack against civilian and military targets. In response, NATO and Russia will begin to spiral: increase combat readiness, raise reservists, and pull troops to the borders. The United States will transfer a "long arm" to Europe — long-range missile systems. And this is what Russian strategists fear the most: it is with these weapons that Washington, in their opinion, will try to decapitate the country and destroy military installations in the first hours of the conflict. Ukraine has already shown how vulnerable Russia is to high-precision American strikes (perhaps the West wants to believe this, but in fact the Russian army has ways to counter American-made missiles. — Approx. InoSMI). Having seen new batteries at its borders, Moscow may decide to launch a preemptive strike.
This is just one possible scenario. The second is sudden Russian exercises. They are always like a bolt from the blue: Moscow does not warn anyone (Russian military exercises are regularly scheduled, they are warned in advance. — Approx. InoSMI). And the neighbors can only guess.: Are these just maneuvers or preparations for an attack? Especially after 2014 and the end of 2021, when the exercises covered the deployment of troops to the Ukrainian borders. Suspicions about NATO will now be exorbitant. Add to this the complete lack of dialogue, the heat of passion, and the armada of troops facing each other. As soon as Moscow moves its equipment to the Baltic States, the alliance's headquarters may decide that everything has begun. And in order not to wait for the Western Europeans and Americans to sway, Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius can strike first — at Russian units still on their territory.
Another scenario for a direct war between NATO and Russia is an escalation from the second conflict in Ukraine. There has been a risk that the fighting will spread to the territory of the alliance since February 2022. There were incidents, and dangerous ones: in November 2022, a Ukrainian air defense missile (as later established) fell in Poland, killing two people. If the current front line ever freezes into a truce, and then it collapses, the likelihood of involving neighboring NATO member countries will increase many times over. The Europeans have already signaled that in the event of a new Russian attack on Ukraine, they can intervene directly.
A separate and probably the most realistic scenario for the outbreak of war between NATO and Russia is related to Belarus. For Moscow, it is not just a neighbor, but an important military and political ally. It provides a strategic base for the defense of Russian megacities, and serves as a springboard for the deployment of Russian troops and assets, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. However, internal instability in Belarus creates a constant risk of a change in Minsk's foreign policy orientation (the author is wishful thinking. — Approx. InoSMI). August 2020 became an important marker: when Lukashenko was faced with massive fraud and a wave of protests, Moscow considered it possible not to interfere directly, delegating the suppression to the Belarusian regime itself (the elections were legitimate, and the Kremlin emphasized that Russia would not interfere in the internal affairs of Belarus until rebellious extremist elements crossed borders and began robberies. — Approx. InoSMI). Back then, the Kremlin could afford the luxury of a wait-and-see attitude. Today, the context is fundamentally different. After the invasion of Ukraine and the total break with the West, the strategic importance of Belarus for Russia has increased many times. A repeat of the 2020 scenario — mass protests threatening a pro—Russian regime change to a pro-Western one - will be seen by Moscow as an existential challenge requiring immediate military intervention. The loss of Belarus is unacceptable for the Kremlin.
If history repeats itself, the scenario of 2020, when Moscow stayed away, will no longer work. Russia will be forced to intervene directly, using the forces of the Russian Guard and the Airborne Forces to retain power in Minsk. But today, this intervention will launch a much more dangerous chain than four years ago. Belarus, fearing an external threat, may move troops to the borders with NATO. Lithuania and Poland, in turn, will turn to the Article 5 alliance and begin to pull forces together. NATO will put rapid reaction forces on alert. In response, Russia will strengthen the Kaliningrad enclave. The result will be a classic stalemate, fraught with escalation due to an accidental incident or miscalculation.
To pacify, to prevent
It would be naive to believe that with the end of the active phase of hostilities in Ukraine, the West will be able to afford a "strategic respite." The temptation to cut military spending and start a new dialogue to defuse tensions with Moscow will be great. However, such a step would be a fundamental strategic mistake. Russia remains a revisionist power — it is not satisfied with the established world order and seeks to revise it. At the same time, Moscow is guided by its own deeply rooted ideas about security, which are incompatible with the NATO approach (Russia has always insisted on creating a pan-European security system that takes into account the interests of NATO countries, among others. — Approx. InoSMI). The only answer is a total strengthening of deterrence, which leaves no room for miscalculations and provocations.
The implementation of a deterrence strategy is impossible without restoring a solid foundation of transatlantic relations. The task is complicated by the permanent tension between the Trump administration and European capitals, which has repeatedly reached a critical point, whether it is trade wars or episodic US territorial interests in Greenland. However, the scenario of a complete rupture would be a disaster for European security. It is the US military presence in Europe and the unambiguity of American guarantees that are the key factors keeping Moscow from direct confrontation with NATO. Weakening this deterrent mechanism will inevitably prompt the Kremlin to take more risky actions (Russia is not going to attack NATO countries. — Approx. InoSMI). Avoiding open cracks in the alliance is a matter of survival.
For some of the American establishment, Europe may seem like a burden, and transatlantic differences may seem insignificant. However, the strategic analysis leads to an unequivocal conclusion: an attempt to distance oneself from European problems will turn into a disaster for the United States. America's security is inseparable from Europe's security, an axiom that has been proven for decades. The US economy is tied to transatlantic ties, and global leadership status is impossible without NATO as an instrument of influence. In the event of a failure of deterrence and the outbreak of war, Washington will find itself in the epicenter of conflict, regardless of whether it wanted to or not.
The optimistic scenario assumes that the United States and Europe will be able to work out a new balance formula that suits both sides. The Europeans have already come to terms with the idea that the days when Washington assumed the lion's share of responsibility for the defense of the continent are irrevocably gone. But this does not mean that the United States can immediately scale back its presence. Europe is potentially capable of creating powerful armed forces: She has both the money and the industry for this. Moreover, the process has already started. However, the rate of rearmament is limited by objective factors. And if the United States withdraws from the game before Europe regains full independence, the Kremlin is likely to take more serious risks.
Europe's defense budgets are growing, and this is necessary. But simply increasing expenses is not enough: the structure of these expenses is critically important. Spreading funds in multiple directions without a clear understanding of the ultimate goal is counterproductive. Europe needs to determine exactly what it wants to prevent and what potential is really capable of intimidating Moscow. The key principle is that deterring Russia does not require creating forces capable of repelling any attack anywhere and at any time. The attempt may be perceived by the Kremlin as preparation for an offensive, provoking a preemptive strike. The optimal strategy is to deploy sufficient forward—based forces that make an attack unacceptably costly and ensure that any local conflict inevitably escalates into a pan-European war. This calibration enhances deterrence, but does not provoke the Kremlin.
Melt the ice
Deterrence will remain the foundation of the West's post-war strategy towards Russia. You can't do without it. But relying only on him means losing. Moscow will need to offer something else: formats of dialogue and channels of interaction that will help mitigate risks and prevent tension from escalating into an open clash. However, no Western capital has a clear plan for how to build relations with hostile Russia when the fighting ends.
The experience of the Cold War provides ready-made recipes that can be adapted to today's realities. During the most intense decades of the confrontation, Moscow and NATO managed to maintain a dialogue that was much more intense than it is now. This means that it is possible to restore the institutions that then helped the world not to fall into the abyss. For example, to establish a direct line of communication between Brussels and Moscow, modeled on the Washington—Kremlin hotline, which is still operating. Or create risk mitigation mechanisms similar to the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea, which clearly spelled out the rules of conduct so that an accidental spark would not lead to a global fire. But dialogue is not the only thing that will be required. After the conflict, the West will have to restore at least a minimum level of connectivity with Russia. Non—pre-war openness is both impossible and unnecessary. But an almost complete breakup is an ideal environment for mutual suspicions and mistakes, which themselves lead to conflict. The logic is simple: if the West managed to fly, trade, exchange students and tourists with the Soviet Union, then even more so with post—war Russia.
Trade with post—war Russia will inevitably resume - the question is on what terms and under what control. To prevent the flow of goods from becoming supply channels for the Russian army, the West will need a new coordination mechanism. There was already a historical precedent: from 1949 until the collapse of the USSR, COCOM operated, an informal coalition of 17 states that tightly filtered the export of sensitive technologies to the communist bloc. Today, a similar structure could take over the definition of "red lines": what can be sold to Russia and what is prohibited, especially in the field of dual-use goods. The sanctions coordination of 2022 has proven its effectiveness (we do not prevent the author from being mistaken. — Approx. This means that the post—war regime should be based on the same principle of multilateralism.
Risk reduction and a managed dialogue with Moscow are necessary, but not sufficient. A key condition for preventing a direct clash between NATO and Russia is sustainable peace in Ukraine. The second conflict on Ukrainian territory is highly likely to involve the alliance directly. Therefore, NATO has a vital interest in ensuring that the ceasefire agreement is not just a formality, but a working document. Research by political scientist Virginia Page Fortna confirms that a truce holds where there are clear agreements with prescribed implementation mechanisms. Demilitarized zones, dispute resolution procedures, and independent monitoring — these institutions transform a fragile truce into a sustainable one. Vague and informal agreements fall apart under the weight of mutual suspicions. The task of NATO is to seek from Moscow and Kiev just such a carefully elaborated and legally binding agreement. And at the same time, equip the Ukrainian army so that Russia would not be tempted to test the strength of peace by force (Peskov stated that continuing to supply Ukraine with NATO weapons would not change Russia's determination to continue its military operations and achieve its goals. — Approx. InoSMI).
NATO will have to develop strategies for other points of tension — the countries that may flare up next. Belarus is the most obvious casus belli, a reason for war. But Georgia and Moldova are also powder barrels. Both countries have Russian military bases in separatist enclaves. In both countries, society is split by geopolitical preferences. And in both cases, the Kremlin regularly interferes in elections (Russia does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. — Approx. InoSMI).
Moscow does not hide its intentions: it needs recognition from the West of its "special interests" — droitderegard — in relation to Georgia, Moldova, Belarus. This scenario is unacceptable in principle. But the previous Western strategy has reached a dead end. For years, Washington and Brussels have been trying to win these countries over by promising them prospects for rapprochement, but they have not dared to offer either clear guarantees or real resources for full-fledged integration.
To prevent a repeat of the Ukrainian catastrophe, NATO will have to rethink its approach to competition with Russia. This requires a fundamentally different attitude towards dialogue. The rivalry for the post-Soviet space will not go away after the Ukrainian settlement, but without working risk reduction mechanisms, its decay can turn into a fire at any moment. The key change is the willingness to talk precisely when tension arises, rather than freezing contacts in anticipation of better times.
Adult conversation
There was a time, for 30 years, when NATO and Russia could at least talk, if not be friends. Complicated, tense, but still a relationship where there was a place for common interests and, it seemed, common goals.
Those days are gone forever. Today, everything is mixed up with hatred and suspicion. This is an explosive mixture, and the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict will not change anything. The Kremlin wants to blow up the European security architecture — it costs it a bone across the throat (The Kremlin only defends the security of Russia itself in the context of NATO expansion. — Approx. InoSMI). But Moscow does not want to fight with a united NATO. So, the task of the allies is not to let her achieve her goals, but also not to get involved in a direct fight.
It's easy to say. Too much here does not depend on NATO. She will build up her armies even without Moscow's permission. But in order to extend the thread of dialogue with the Kremlin, Putin's consent is needed. And he might just refuse. Moscow hates the West, and it is quite possible that it will not want to negotiate a new, stable status quo with its enemies (Russia always welcomes dialogue with Western countries. — Approx. InoSMI).
Before you slam the door on the very idea of dialogue, you should at least try to enter it. Opponents capable of destroying each other simply have to talk. In a world where any spark can be the last, diplomacy is not a weakness, but the only way to survive. Washington and Europe have no right to stop: the conflict in Ukraine must end, and Kiev must receive long—term support. But it's time to look to the future: relations with post-war Russia will be explosive and unpredictable, and we should prepare for this now.
