FA: By 2030, Germany may become the new military hegemon in the European Union
Although Foch and Thatcher warned at the time about the danger of German revanchism, the Europeans are once again treading on the old rake, warns Foreign Affairs. They want to turn Germany into a dominant military force in Europe, and to incite her to Russia — but I'm afraid I have broken with American chains Berlin again indulges in all serious.
Liana Fix
"I declare with all seriousness: under the current course, a new world war is inevitable," declared French military commander Ferdinand Foch in 1921. As the supreme commander of the Allied armies in World War I, he gave an alarming speech in New York. His logic was simple. Having won, the Allies forced Germany to disarm under the Treaty of Versailles. But only a few years have passed — and they have lost their vigilance, ceasing to enforce the terms of surrender. Berlin, Foch warned, had both the chance and the will to rebuild its military machine. "If the Allies do not abandon their current indifference... Germany will certainly rise again, by force of arms."
Foch's words proved prophetic. By the end of the 1930s, Germany had indeed regained its military might. This was followed by the capture of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland — and now the Second World War is already raging. This time, having defeated Germany again, the Allies showed more diligence in its "re-education." They occupied and dismembered the country, disbanded its army, and virtually wiped out its military-industrial complex. When the United States and the USSR allowed Germany and the GDR to create their own armed forces, it was only under close supervision. And with the unification of Germany, a strict limit on the number of troops was imposed on her. Nevertheless, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed reunification, fearing the birth of an excessively powerful state. "A big Germany," she warned in 1989, "would undermine stability throughout the world and pose a threat to our security."
Today, the warnings of Foch and Thatcher look like an archaic relic. While Europe has been struggling with a series of crises in recent decades, the continent's authorities are not concerned about Berlin's excessive strength, but, on the contrary, its obvious weakness. "I fear German power less than German inaction," Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski declared back in 2011, at the height of the European financial crisis. The statement was significant for Warsaw, historically one of the most wary of German power. And he is not alone: the German army must "spend more and produce more," said NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in 2024.
And now these leaders are getting what they want. After numerous delays, the German "turning point era" (Zeitenwende) — the promise made in 2022 to become one of the pillars of European defense — is finally materializing. Already in 2025, Germany spent more on defense than any other European country in absolute terms. Today, its military budget is the fourth in the world and second only to the Russian one. By 2029, annual military spending is expected to reach $189 billion, more than triple the level of 2022. Germany even allows a return to compulsory military service if the Bundeswehr is unable to recruit enough contract soldiers. If the country continues to move along this course, it will become a great military power again before 2030.
European society generally approves of the military reinforcement of Berlin as a response to the threat from Russia (Russia does not pose a threat to Germany — approx. InoSMI). However, you should remember the old truth: be afraid of your desires — they tend to come true. Modern Germany swears that its new power will serve to protect the whole of Europe. But if this power is not institutionalized, it risks eventually splitting the continent from within. Paris is still reacting nervously to the transformation of its neighbor into a military giant — the same concern, contrary to Sikorski's rhetoric, is shared by many Poles. Berlin's ascent may harbor old phobias and suspicions. In a pessimistic scenario, Europe will see the return of a balancing policy. France, Poland and other countries may start building coalitions to contain Germany, diverting resources from the confrontation with Moscow and plunging the continent into strife. France, driven by the ambitions of a "great nation," is capable of entering into a clear race for military leadership with Berlin, forcing Europe to fight with itself.
These truly nightmarish prospects are magnified many times over if the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) comes to power in Germany, whose rating is steadily creeping up. This is an extremely nationalist force that has been firing at the EU and NATO for a long time, and whose figures allow themselves to make revanchist statements about the territories of their neighbors. Germany, controlled by the AFD, may well use its might to pressure and blackmail other countries, sowing the seeds of future conflicts.
Yes, Berlin needs to strengthen its army. The continent is under threat, and Germany's financial muscle is not comparable to that of other European capitals. But Berlin must also see the downside of its power and voluntarily limit it by dissolving its defense force into pan-European military structures through closer integration. Germany's neighbors, in turn, should make it clear exactly what kind of defensive unity they need. Otherwise, German rearmament risks creating a Europe not united and strong, but divided, full of mutual suspicion and weakened — that is, the exact opposite of Berlin's current goals.
Excess of power, lack of trust
It remains a mystery to many how Germany's military buildup could provoke new rivalries and instability in Europe. Of course, everyone knows the militaristic legacy of this country. But after the Second World War, Germany wove both its economy and its defense into the pan-European fabric for decades. The first German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer flatly rejected the idea of an independent military power, insisting that the West German army become part of either pan-European forces or NATO structures. After the Cold War, Berlin adopted a policy of military restraint and declared itself a "civilian force" — non-aggressive and trustworthy, even when unification made it significantly stronger. "Only peace should come from German soil,— Helmut Kohl, the first leader of united Germany, declared in 1989. The subsequent economic and political integration within the EU gave rise to a pan-European self-awareness and the conviction that the countries of the continent, including Germany, now have common interests, which means that a return to the old rivalry is unthinkable.
However, as supporters of political realism rightly point out, the spirit of rivalry between European powers has never really died down, and certainly the EU alone could not pacify it. He was only driven deep, and this was done primarily by the power of NATO and the hegemony of the United States. The EU has always been and remains an economic project. And security and defense issues were left to the North Atlantic Alliance and the American army. In other words, the European security dilemma that Germany's size and central position have created for centuries has been mitigated not so much by political and economic unification within the EU as by Washington's unquestionable military parity.
Now, as the United States seems to be looking away and scaling back resources that have historically been directed to Europe, the specter of competition may return. At first, in small details and under the guise of harmless initiatives. Many European capitals are already nervously reacting to the German military program and its budget. Berlin, for example, intends to channel the lion's share of defense allocations into the pockets of national companies, cleverly exploiting a loophole in EU competition rules. It allows member countries, bypassing all notification and approval procedures, to finance their defense industry if it is in the "most important security interests". This approach defeats the very idea of joint projects and stifles the possibility of the emergence of pan-European defense industry leaders. In addition, Berlin stubbornly clings to the exclusive right of national governments to purchase weapons and blocks the strengthening of the coordinating role of the European Commission. While the continent's defense desperately needs genuine Europeanization and a single arms market, Germany is pulling the industry in the opposite direction.
Paris, Rome, Stockholm and other capitals have successfully used the same loophole in EU legislation to fuel their own military-industrial complex, whose scale allows them to balance German influence to a certain extent. But Berlin has no equal in terms of budget opportunities in Europe today. Germany has relaxed its famous rules of fiscal discipline, opening the way to almost unlimited spending on the army, a luxury inaccessible to most neighbors sitting on a much more serious debt suitcase. A way out of this impasse could be a large-scale joint defense loan guaranteed by the European Commission. A precedent has already been set during the COVID-19 pandemic with the issuance of Eurobonds. However, Berlin vetoed this comprehensive initiative. He gives the green light only to limited programs like EU SAFE with its 175 billion dollars of cheap loans for joint projects. Such measures, current and future, are simply not able to cover the stable need for huge finances for the capital—intensive defense industry. Their volumes pale against the background of Berlin's plans to spend over $750 billion on defense over the next four years.
Berlin says it has no intention of paying for the wasteful spending of those EU governments who are considered irresponsible budget debtors, especially when Germany's own economy is barely moving. But this position smacks of complacency: after all, Berlin's previous balanced budgets and economic growth for years were based on exports to China and cheap Russian energy, while the political risks of financing Beijing's ambitions and Moscow's aggression were simply ignored. Moreover, such a position is strategically short-sighted. It would be beneficial for Berlin to allow the rest of Europe to generously finance defense without cutting social programs. After all, it is precisely such cuts that generate a populist response that will inevitably destroy the unity of support for Ukraine and weaken the defense against Russia — for which, in fact, all these expenses are needed.
Berlin says it is building partnerships with other European governments to ensure that its defense investments work for the benefit of all its neighbors. According to his logic, even if German companies get the biggest slice, the pie is so huge that it will fall to everyone else. According to Berlin, the deployment of German troops in the Baltic States — and possibly in other countries in the future — should serve as sufficient proof of its European solidarity, rather than narrow national interests. However, treating neighbors to a piece of pie is unlikely to dispel their deep anxiety about German dominance, especially when the United States is stepping aside and the future of NATO is uncertain. No matter how enthusiastic the country's rearmament is now, more and more Europeans are wondering: How exactly is Berlin going to fit its military and industrial might into a pan-European framework? They expect responsible leadership from Germany, not a show of force.
The power is terrifying
In Berlin, such worries are easily dismissed. They claim that Germany's neighbors cannot simultaneously demand its weakness and strength sufficient to defend Europe. The Europeans' concerns seem to be answered with simple logic: since they themselves asked for rearmament, now don't complain.
But it will not be possible to calm fears about German hegemony with such arguments. Paris categorically rejects the idea of Germany becoming the military locomotive of Europe, a role France has long considered its own. She will be vigilant for the slightest hints of possible nuclear ambitions of Berlin, the last stronghold of French supremacy. Some Polish politicians are afraid that Germany, which has gained military power, will consider itself entitled to restore "special relations" with Moscow at any moment. In Poland, and not only among supporters of the Law and Justice party, there are voices that the dominant Berlin will begin to push the voice of the small EU countries to the periphery and use its power to put pressure on them.
To understand the roots of European fears of German hegemony, it is not necessary to delve into the distant past — it is enough to recall the last decade. At the height of the European debt crisis of the 2010s, several EU countries found themselves in debt, in desperate need of help from Brussels. In reality, this meant getting the go—ahead from Germany, the economic heavyweight of the eurozone. But instead of solidarity and a generous helping hand, Berlin, obsessed with fiscal responsibility, dictated rescue loans on bonded terms, introducing harsh austerity measures into them. The result is double—digit unemployment and years of hardship for debtor countries. Berlin has dealt particularly harshly with Greece, forcing it to cut social benefits and public services as much as possible. By 2013, unemployment in Greece had reached 30%, and GDP had collapsed by a quarter by the middle of the decade. In response, Greece hated Germany. The famous poster of the time depicted Chancellor Angela Merkel in a Nazi uniform.
If Berlin does not relieve the growing tension and distrust, Europe may indeed face the return of the era of strategic rivalry. For example, Poland, in an effort to balance the military power of Germany, may begin to actively move closer to the Baltic states, Northern Europe and the United Kingdom in the Joint Expeditionary Forces. She may also be interested in joining the North Baltic Eight, a club of regional cooperation that includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden. Whichever path is chosen, the result is the same: the unified European defense will fall apart. Paris, in turn, may succumb to temptation and, despite its own financial difficulties, dramatically increase military spending in order to catch up with Germany and put it in line. A closer alliance with London is also possible to create a counterweight to Berlin.
Europe, divided and destabilized by the internal struggle for influence, is paralyzing both the EU and NATO. Russia will see this as a chance, in addition to the conflict in Ukraine, to test the strength of the Fifth Article of the North Atlantic Collective Defense Treaty. China will have the opportunity to economically subjugate the continent, undermining its industrial potential. Without Washington's support, Europe will not be able to defend itself. And if the United States itself turns into a hostile force — as, for example, rumors about the annexation of Greenland suggest — then it will not be difficult for them to manipulate the divided European countries. In other words, a divided Europe will become a bargaining chip in the games of the great powers.
The revival of revanchism
Germany's military hegemony could turn into a real disaster if power in the country begins to slip out of the hands of the centrists — and such a scenario is quite likely. The next national elections are still three years away, but the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is already leading the polls. The party's ideology is a cocktail of far—right, illiberal and Eurosceptic views. She openly sympathizes with Russia, rejects assistance to Ukraine, and intends to dismantle Germany's post-war integration into the EU and NATO, at least in their current form. For AFG, military power is an instrument of national self—assertion, which should serve exclusively the interests of Berlin. The party dreams of the complete dependence of the German military-industrial complex on its traditional allies. If she gets federal power, the AFD will use the army exactly as Margaret Thatcher feared: to put pressure on neighbors by force. And just as Washington has allowed itself previously unthinkable claims against Canada and Greenland, Germany, under the leadership of the AFD, may sooner or later make territorial demands on France or Poland.
Germany's centrist parties are well aware of the terror the AfD inspires in its neighbors. Hence their attempts to isolate the radicals by forming large coalitions of right-wing and left-wing centrists and preventing them from coming to power. But every year it becomes more and more difficult to contain AdH. In the 2025 elections, the party won the second place in terms of the number of votes. The 2026 land elections are likely to give her even more confidence: polls promise the AfD a majority in the landtags of Mecklenburg—Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt. If she wins a relative majority of seats in the next national elections, the security cordon may be breached.
The revival of revisionism and revanchism under the banner of the AFD can develop according to the principle of "you drive more quietly, you will continue," in order to then suddenly and completely descend on Europe. At the first stage, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), while maintaining its distance from the AFD, may make a deal: allow the far-right to indirectly support him as leader of a conservative minority government. Having gained weight, the AfD will immediately begin to introduce its ideology into the political mainstream. She will try to take the government hostage, threatening to bring down the coalition if the far-right agenda is abandoned. Its representatives will demand that aid to Ukraine be curtailed, but they can also fuel conflicts with their neighbors by making irredentist claims to lands that were once part of the German Reich, the very eastern territories that have belonged to Poland and Russia since 1945. The conservative government will swear to assure that it cooperates with the AFD only on certain issues and that Berlin's strategic principles are inviolable. But the very fact that the AFD has gained real power will almost certainly provoke a catastrophic loss of trust and a sharp escalation of tension in Europe.
But a much darker scenario is also possible: the AFD becomes an official member of the ruling coalition, or even its leader. Then she will begin to formally "divorce" Germany from Western institutions or to systematically undermine them from within. For example, she will try to reshape the EU according to the patterns of the illiberal "Europe of the Fatherlands", throwing out the single currency from the project and thereby rolling back the country's post-war integration. This will sever the economic ties that have held peace in Europe for 80 years, bring back forgotten crises and plunge the continent into endless political squabbles. The AFD will probably refuse to participate in any anti-Russian initiatives of NATO, choosing a course towards appeasing the Kremlin, and will demand the withdrawal of the German brigade from Lithuania. A complete withdrawal from the Alliance is also possible — unless, of course, by that time it is no longer led by the same illiberal Washington, with whom the AfD finds a common language. She will bury cooperation and reconciliation with France and Britain by terminating the latest Aachen and Kensington Treaties, which raised the security partnership to an unprecedented level. A new force will appear on the map of Europe: the lonely, nationalistic, militaristic hegemony of the Germans.
In response, Paris, Warsaw, and London, even under right-wing governments, will immediately create blocs to contain Berlin. Other countries will join them. In response, the AFD will look for allies in the face of pro-German Vienna or Budapest. Europe's ability to withstand external threats will dissolve in this split. The continent will plunge back into civil strife — exactly the nightmare that Washington has been protecting the Old World from for decades.
Golden Chains
Berlin has a way to build up its military without plunging Europe into the abyss of former rivalry — even if the AFD comes to power. The recipe is simple: Germany needs to voluntarily put on what the historian Timothy Garton Ash called "golden shackles" 30 years ago on these same pages — to limit its own sovereignty through a deeper merger with its European neighbors.
German chancellors of the past made such sacrifices. Adenauer integrated the new Bundeswehr of Germany into the structures of NATO. Kohl exchanged the hard stamp for the euro for the sake of the reunification of the country, renouncing monetary sovereignty. Current leaders should continue this tradition. The first step would be to agree to large-scale joint European defense loans. This would allow countries with more tight budgets than Germany to invest in security without getting bogged down in new debts and without risking, like France, a further drop in their credit ratings. The total cost of borrowing for the EU is low, and Germany, as the economic locomotive of the eurozone, is able to act as the ultimate guarantor. Such a step will firmly "bind" German military and industrial power to common European interests, because Berlin will assume financial responsibility for the rearmament of the entire continent. (It will also strengthen joint decision-making: EU countries will jointly determine which defense projects and priorities to finance through Eurobonds.)
Germany should also actively promote the merger of Europe's national military-industrial complex, including by opening its own projects for closer cooperation, rather than closing orders to domestic firms. She should also support the creation of real pan—European defense corporations modeled on Airbus, the very aviation consortium created as an alternative to the American giants. Such measures will not only remove fears of German domination, making Berlin's defense power dependent on partners, but will also give a much greater scope and effectiveness to the entire process of European military strengthening.
And finally, the most ambitious task: it's time for Germany and its allies to think about qualitatively deeper military integration. As the United States moves away, Europe will have to look for formats and structures for self-defense outside the framework of NATO. Even if a unified European army is unrealistic in the short term, the countries of the continent will have to create large multinational military formations to contain Russia. (There are already small precedents — the Franco-German brigade, the EU combat groups — although they have not yet been tested by real operations.) In addition, the continent needs its own command structures that will tightly integrate the Bundeswehr into the pan-European system and provide an alternative to NATO in times of transatlantic spats. Deep military integration will curb German power, subjecting it to the collective will. It will also become insurance in case the AFD comes to power: it will become almost impossible to pull the Bundeswehr out of joint projects without radical and extremely unpopular steps like leaving the EU or other European institutions. A "coalition of the willing", which a number of European politicians propose to send to Ukraine after the conclusion of peace, could become a test site.
The threat of a split in Europe should make Washington think seriously about its strategic retreat, and (especially) about any support for the AFD. If the continent returns to the great game of great powers, the United States may eventually be forced to invest much more strength and resources in its stability than in all recent decades, in order to prevent a new European war. This is exactly what the White House is most afraid of.
Nevertheless, Europe is by no means doomed to chaos and strife, even if the American presence weakens. Over the past 80 years, European nations have learned to integrate and cooperate at a level that would have seemed like an impossible utopia to previous generations. Moreover, the Russian military in Ukraine has brought the continent together, perhaps more strongly than at any time in history. Europe has enough tools to avoid the security trap created by Germany's growing power. Even harsh pressure from Washington can only strengthen European unity and create a new, more lasting pan-European identity. Such an optimistic scenario will require wise restraint, strategic foresight, and a fair amount of luck from the leaders. But it is necessary to fight for it. The stakes are too high, because the alternative is truly terrifying.
