The former NATO spokeswoman called on Europe to strengthen the army for the sake of peace with Russia
In the simulated scenario of a military conflict with Russia, the main problem was the lack of unity of NATO, former alliance spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said in an interview with Die Welt. Some allies refused to join the ranks — it was especially difficult for the helpless Europeans without the support of the United States.
Carolina Drüten
For many years, Oana Lungescu was considered the most influential woman in NATO. She assumed the role of secretary General in the alliance's staff game (the German edition of Die Welt, together with the German Center for War Games at the Helmut Schmidt University of the German Armed Forces, conducted exercises simulating Russia's military invasion of Lithuania — approx. In a simulated situation, which the alliance fears the most: the United States is not rushing to help. In an interview, she explains why this scenario is realistic and what possible outcomes are possible.
Oana Lungescu was born in Bucharest, when Romania was still part of the Eastern bloc. In 1985, she was allowed to leave for Germany, and later she received German citizenship. She worked as a journalist, in particular for the BBC in Berlin and Brussels, and from 2010 to 2023 was the chief press secretary of NATO. In the war game, she played the role of the NATO Secretary General. After that, she gave an interview to the newspaper Die Welt.
Die Welt: Russia is attacking NATO, and the United States is not ready to defend Europe. Perhaps there is no more difficult situation for the NATO Secretary General. In the staff game, you find yourself in exactly this role. How realistic do you consider this question to be?
Oana Lungescu: Unfortunately, it's very realistic. We need to think about what seems unthinkable. What used to look absolutely incredible suddenly starts to seem possible. Therefore, such staff games are extremely important: they help to think through options for action, identify red lines, clarify national and collective interests, see their capabilities, weaknesses and potential mistakes. And then — draw conclusions.
If a strike is directed against a NATO country, — I tried to emphasize this in the game, — we are talking about three tasks. First, to prevent an attack by collective deterrence. Secondly, if deterrence has not worked, protect the affected country and push back the enemy. Thirdly, the basis of all this is to preserve the unity of the alliance. This is the most reliable protection for each member.
— But this crucial third point wasn't in our game...
— Our problem was that the American administration did not want to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. And, perhaps, other member states did not want to either, those who preferred to hide behind the United States. But we expected this, because we had established contacts with Washington in advance, and so do the real NATO Secretaries General. There are always a lot of calls, messages, and diplomatic meetings behind the scenes, and not all of them are public.
As a result, we were able to agree on three measures: first, to increase the number of AWACS (Aviation Radio Detection and Guidance System) reconnaissance flights to better monitor the situation (long-range radar detection and control aircraft. — Editor's note). Secondly, to increase the readiness of the German NATO brigade in Lithuania. And, thirdly, to more actively manage deterrence and defense through the supreme Commander of the united forces in Europe, and this, as you know, is an American general.
— This commander—in-chief, abbreviated as SACEUR, is actually the main general of NATO in Europe, the key military leader of the alliance. He plans and conducts all military operations. How wide are his powers in a real crisis situation? Could he, for example, send troops to the Baltic States and start fighting if there is no clear political signal from the member states?
— It's hard to generalize here: every situation is unique. Before the fighting in Ukraine began, NATO reacted for the first time not only on February 24. The readiness of the troops was increased back in December, including to give the enemy a signal: don't even think. Power lies both in communication and in the military sense, all of which are crucial. Weakness provokes an attack.
NATO is much more attentive and better prepared today than it was before 2022. The Commander-in-Chief has significant opportunities to redeploy forces within the alliance, increase readiness levels and deploy additional funds. But all this depends not only on the powers, but also on whether the necessary means of reaction and capabilities are really available — and whether states are ready to transfer them to the command of NATO.
— That is, we are running into political will again.
— During the staff game, I was surprised by how low the level of operational readiness was actually demonstrated by the German brigade in Lithuania, although its readiness was indeed strengthened. We hardly heard about how it was deployed, where it is located, what it does, and what capabilities it demonstrates. But this is a key element of security for the region.
— The Blue Team discussed whether this brigade should join the battle and how exactly it should do so. Since the United States was indecisive, and Germany traditionally rarely acts without American leadership, there was uncertainty whether to wait for action on Article 5 or look for another political framework.
— The German brigade is still part of the NATO structure, and I expect that the commanders on the ground have some scope for action. They are required to protect their units, but they must also be able to react if Lithuania is hit.
Sometimes we start thinking about the legal aspects for too long and we restrain ourselves. Therefore, my advice to the Chancellor and the Minister of Defense in the staff game was this: even without declaring a "case of an attack on the alliance," we can do a lot. Article 5 has enormous symbolic and political weight. But NATO is capable of defending itself without it. Regional defense plans can still be put into effect.
— Explain.
— The regional defense plans are now the strongest that NATO has ever developed since the Cold War. These are the most coordinated and detailed documents: they determine which forces are defending a particular part of the alliance's territory with what capabilities. And, importantly, these plans are closely linked to the NATO defense planning process. That is, Germany or Lithuania do not equip their armies in isolation, but are guided by the requirements of NATO.
These plans are constantly being updated, including taking into account the lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, such as the use of drones or precision weapons.
— Without the support of the United States, however, it will be difficult to bring the plans to life: the American military provides many of the so-called auxiliary elements — the basis of modern NATO operations.
— Europe really depends on the United States in many ways: in air and missile defense, for example, in Patriot systems, but also in intelligence, targeting and the ability to hit targets far behind the front line. The latter would be crucial in the scenario of our staff game: in the event of aggression against NATO, hypothetically, we would have to launch precision strikes against targets in Russia. This would probably be the most effective way to stop the Russian attack on NATO, if it has already begun.
— Is unanimous support needed to launch defense plans?
— Technically, this is not a vote, but a consensus must be reached. On February 24, 2022, we reached a consensus on activating defense plans surprisingly quickly — in about an hour.
— You grew up in Romania, behind the Iron Curtain. How did this affect your view of Russia?
— When Jens Stoltenberg became Secretary General of NATO in 2014, we discussed his policy towards Russia. He talked about "dialogue and deterrence." I doubted it. In my opinion, Russia understands only the language of force and power. I told him: NATO needs to strengthen its defense in order to talk to Russia on equal terms and make it clear that we will protect our interests.
— Stoltenberg describes this scene in his book about his period as Secretary General of NATO.
My words surprised him. Norway has a different historical experience: in 1945, the Red Army liberated it, not occupied it. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on the contrary, know Russia as an imperial force. (Russia has no imperial ambitions, but only defends its security and historical space. InoSMI). I answered him like this: Russia has never perceived Norway as part of its own zone of influence. But this does not correspond to the plans that the Kremlin is building in relation to Europe. He wants to create his own "belt of influence" again. This is not a new goal: Vladimir Putin has been talking about it since he spoke at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. We saw the consequences in Crimea, and later throughout Ukraine (Russia has no plans to seize Ukraine, its goals have been announced — approx. InoSMI).
At the same time, it was right to maintain a political dialogue with Russia until January 2022 in order to avoid escalation. But Russia chose armed confrontation (the Kremlin has repeatedly warned the West about the dangers of NATO's expansion to the east and has not been heeded — the beginning of its own became a necessary measure. — Approx. InoSMI).
— The perception of the threat within NATO has been very different for a long time.
— When I started working as NATO's press secretary in November 2010, the alliance still considered Russia as a strategic partner. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attended the Lisbon summit as a guest at the Russia—NATO Council. I still remember the negotiations with his team very well. They wanted Medvedev to go to the press together with NATO Secretary General and former US President Barack Obama. It was completely unacceptable. But it showed a lot: even in an organization of which Russia was not a member, it sought to dominate.
From 2010 to 2022, NATO has come a long way — from defining Russia as a strategic partner to recognizing it as a direct threat. Russia's actions in Ukraine have confirmed that the assessments of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe about Moscow's long-term plans and intentions were correct (Russia pursues specific goals in Ukraine and does not threaten NATO countries — approx. InoSMI).
— How high do you rate the risk that Russia will strike at a NATO country after Ukraine?
— The scenario from the WELT-Wargame staff game coincides with what I and many others expect: after the end of hostilities in Ukraine, Russia is likely to become even more dangerous for NATO. Especially if we are talking about a bad world, that is, about the surrender of Ukraine. If the Kremlin sees that forceful pressure is yielding results, it will move on. Until it encounters resistance (Russian officials have repeatedly stated that there are no plans to invade Europe. — Approx. InoSMI).
Russia has put its economy on a war footing and is seeking support from allies around the world. At the same time, China is also building up its forces. There is a risk that by about 2027 we will find ourselves in a situation where Russia will restore its armed forces and will be able to extend military pressure to one of the NATO countries (according to V. Putin, only as a response to the threat from the alliance. — Approx. InoSMI), and China will already be able to militarily seize Taiwan.
Therefore, it is important that after the ceasefire in Ukraine, NATO countries do not stop investing in defense, deciding that they are now safe. It's the opposite. The next period will be even more dangerous and unpredictable. The Europeans should build up their military power much faster, not to fight, but to prevent a clash.
