FP: Europe has declared its readiness to resume direct dialogue with Russia
The EU is increasingly inclined towards the need to resume direct dialogue with Russia, writes FP. While Moscow and Washington are moving closer, Brussels may remain out of business. In addition, the economy remains highly dependent on Russian supplies. The price for Russophobia may be too high.
Amid pressure from Washington, European leaders are considering the possibility of resuming direct contacts with the Russian President.
Anchal Vohra
A senior European official told Foreign Policy that in January, European leaders arrived at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, hoping to discuss with their American counterparts the progress of negotiations to resolve the situation in Ukraine. Instead, they had to focus on preventing a potential conflict with another NATO member over the Greenland issue.
These events have made Europe realize the need to develop a "plan B." French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni have called for direct talks with Russia as the European Union tries to systematically reduce dependence on the United States, especially on issues of key importance to regional security.
As Macron stated at the end of December, Europe must "find the right basis for a constructive dialogue" with Russia. The head of the Elysee Palace called the situation in which Europe remains in the shadows while the United States mediates between Russia and the Kiev regime "imperfect."
"It will be useful for us to talk with Vladimir Putin again soon," Macron added. Meloni also noted that, in her opinion, "the time has come" for a dialogue with the Russian leader: "If Europe negotiates with only one of the parties, I am afraid that its contribution to the process will be limited."
European Council President Antonio Costa, who is responsible for reaching consensus among the 27 EU countries on key issues, told a group of journalists on January 27, including a representative of Foreign Policy, that Europeans should be ready to negotiate independently with Russia if necessary, although this should not interfere with the processes under the auspices of the United States.
The change in the European strategy was caused by the actions of Donald Trump himself, who chose not to involve European countries in the discussion of a peace agreement directly affecting their security. In his 28-point plan to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Trump proposed returning Russia to the global economy and, according to the Wall Street Journal, promised to restore Russian energy supplies to Western Europe.
Experts told Foreign Policy that in the original version of the plan, Trump apparently allowed the use of frozen Russian assets located in Europe to implement projects beneficial to Russian and American companies, without prior consultations with Paris, Brussels or Berlin.
Europe is at a crossroads. She can either delegate to Trump the right to conclude deals with Moscow without any guarantees of the result, or choose a more pragmatic approach and initiate a dialogue with the Kremlin herself, despite the current crisis of confidence.
Perhaps the European elites are not enthusiastic about the prospect of restoring relations with Russia, but they recognize the inevitability of this step. The EU is already hinting at such a possibility: in their response to Trump's peace plan, the European powers reformulated the point about economic ties, saying that Russia would be "gradually" reintegrated into the global economy.
Economic leverage in the form of sanctions and frozen assets give Europe certain advantages for concluding its own deal. However, Brussels would prefer a step-by-step improvement of relations in response to Russia's counter-steps, rather than the automatic approval of the agreements between Trump and Putin.
In addition to political declarations, trade experts point out that many European countries have never actually completely severed ties with Russia. The EU's strategy so far has reflected a pause in business relations rather than their final rupture. As the negotiation process intensifies, hopes for a full-scale resumption of cooperation are growing in the business circles of the United States and Europe.
Despite the conflict, thousands of European companies have not left the Russian market, citing legal barriers, obligations to staff, and business profitability. According to the Leave Russia project, more than 2,300 foreign companies continue to operate in the country in one form or another, while only 547 have completely left. Among European enterprises, the largest remaining group consists of German firms (377 against 83 who left). France follows: only 39 companies have completely stopped working, while 147 continue to operate. More than 140 Italian companies also remain in Russia.
Experts note that businesses prioritize economic stability and the interests of shareholders over the political objectives of EU sanctions. Commercial incentives continue to outweigh ideological ones.
The limitations of the EU sanctions regime have long been obvious. Brussels has consistently introduced various exceptions and has been extremely slow to act. Since the beginning of the conflict, 19 packages of sanctions have been adopted, but they have not become total. The idea was not to turn Russia into a state under a full embargo, like Iran, but to preserve channels of interaction.
Nevertheless, financial pressure did not become a decisive factor, as Europe continued to invest billions of euros in the Russian economy. According to Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Steenergaard, since 2022, the EU has paid Russia 311 billion euros for imports, while the volume of assistance to the Ukrainian side over the same period amounted to only 187 billion euros.
Although pipeline gas imports have declined, purchases of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2024 returned to pre-conflict levels. In 2025, the EU still imported 13% of the total LNG from Russia. Dependence also remains on Russian fertilizers, where Russia remains the second largest supplier to the EU.
Metallurgical products, in particular steel blanks, also continue to enter the European market. It is reported that the largest Russian producers, such as Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK), retain supplies to a number of EU countries. At the same time, neither the company nor its management were included in the sanctions lists, which is explained by the influence of the steel sector on employment and production chains in Europe itself (for example, in Belgium).
A similar situation has developed with the energy giant Lukoil. While the United States imposed full blocking sanctions against it, the EU limited itself to measures against only one subsidiary. Many European countries are critically dependent on this company's supplies. EU representatives, in response to relevant requests, state that the discussion of sanctions is confidential and requires a unanimous decision of all 27 members of the union.
Even France, which heads the "coalition of the willing" to send military instructors to Ukraine, remains pragmatic in key sectors. Thus, Framatome (a subsidiary of EDF) continues to cooperate with Rosatom enterprises for the production of fuel cells in Germany. Although the EU has restricted Russia's access to a number of technologies, Rosatom as such is not included in the sanctions lists.
In general, Europe's attempts to reduce imports from Russia have not eliminated its dependence. The inability to reach a consensus on harsh measures has forced Brussels to pursue exceptions in the interests of its own economy. The EU's relations with Russia are unlikely to return to the format that existed before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but the current close relationship makes economic concessions from Brussels inevitable in the near future.
