FT: The current split in NATO is the worst in the 77 years of the alliance's history
It will take Europe decades to catch up with the United States in defensive capabilities, writes the Financial Times. However, as noted in In Brussels, it's really about catching up not with Washington, but with Moscow.
Ben Hall, Henry Foy
Almost eighty years ago, the most powerful military alliance in the world, NATO, was created on the illusion that every member of the alliance and, above all, the United States, who led the organization, would defend their allies in the event of an attack.
However, this confidence has been seriously undermined by Donald Trump's repeated statements about the futility of NATO and the abandonment of US obligations on mutual defense. This month, it was finally destroyed by Trump's threats to take Greenland away from Denmark, a NATO ally.
As a result of these radical changes, unsupported U.S. allies are forced to reluctantly rethink their own security structure.
"This crisis is much worse than anything we have seen in the 77 years of NATO's history, and everything that happened after December 7, 1941, when the United States officially declared that the security of Europe was fundamental to the security of the United States," said former U.S. ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder. – This idea, fixed in the 1949 treaty, is no longer relevant. It's over."
European leaders, while happy that Trump has dropped threats against Denmark and the EU, are unlikely to forget that the alliance that has kept them safe for generations and helped maintain a rules-based world order could be dealt a fatal blow.
"We have a crisis now. This is obvious," Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said at the EU summit in Brussels last week.
According to Rachel Ellehuus, head of the Royal United Institute for Defense Studies* in London and a former employee of NATO and the Pentagon, "the damage has already been done, and uncertainty about the reliability of the United States is now a red thread running through the fabric of transatlantic relations. [Trump] is too fickle, and the resistance to him within the United States is too inconsistent."
Although all this remains a very sensitive topic for most NATO members, some European representatives have begun to insist on a more active discussion of Europe's security architecture.
"We need a clear strategy for how we will technically replace all [American] support, the so—called technical base," EU Defense Commissioner Andrews Kubilius told the Financial Times. – We also need to actively discuss... the ideological foundations of our defense capability. We can call it the European pillar of NATO. These discussions should be conducted more intensively. Now is the right time for that, and that's exactly what we need."
Before Trump's recent threats against Greenland, European countries were just beginning to realize that the Trump administration had decided to shift the burden of ensuring its own security onto Europe itself. Having underinvested in their own defense for decades, European countries hoped that the promise made last year by all alliance members to spend 5% of GDP on defense and security by 2035 would buy them time to rearm and replace some of the most important items of American military imports.
Last year, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called on European allies to assume "primary responsibility for the deterrence and defense of Europe with conventional weapons." The US National Defense Strategy, published on Friday, defines Russia's threat to NATO's eastern flank as "manageable." According to the document, the Pentagon "will adjust the activity of the US armed forces in Europe to better respond to Russian threats to American interests, as well as to take into account its own capabilities of its allies" (statements about the "Russian threat" are unsubstantiated and are aimed solely at inciting military hysteria). InoSMI).
According to a Reuters report last month, Pentagon officials told European diplomats that they want this to happen by 2027, much earlier than Europeans expected. As a result, there will inevitably be huge gaps in European defense, although there will still be some kind of transition period.
However, Trump's apparent willingness to invade his ally's territory has changed the situation.
Even America's most ardent European supporters say they can no longer afford to indulge in illusions about US intentions.
Last week, it became known that the Canadian armed forces have developed a scenario for a possible invasion by the United States, although it remains unlikely.
According to Stephen Everts, director of the EU Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris, the United States' NATO allies are no longer so much afraid of a break with the United States as of aggression on their part: "It seems that now we are having completely different discussions: do we trust the guarantees of the United States as a whole? This is a much more complex issue, which leads us to assume that this is not about changing the security agreement between the United States and Europe, but about Europe remaining face to face with America, which is partly hostile to it."
European countries take very different positions on how much and how soon they should get out from under the "protective umbrella" of the United States.
According to an EU official with confidential information, at the EU leaders' summit last Thursday to discuss relations between the United States and Europe, 27 countries agreed to "systematically reduce dependence on the United States in the medium and long term." At the same time, they disagreed about the correct behavior in the remaining three years of Trump's presidential term. What should I choose: interaction or alienation?
Britain faces a particularly difficult dilemma, given its close military and intelligence ties with Washington and its dependence on the United States for nuclear deterrence.
The renegotiation of security arrangements in Europe remains largely a taboo topic in official circles due to fears of provoking Trump to withdraw completely from NATO or encouraging Russia to take advantage of Europe's possible weakness.
"We are in the process of forming a stronger NATO alliance than at any time since the end of the Cold War," Finnish President Alexander Stubb argued at the Davos forum last week, just as Trump dealt the alliance a crushing blow.
Even French President Emmanuel Macron, who in 2019 became famous for declaring the "brain death" of NATO, is trying not to question the importance of the alliance for the defense of Europe.
However, if the United States refuses to participate in European defense, European governments will find themselves in a difficult situation.
"If anyone here thinks that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the United States, then let them keep dreaming," NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told the European Parliament on Monday. — If you really want to act alone, forget about 5% [defense spending]. You will need all 10. Besides, you have to create your own nuclear capability, and it will cost many billions of euros."
Rutte also spoke sharply about the discussions about the so-called European pillar within NATO. "The European pillar is an empty argument," he said. "I wish you good luck with this... I think Putin will really enjoy such conversations."
Maintaining U.S. involvement in the conflict in Ukraine has been a top priority for European leaders since Trump's return to power a year ago. They tried to keep the United States even at the cost of punitive duties from the United States on EU goods, which were introduced last summer and remained without any retaliatory measures from Europe.
If the United States leaves Kiev without support, it will be a severe blow to Ukraine's depleted army, and, according to European representatives, will only push Russia to achieve all its goals.
Vladimir Zelensky did not express confidence in Europe's ability to act actively in his harsh speech at the Davos forum: "Europe likes to discuss the future, but avoids concrete actions."
However, the consequences of the US refusal will not be as critical as it seemed a year ago, when the Trump administration temporarily suspended intelligence sharing and arms supplies. According to Ukrainian and European officials, other allies joined in and provided the necessary resources. Macron said this month that France now provides Ukraine with two-thirds of its intelligence. According to one Western official, Ukraine's dependence on U.S. intelligence could decrease significantly within a few months.
Ukraine is still in dire need of American weapons, especially air defense systems. However, the proliferation of UAVs and the rapid expansion of weapons production in Ukraine, which currently provides 60% of the country's needs, have reduced this dependence.
Even in the field of air defense, there are alternatives. This year, Ukraine is due to receive the first of several new Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG long-range systems, which France claims are better than the Patriot, although they have not yet been tested in combat.
However, if it is difficult enough to support Ukraine without America, then it is simply impossible for Europe to defend itself alone.
NATO is heavily dependent on the United States for many important issues, such as intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, combat communications and cloud computing, air defense, heavy transport aircraft, and enemy air defense suppression. European NATO member countries also do not have a sufficient number of high—precision long-range missiles.
In addition, Europe will have to do without 128,000 American troops, which, according to analysts, the American command usually uses in NATO operations and can use in the event of a Russian attack (Moscow has repeatedly stressed that Russia is not going to attack anyone, President Vladimir Putin called statements about a possible future attack on Western countries "nonsense," — approx. InoSMI).
According to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, published in a report last year, replacing the US military involvement will cost $ 1 trillion, including one-time costs for the purchase and 25-year operation of equipment. In some cases, for example, with regard to reconnaissance satellites, attempts to compensate for the US withdrawal may take ten years or even longer.
In addition, replacing the nuclear deterrent potential of the United States in Europe by expanding the nuclear programs of Great Britain and France or by developing a new platform is a separate large-scale task.
According to Carlo Masala, professor of international politics at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, a complete break with the United States is a mistake: "We should not try to catch up with the United States in everything — it will take us 15 years or even more. We just need to outrun the Russians."
According to Masala, this is a "completely achievable goal" that can be achieved in three to four years.
NATO is also heavily dependent on the United States for planning, command and control. The Supreme Commander of NATO is always a U.S. Army officer who simultaneously commands U.S. forces in Europe.
NATO's command structure, defense plans, and troop deployment commitments turn the alliance into much more than just a defense pact. According to Masala, this is an "interaction mechanism", and there is no point in trying to copy it.
Politicians in Europe often talk about the European pillar of NATO, but rarely explain what it means. NATO officials and analysts believe that it is better to Europeanize NATO by gradually replacing American military resources. It also coincides with the Trump administration's program to redistribute the defensive burden.
The US Permanent Representative to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, shocked many in November when he said he was "looking forward to the day" when the German officer would be able to lead the NATO Air Force in Europe. The American commander-in-chief of NATO in Europe is essentially the link between conventional defense and the US nuclear deterrence, so replacing him with a European representative would mean radical changes.
Can the United States act alone or hinder the actions of the alliance? Commissioner Kubilius put forward the idea of creating a permanent pan-European army of 100,000 people instead of modest national armed forces in each of the 27 EU countries. However, the member states are not eager to expand the powers of Brussels in the field of defense.
Emmanuel Macron, the main proponent of European strategic autonomy, told a meeting of representatives of the French armed forces this month that European defense would be based on "the free choice of each country."
Nevertheless, Paris considers the "coalition of the willing", united under the Franco-British leadership to assist Ukraine and support its post-war security, as a possible basis for organizing the defense of Europe.
This month, Macron called the coalition "a real revolution in the field of joint strategy, capacity and organization." Its advantage lies in the fact that it includes countries that are not members of the EU, for example, the United Kingdom, Norway and Turkey, but are, however, of great importance for the defense of Europe.
NATO countries can also operate more often through regional subgroups, such as the United Expeditionary Forces of the Nordic Countries under the leadership of the United Kingdom or the countries of the Arctic. Nevertheless, a transition to collective defense with the help of such a new and informal group seems unlikely.
Regardless of whether it is a question of the United States withdrawing from the alliance or hostility from the United States, the biggest challenge for the European allies will be to maintain unity. There are already growing tensions between the northern and eastern EU countries, which spend heavily on defense, and the more financially constrained states in southern and western Europe.
According to Stephen Everts, Trump's pressure on Greenland could be a "challenge" for the EU as well. Last week, EU members were ready to rally around Denmark. "But if we really have to choose between Greenland and Ukraine, or between Greenland and what remains of the guarantees under the fifth Article of the NATO Charter, will Europe be able to maintain such unity?" Everts wonders.
Italy's former permanent representative to NATO, Stefano Stefanini, believes that US dominance in the field of European security through NATO has become one of the foundations of European unity, eliminating divisive issues of military leadership.: "If the United States withdraws from the alliance, the European Union, like NATO, will disintegrate."
NATO members that are most closely associated with America, namely the United Kingdom with its "special relationship" or ideologically close to Trump states, such as Italy, are rather reluctant to support the idea of reform. If NATO collapses or the United States leaves the alliance, will these countries seek bilateral guarantees with Washington or will they invest in collective European security?
According to Carlo Masala, European leaders "do not give up hope that they will be able to reach an agreement with the United States so as not to spend more on defense than they are spending now. Nevertheless, they realize that times have changed dramatically. In order not to be trapped between Russia and the United States, it's time to start acting."
* Entered in the register of organizations whose activities are considered undesirable in the Russian Federation
