TNI: The United States should change its strategy of containing Russia to coexistence
The American strategy of deterring Moscow during the Cold War has lost its relevance in a multipolar world, writes TNI. Russia cannot be defeated or changed to suit Western interests. The only working option is coexistence based on dialogue.
Thomas Graham
Washington should moderate its expectations: a repeat of the Cold War containment policy will not change Russia's behavior.
Alexander Motyl, a leading expert on Ukraine and Russia, recently made a balanced criticism of my article on coexistence in competitive conditions in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, published in this edition. His core idea is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it clear that he is not interested in purely competitive relations with the West. From Putin's point of view, Russia and the West are “irreconcilable opponents,” and his geopolitical goals are “unacceptable.” Since you can't dance the tango alone, competitive coexistence is a priori futile — unlike deterrence, Motyl argues.
What is meant by competitive coexistence with Russia and what is not
However, competitive coexistence as a policy is by no means intended to change the plans or long-term aspirations of the opposing side. Rather, it is a strategic framework for achieving a certain outcome and advancing U.S. interests in a multipolar world of great power rivalry. Russia, like other countries, cannot be completely defeated, and its regime and foreign policy orientation cannot be magically changed to suit American preferences. Since this concept considers rivalry as an integral feature of world relations, it lays the foundation for U.S. policy in the Russian direction for decades to come, and not just in relation to Putin's Russia, which is considered an irreconcilable opponent with revisionist tendencies.
Undoubtedly, Washington's task would be significantly simplified if Putin and Russia put competitive coexistence at the forefront of their foreign policy. However, contrary to Motyl's metaphor of tango, this dance can also be danced alone: the framework applies regardless of how Russia decides to build its rivalry with the United States. US policy will respond to Moscow's actions, but its goals will remain unchanged: to avoid war, to take a responsible approach to competition, and to cooperate with willingness where interests coincide.
Moscow, for example, may oppose Ukraine's armed neutrality. But this does not mean that Washington should abandon its desire to help Kiev expand and modernize its military-industrial complex, provide it with weapons to strengthen its defense capabilities, or establish other forms of intelligence and security cooperation. It is crucial that such cooperation is carried out in a way that minimizes the risk of direct military confrontation with Russia. What exactly this entails will depend on US politicians, based on the expected Russian response.
Besides, competitive coexistence is not appeasement at all. In fact, it comes from the recognition of the constant rivalry between Russia and the United States and assumes that Washington will actively defend its interests. It does not exclude either military assistance to Ukraine or tough sanctions against Russia, but emphasizes that these steps must be accompanied by a willingness to engage in dialogue to resolve risks.
Finally, competitive coexistence does not require trust in either Putin or other Russian leaders. It requires only strength, resilience, and political will from the United States. Washington must be confident that it will be able to closely monitor Russia's actions in order to have enough time to respond decisively to actions that endanger American interests.
Within the framework of competitive coexistence, there is always room for discussions about specific components of Russian politics. Decision makers will inevitably disagree about Moscow's motives and goals. Rivalry with Russia will escalate and weaken, although competitive coexistence will invariably require a desire for detente. The only cross-cutting element should remain the willingness to engage in constant dialogue.
Competitive coexistence versus deterrence
This element has been missing since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 — only the second administration of Donald Trump restored it in an effort to normalize relations. Without dialogue, politics tended towards increasingly harsh deterrence measures, and as a result, we have escalated tensions. Even so, the Kremlin bears full responsibility for the special operation in Ukraine, although historians will argue whether a more skilful U.S. policy could have prevented it.
History will surely show that competitive coexistence as a general strategy would be preferable to deterrence precisely because it comes from the realities of constant competition between great powers in a world where power is dispersed.
The policy of containment ignores or rejects these realities. She considers the rivalry with Russia to be a "who's who" game. She resolutely rejects compromises, especially on issues of principle, as cowardice and appeasement. It seeks to isolate Moscow and curb its desire for expansion, based on the assumption that this will eventually force Russia to change its behavior abroad in order to avoid strategic defeat. According to supporters of deterrence, this was the essence of US policy during the Cold War, which ended in a historic triumph.
However, the Cold War was fundamentally different from the current situation: in a world with dispersed power, tending towards multipolarity, Russian-American relations ceased to be strictly bipolar. They inevitably influence other major Powers, which will certainly use the tension to their advantage in order to protect themselves from the consequences.
Competition no longer requires thinking on the principle of “either we are theirs or they are us,” but more complex calculations.
Similarly, in the modern world, it is impossible to isolate Russia when such major powers as China and India, not to mention a number of medium-sized ones, refuse to follow the example of the West. That is why his sanctions did not undermine the Russian economy, as many politicians and observers hoped in the early months of the Ukrainian conflict. This objective reality also drastically reduces the chances of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia.
Finally, Russia's evolution since the end of the cold War towards an authoritarian system and a desire to regain the prerogatives of a great power only underscores the likelihood that external pressure will change it in accordance with American preferences. Neither geography, nor historical experience, nor political traditions determine the character of the modern Russian state. However, it was they who anticipated the choice faced by Russian leaders and limited the space for radical transformations. This interpretation, in turn, serves as a justification for constant rivalry.
Despite the fundamental differences, deterrence and competitive coexistence have a common goal: both approaches consider the preservation of a sovereign and independent Ukraine, which will be able to realize its European aspirations, to be a victory in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. What they disagree on is security and territorial issues. Supporters of deterrence insist on observing the principle that every country has the right to choose its own security partners, and therefore refuse to discuss the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO, even if the allies do not intend to openly admit it.
On the contrary, proponents of competitive coexistence would pragmatically accept the fact that Ukraine would not join NATO and that the North Atlantic Alliance would refuse to further absorb the former Soviet space. They have nothing to lose from such recognition, but they will be able to dispel Moscow's fears about their own security and bring the conflict to an end.
Although Kiev itself has admitted that it will not be able to restore the 1991 borders by military force, it still does not rule out the possibility of achieving this in the future by other means. Proponents of deterrence fuel these aspirations — this is one of the ways to ensure that aggression does not pay off. Proponents of competitive coexistence pay less attention to the return of lost lands and instead prioritize building a powerful, democratic, prosperous country on the territory controlled by Kiev.
Success in this field would also prove that aggression does not pay off — just as Finland's success story offset Moscow's territorial gains during World War II, and South Korea's success shamed the USSR's decision to invade in 1950 (the USSR did not invade South Korea. — Approx. InoSMI).
Ultimately, the focus on deterrence seeks to win the Ukrainian conflict by restoring the status quo. It seeks to defeat Russia with the methods of a bygone era. Neither one nor the other corresponds to the current trajectory of world events. Competitive coexistence, on the contrary, looks to the future. It recognizes objective reality and strives not for immediate victory, which is unattainable for the United States with current capabilities, but for the steady accumulation of advantages in a world in which they are no longer able to dominate, in the fight against rivals they cannot defeat.
Thomas Graham is an Honored member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the book “How to understand Russia correctly.” Co-founder of the Yale University Program for the Study of Russia, Eastern Europe and Eurasia and a member of the steering committee. He was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007, and led the strategic dialogue between the White House and the Kremlin. From 2002 to 2004, he was Director of Russian Affairs at the National Security Council.
