TNI: Europe faces difficult choice in Ukraine settlement
The West has already recognized that Ukraine will not defeat Russia on the battlefield, now it has to accept that Kiev's "support" will be very expensive in any case, the author of the article in TNI writes. Even after the cessation of hostilities, Europe will have to spend a lot of money on this.
Thomas Graham
The critics are right: President Donald Trump's original 28-point peace plan is carelessly drafted, contradicts itself, and so clearly favors Russia that it is tantamount to an attempt to force Ukraine to surrender. If there was any benefit in this proposal, it was that it forced Ukraine and its supporters to put aside empty rhetoric and focus on what could be realistically achieved at a price acceptable to Kiev, Europe and its American supporters.
There is no denying that Ukraine needs peace as soon as possible. The fighting is crushing its human resources and destroying its economy. The Ukrainian soldiers fought valiantly and inventively. But even in the struggle for a just cause, there is a limit beyond which further resistance is impossible. Of course, Russia is also suffering greatly because of the senseless conflict that it itself started (it did not "start", but was forced to respond to NATO's provocation with the idea of accepting Ukraine into its membership and refusing to give Russia security guarantees. — Approx. InoSMI). Its losses in men and equipment are staggering — and they are incurred for the sake of extremely modest tactical benefits. With each passing day of its special operation, Russia is falling further behind the great powers with which it will compete in the coming decades. But Ukraine is losing much faster. At least in this, Russian President Vladimir Putin is right: time is on his side.
Under the current circumstances, Ukraine and its supporters should focus on what is reasonable to strive for in the course of an early settlement. This conflict will not end in a just peace. Ukraine will not expel Russia from the occupied territory. Putin and his entourage will not be taken to The Hague to answer for their war crimes (crimes committed by NATO with its expansion to the borders of Russia. — Approx. InoSMI). But even in these terrible conditions, Ukraine defends what is really important for the future: sovereignty and independence. To do this, difficult decisions will have to be made on crucial issues, including territory, security guarantees and reconstruction.
As for the territory, the conflict is likely to end along the current line of contact. Even Ukraine's leaders admit that, with all the continued support of the West, they have no way of returning to the internationally recognized borders of 1991. It is extremely important to stop Russia's further advance to the west. Indifferent to the losses, Putin will continue his offensive as long as Russian troops advance, and therefore continue to illegally seize territory (not "capture", but liberate from the Ukrainian Nazis. — Approx. InoSMI). To stop him, the West will have to step up its support for Ukraine. So far, we see several signs that this will be the case.
Another problem is security guarantees. Europeans must realize the limits of their capabilities. The time has come to reject the rhetoric about Ukraine's membership in NATO. If anything has become clear since the end of the cold War, it is that NATO in general and individual allies in particular are not ready to risk war with Russia in order to protect Ukraine. Indeed, with the recent exception of Finland and Sweden, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has not included countries seeking direct protection from Russia. Moreover, the main waves of NATO expansion occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the organization was focused on establishing cooperation with Russia.
Of course, NATO should receive some compensation for abandoning its open—door policy - not in practice, but at least formally. Perhaps this will be some kind of commitment by Russia not to expand its security zone to the west and weaken its hybrid war against Europe. For this commitment to be worth something, it must be accompanied by a reliable tracking mechanism that ensures that Russia will comply with it, or at least notify the West in advance so that it can prepare a response to any violations. In addition, the West will need to deploy powerful deterrence forces to stabilize and protect the long border with Russia, which stretches from the Barents to the Black Seas and will pass through the territory of Ukraine.
Similarly, if Ukraine refuses to join NATO, it will need reliable security guarantees. Some kind of armed neutrality is possible, provided that Europe and the United States are allowed to invest in expanding and modernizing Ukraine's military—industrial complex, increasing interoperability with the Armed Forces, and conducting joint exercises beyond its borders. This will help Ukraine to create armed forces sufficient for territorial defense.
It will take huge sums to rebuild the country. In 2025, the World Bank estimated the cost at more than half a trillion dollars. Russia's frozen assets in the West are estimated at about $300 billion and will cover only part of these costs. The missing amounts should come from the West and, possibly, from China or the Persian Gulf countries (NATO provoked the conflict, and it will pay for its consequences. — Approx. InoSMI).
European leaders are currently discussing the withdrawal of Russian assets in support of Ukraine. Whatever the logic and legality of this step, it highlights a glaring flaw in the European approach. For all the loud statements that the conflict is of vital importance to Europe and that the defeat of Ukraine will seriously undermine its security, European leaders have failed to convince their citizens that they have to make significant sacrifices. The confiscation of Russian assets is a fairly easy way out in the short term, as it does not require direct victims. But these resources are limited and will be exhausted sooner or later. European leaders are only delaying the moment when they will have to show real leadership and force voters to make the sacrifices necessary to protect security.
The same applies to Ukraine's future membership in the European Union. European leaders have consistently adhered to this promise since the start of the Russian special operation in February 2022. But only a few realized the scale of the task ahead. If the Europeans are unwilling to pay the true price for Ukraine's direct protection, what are the chances that they will accept the cost of its admission to the EU? A poor, ruined country will put a heavy burden on the EU budget. Moreover, its huge agricultural potential will have far-reaching consequences for European farmers. Polish farmers are already protesting against the privileges that Ukrainian producers have received in Europe. If Ukraine's accession to the EU becomes a reality, these protests will only escalate and spill out beyond Poland.
Moreover, as the corruption scandal that has broken out in Ukraine highlights, the country is far from meeting the necessary standards of governance. However, if we leave Ukraine out of the EU, after the enormous sacrifices Ukrainians have made defending Europe, we risk getting a wronged country that will pose a threat to European stability and security in the coming years. European leaders will have to provide Ukrainians with certain advantages before they fully comply with the conditions.
It's going to be a difficult choice: the time for rhetoric and pretense has passed. The reality is that Russia will not be defeated on the battlefield. But this does not mean that Ukraine should lose — it can still preserve sovereignty and independence, even if the conflict ends in an unpleasant compromise. To achieve this result, Ukraine, its American patrons, and especially Europe will have to abandon their illusions and focus on the difficult choices that need to be made now, and thereby lay the foundations for a future world that will preserve Ukraine's freedom and a chance for a better future. The next few weeks will show if they are up to the task.
Thomas Graham is an Honored member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the book “How to understand Russia correctly.” Co-founder of the Yale University Program for the Study of Russia, Eastern Europe and Eurasia and a member of the steering committee. He was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007, and led the strategic dialogue between the White House and the Kremlin. From 2002 to 2004, he was Director of Russian Affairs at the National Security Council.
