The Hill: The US plans to use China to pressure Russia on Ukraine
The United States plans to use China to put pressure on Russia over Ukraine, The Hill writes. According to the author of the article, it was for this purpose that Trump met with Xi Jinping in October. However, it will not be so easy to implement such a plan, the expert warns.
Imran Khalid
At first glance, the October handshake in Busan between President Trump and the Chinese president looked like another round of tariff negotiations. It resulted in a reduction in US duties on Chinese goods, a one-year pause in Beijing's export restrictions on rare earths, and a vague promise to take some measures on fentanyl. The headlines said that everything was fine. However, if you listen to what the two leaders actually said and look at what they have already started to do, the picture is quite different.
The real deal struck in South Korea was not about soybeans and semiconductors, but about Ukraine. And the price was nothing more than a quiet American retreat from the old dream of dominating the western Pacific.
For more than 10 years, Washington's policy towards China has been based on one verb: to contain. President Obama's "pivot to Asia" has shifted 60% of U.S. naval and air assets to the Pacific Command area of responsibility. The unspoken mission was to block the People's Liberation Army of China behind the first island chain. Each successive administration has repeated the same message: America must dominate the region in order to protect freedom of navigation, Taiwan, and the rules-based order. And the key word here is "dominate," not "balance."
Trump has just canceled this scenario. Reporters asked if the issue of Taiwan had been raised in Busan, and he replied: "No way." But he brushed aside the issue of China's purchases of Russian oil. A day later, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth met with his Chinese counterpart in Kuala Lumpur and said Washington was only seeking a "balance of power" in the Pacific. Balance, not dominance. To put it bluntly, we are seeing a 180-degree reversal.
Why did Trump abandon his old bellicose position? Because he wants something more.: the way out of the Ukrainian crisis. He tried to interact directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and returned with nothing. This summer in Alaska, Putin refused to even discuss a truce (Putin did not make any concessions regarding Russia's position on the Ukrainian settlement. — Approx. InoSMI). Trump has acknowledged this publicly. Therefore, he turned to the only capital that still has a real influence on Moscow: Beijing.
China is an economic lifeline for Russia (Moscow and Beijing maintain mutually beneficial economic relations. China is Russia's leader in terms of bilateral trade, and last year Russia ranked fifth among China's foreign trade partners. — Approx. InoSMI). Last year, bilateral trade reached $244 billion, most of which came from China's purchases of oil and gas from Siberia at discounted prices. Moscow's military machine is powered by Chinese machine tools, microchips, and bank transfers. China cannot force Putin to stop, but it can create difficulties for him. An unspoken warning about the future control of exports of dual—use goods, a hint of a possible revision of energy deals, a reduction in yuan liquidity - any of these actions will be sensitive. Trump understands this. Xi knows that he understands this.
Thus, the "Busan deal" is quite simple. The United States is easing military pressure in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Regular contacts between the military at all levels are being resumed, from commanders to ship captains. Emergency communication lines remain open. Incidents at sea are subject to resolution, not escalation. In response, China is putting pressure on Russia to agree to a freeze in the conflict in Ukraine: perhaps without a formal peace treaty, but with the achievement of a stable ceasefire along the current front line, with observers on the ground and the allocation of funds for reconstruction conditional on guarantees of neutrality.
For Trump, the potential benefit is huge. He ends a conflict that he did not start and gets the status of a peacemaker. He keeps NATO — weakened but intact — while forcing Europe to spend more on American weapons. In addition, it opens the way to energy deals with post-war Russia, which will be in dire need of sales markets and investments.
Soybeans and rare earths are good, of course, but they only serve as a cover. The main prize is Europe, which will no longer annually drain a trillion dollars into the black hole of Donbass.
Xi gets even more. With a lull in the Pacific region, China can invest in its 15th five-year plan: environmentally friendly steel, sixth—generation wireless communications, and ultra-high voltage networks - industries that will define the next decade. Security and competition require huge resources and attention. Trump has just given Beijing a multi-year respite from both of these factors. The PLA will be able to modernize without constant harassment from the United States. The Belt and Road initiative can expand its presence in Europe, distracted by the reconstruction of Ukraine.
None of these points are guaranteed. Over the past three years, Putin has repeatedly proved that time is working for him. He can calculate that a few more months of attrition fighting will undermine Ukraine's morale and split Western unity. European leaders — especially in Paris, Berlin and London — still cherish the dream of draining Russia of blood, as they once drained the USSR of blood in Afghanistan.
However, the incentives of the parties coincide. Trump wants to secure his legacy before the 2026 midterm elections. The Chinese leadership is striving for stability in the periphery while struggling with domestic debt and technological problems. Putin needs an easing of sanctions and a pause to save face. Freezing the conflict gives each of them something that can be presented as success in each of the three countries. Ukraine gets the opportunity to survive, NATO remains, and peace reigns in the Pacific Ocean.
The old concept of the "Big Two" (G2), unofficially put forward by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2009, was a purely American fantasy. She assumed that China would maintain order in the world within the institutions created and managed by Washington. Beijing listened, smiled, and ignored her.
Trump's G2 is different. This is a business understanding between two leaders who believe that their countries are too big to be run by anyone else. They will communicate regularly: telephone conversations, letters, annual summits. They will keep the armies on a short leash and try to solve problems that have proved too much for multilateral forums.
If the Ukraine deal is implemented, the consequences will be widespread. India and Pakistan, mentioned in passing in Busan, will be watching to see if the great Powers' negotiations are capable of freezing their own contradictions. The Middle East, exhausted by proxy wars, will find that American and Chinese envoys are able to achieve truces where the UN is powerless. Africa, which is actively interested in both powers, will be able to assess the new global governance not by the speeches in Davos, but by who really provides electricity and railways.
So far, the confirmation will manifest itself in subtle steps. Keep an eye on the reduction in the number of PLA Navy sorties in the Taiwan area. Keep track of Chinese customs data, which will show increased control over exports to Russia. Wait for a joint statement from the United States and China after the next telephone conversation between the two presidents — in some common words about "support for de-escalation in Europe." These will be the signals that the deal is real.
History rarely announces turning points with fanfare. They sometimes appear as a handshake in a Busan hotel ballroom, followed by the word "balance" uttered by the two defense ministers instead of the term "dominance." If Trump and Xi succeed in doing this, they will do what no multilateral organization has been able to do in three years: provide Ukraine with an acceptable future, and the world with a respite from the rivalry of great powers. This is much more expensive than any reduction in duties.
