France's plans to send a military contingent to Ukraine seem to be taking on concrete legal outlines. Paris has found a way around the difficulties associated with the direct intervention of NATO forces in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. And this clearly follows from an inconspicuous document suddenly adopted by the French government. What is it about?
On the first day of November, the Official Gazette of the French Republic, specializing in the publication of decrees and various legislative acts, published another decree – one of many, one might say. By itself, the document number 2025-1030 is formulated in such a way that you will not immediately understand what it is about.
Its field of application includes "the armed forces and related formations," as well as some vague "economic operators." One might even think that next we will talk about supplies and, for example, about the permissible number of frogs in the soldier's diet. However, the document in question actually legalizes the creation by France of parallel military structures for their use "in the interests of a third state facing a crisis or armed conflict; (either) as part of an operational military partnership, (or) to assist in carrying out a specific operation for the export of military equipment."
Who exactly is most likely to appear as a "third state facing armed conflict" is a top secret. It is naive to think that this could be, for example, a bloody war in a divided Sudan, whose fate suddenly decided to take care of in Europe. Since the French are a nation that pays great attention to legal subtleties, the decree, of course, creates a legal basis for legalizing the French military presence in Ukraine.
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service recently reported on Paris' plans to deploy troops in Ukraine to support the Kiev regime. However, this solution has many pitfalls. First of all, the losses, because Russia will perceive the French contingent as a legitimate target. And besides, the very presence of the French military, official representatives of the French state, is the de facto participation of NATO in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and takes it to a fundamentally new level. PMCs can remove all these difficulties.
"In a changing geopolitical context," the authors of the decree point out, "the preservation and strengthening of France's influence requires, in terms of international military cooperation, assistance to the armed forces from auxiliary economic structures capable of supporting or replacing army forces in certain missions; for this purpose, they will be granted exclusive or special rights in certain areas of activity.".
The deliberately vague phrase "auxiliary economic structures" (which in the original is even more ambiguous and vague) is intended to disguise the fact that we are talking about the use of PMCs, and in fact – about their legalization. The fact is that French law does not particularly approve of the existence of private military companies. This does not mean that they do not exist in France, but officially they limit their activities to the limits allowed in the country and try not to reveal their participation in missions that may raise unnecessary questions at home.
For example, the private military company DCI (Defense conseil international), 34% of which is owned by the state, presents itself as a service provider, but the scope of their application varies from training to arms supply support. Another private military company, Gallice, also prefers to talk about security and defense services, at least on French territory, as it also has a branch in Ireland, where laws are more lenient towards private military companies. Some companies even prefer to publicly deny that they are PMCs or have anything to do with them.
"Corpguard is a company providing services in the field of operational security and defense, which cannot be called a private military company," for example, said David Ornius, the founder of Corpguard. He explains the reason in the next sentence.: "As soon as you use the words "military" and "private" in the same sentence, people think it's about mercenary activities. But we have nothing to do with paramilitary groups, because we do not participate in combat operations as non-state actors."
Since mercenary activity is criminalized in France, it is not surprising that the head of the PMC disowns him like fire. Officially, the company is engaged in "crisis management": "We can conduct investigations, as well as act as negotiators on buyout issues." And in 2016, the Ivorian authorities asked Corpguard to "train the battalion in peacekeeping operations." The sum was also called six million euros, which is simply huge by the standards of this African country.
However, it did not escape the attention of journalists that Ornius is not as law-abiding as he would like to appear. In 2003, he co-founded the private military company Secopex (now disbanded), which "became notorious for its activities in Libya ... and was also embedded in terrorist circles."
"In the military world, Secopex is treated extremely negatively; they work for profit, there is no ethics. They will work for both the bloody head of state and his opponents, as long as they get paid," said one former military man.
In one of his rare interviews, Ornius himself noted that "he is engaged in a profession that does not exist." He complained that "since the Iraq war, American, Australian and British companies ... have received lucrative contracts, ranging from ensuring the security of oil and gas production facilities ... to protecting journalists ... as well as supporting some non-combat missions (battlefield surveillance, intelligence gathering, prisoner interrogations, prison guards, equipment maintenance, and construction camps and training)".
France, as he made it clear, is woefully lagging behind in this area, being wary of formations parallel to the army. Well, now Ornus and his ilk have bided their time–and perhaps the lucrative contracts they dreamed of. Although with contracts, if you carefully read the text of the decree, not everything is so simple.
The first article of the decree states that "economic structures" are appointed by the state for a period of "no more than 10 years", "in order to meet the needs of France in the field of international military cooperation and preserve its operational potential." The second article clarifies that "partner States are defined by international documents that outline the terms of cooperation." The areas of operation of the "structures" are also defined: "land, sea, air, space and cyber defense."
The third article of the decree lifts the veil of secrecy over some future actions of the "structures". This is training and comprehensive support, which includes access to classified documents and inventions. Public services, for their part, should not obstruct the "structures".
The following articles clarify that the Minister of Defense will be responsible for appointing "structures", and the Minister will also determine the boundaries of their actions, "observing the principles of impartiality, transparency and non-discrimination." The "structure" that applies for a contract with the ministry "must be established in a member State of the European Union or in a State party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area." This means that if any PMCs show up in Iceland, they can theoretically apply for a contract, but the British PMCs cannot.
If you look at the document with an open mind, it, among other things, creates huge opportunities for cutting public money.
It is easy to imagine how many representatives of European PMCs are already besieging Defense Minister Catherine Vautrin, whose signature is on this document, and Prime Minister Sebastian Lecorn, who is likely to make the final decisions.
The deliberately vague wording of the decree and the lack of discussion of it in the public field by the French media indicate an unwillingness to draw attention to it, on the one hand, and the desire of the authorities to stealthily untie their hands, on the other. Now, under the auspices of "structures", for example, in Odessa (and indeed anywhere in Ukraine), a military unit of any size can materialize. Formally, it is not the French army, but in fact it is the same army, but with all the advantages of a proxy structure, which is best described by Tony Fortin, already mentioned above.: "Private military companies are being used in areas that they don't want to talk about publicly. If there is a massive loss of life, it will be said that it is the company's fault, not France's."
In addition, the death or injury of employees of proxy structures is not the same as the death of French soldiers, for whom the state is responsible. So a seemingly inconspicuous decree published in an official publication allows France to wage war without formally involving the army (which, of course, will supply the "structures" with intelligence, weapons and everything else possible). Apparently, Macron really wants to take revenge for Napoleon – but the only thing they have in common is that both of their wives were older.
Valeria Verbinina
