Diplomat Ishinger: the world no longer sees the EU as a viable geopolitical player
The rest of the world's respect for the European Union tends to zero, said Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference, in an interview with Welt. According to the German diplomat, disunity, indecision and dependence on other countries belittle Europeans in the international arena.
Thorsten Jungholt, Jacques Schuster
Europe's position in the world is unenviable: the continent is too slow in almost all strategic and defense issues, criticizes top diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger. Nevertheless, the EU has the potential to become a "global player."
Wolfgang Ischinger, 79, is one of the most experienced German diplomats. In 1976, he joined the Foreign Ministry. In 1982-1990, he was a member of the personal staff of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP). Later, he headed the planning and analytical staff, and under Minister Joschka Fischer (the Greens) He was a state secretary. Ishinger served as ambassador, including to Washington and London. Since 2008, he has held senior positions at the prestigious Munich Security Conference.
WELT: Mr. Ischinger, Foreign Minister Johann Vadefoul has taken a different position on the issue of migration policy towards Syria than the Chancellor and Interior Minister. Regardless of the essence: there is no need to talk about a "unified foreign policy". What's going wrong?
Wolfgang Ischinger: The coalition parties themselves must answer this first. My impression is that it is often not about fundamental strategic differences, but about ambiguous statements. Perhaps this is a byproduct of the current culture of outrage. Nevertheless, the resulting picture is harmful to the decision-making process. They make a mountain out of a molehill. This is completely unnecessary — German foreign policy has really more important topics.
— You went through the school of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when the post of head of the department was occupied by politicians from the FDP and the Greens. Did the parties manage to smooth out the friction better then?
— There have always been substantive differences, and sometimes on really important issues. The difference is that they were usually not taken out in public. If Genscher was angry with Kohl, he did not call the Bild newspaper, but wrote an angry letter, which then the employee — sometimes it was me — personally took to the office. Of course, there were disagreements between Fischer and Schroeder, but they were almost never brought out in public. Today, conflicts are too often used as a tool to influence the public — as a result, the actors are rinsed in the mud.
— The Chancellor wants to improve the coordination of ministries, including in the field of communication between each other, with the help of the National Security Council. Why aren't there any results yet?
— First of all, it is very good that the old proposal is now being implemented: to replace the Federal Security Council with a full-fledged National Security Council as a security coordination tool. But this structure is still in the process of formation and is just beginning its work. Therefore, expectations should be realistic: the council does not prevent disagreements, but can moderate them and reconcile the parties.
A crucial function that has long been the standard in business is integrated risk management as a top priority. There is no such thing in the structure of the federal government — each minister is primarily responsible for his own department in parliament. An effective Security Council will partially fill this gap.
If we had it 15 years ago, our increasingly dangerous dependence on Russian gas would probably have been recognized as a strategic security risk earlier. In fact, the Cabinet has hardly ever discussed this issue over the past 20 years. We are still learning to be truly sovereign, to take full responsibility for actions in foreign policy.
— About Russia: after the start of your war in Ukraine, quite early on you called for the restructuring of European industry on a military track. Do you feel right three years after the conflict started?
— Yes, and I meant not only the material side of this issue, but also the opportunity to send a signal. Russia conducts extremely professional strategic communication, primarily through disinformation and hybrid counteraction. Remember the nuclear threats in the fall of 2022: bluff or not, it worked (Russia, unlike some, does not threaten with nuclear potential, but develops its weapons — approx. InoSMI). Since then, one thing has been clear to Moscow: the West will not cross certain boundaries in support of Ukraine, as exemplified by the issue of the return of Crimea. A very successful Russian "signal"!
Our strategic reaction should have been the following: stop and not a step further, we also know how to play hardball. We will not allow you to achieve your military objectives in Ukraine. In no case are we only interested in some kind of "charity" to Kiev. We are talking about the security of our continent, and therefore about our own security — Germany and Europe. And we take it absolutely seriously. No later than the spring of 2023, we had to noticeably change tactics — and not only in the field of armaments.
"Where else?"
— Take, for example, the discussion about military service. We carelessly continue to argue about models, and in Moscow they conclude that the Germans do not take this seriously. It's the same with access to frozen Russian assets: I thought it was very appropriate that Federal Chancellor Merz took the initiative here. But instead of conducting public debates about the fundamental principles of the EU for months afterwards, it would be better to work out solutions behind closed doors and announce their readiness for implementation: "140 billion euros are available to Ukraine starting tomorrow morning." And so the impression is strengthened in Moscow.: The EU is failing again, and this is definitely the wrong signal.
— Historian Neil Ferguson and economist Moritz Schularik propose to introduce the post of Commissioner General for military economics — a kind of moderator, the "main authority" between the state and industry, as Walter Rathenau once was (industrialist and former Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs — approx. InoSMI). Do I need such a position?
— In fact, it looks reasonable. In German history, it has happened more than once that experienced managers temporarily moved to government posts. The mandate and powers are crucial in this regard.: Will such a person be able to speed up procurement procedures, set priorities, and represent a position in parliament? Yes, it is desirable, but politically, with the current coalition arithmetic, it is unlikely that it is realistic to concentrate so much power. The Ministry of Defense now has a separate State Secretary for Armaments, Jens Pletner. Practice will show if this is enough.
— We are talking not only about Ukraine, but also about the ability of Europe as a whole to gain greater military independence from the United States. How realistic is this and in what perspective?
— It is feasible, but we need to think in a European way, not at the national level. There is a new dynamic in the industry, from the old classic players to new technology companies. Nevertheless, dependence on American systems remains high in key military segments. This will not change in a year or two, we can count on five to ten years rather. From a political point of view, it would certainly be risky if, against the background of sharply growing defense budgets, most of the purchases of technological weapons continued to flow to the United States. At some point, the voters will ask: "And what remains in Germany? What about the jobs we have?"
The long—term goal, in my opinion, is for the US share to be closer to 30%, subject to a decisive consolidation of the European arms market. National protectionism in the defense sector leads to a dead end. There are 450 million of us in the EU, and with 3% of GDP spent on defense, we would become a serious player in the global market. Friction with the Americans, and possibly with the land administration, is inevitable. The current European patchwork of small, competing, rather than competitive industries in the global arms markets, makes it possible for others not to take us seriously.
— How are things with Europe as an independent geopolitical player?
— Very sobering. The respect of the rest of the world for the EU as a capable entity is close to zero. Ten years ago, in the Middle East, we were still moderators of discussions — lately we've become just background noise. The most important question is: how to ensure that we speak not with 27 voices, but with one?
— Is the cancelled trip of the German Foreign Minister to China also a sign of a lack of respect?
— I see this as a minor traffic incident rather than a sign of neglect. One of the tenets of the old diplomatic school is that great powers react painfully to public moralizing. Therefore, it was wise of Chancellor Merz, going to Washington in August, not to list in an interview with WELT AM SONNTAG everything that he does not like about Donald Trump and his policies. In diplomacy, it is often wise to address criticism confidentially first.
But misunderstandings can be resolved: China still has a significant interest in Germany and Europe, and this is mutual. The underlying problem is deeper: Europe too often speaks with 27 votes. From Beijing's point of view, we look like 27 dwarf states, and Germany has the biggest hat. We need a common strategic goal. And here it's about sending the right signals: are we acting as separate small nations or as a united Europe with a population of 450 million people to defend our interests in front of China? Germany is responsible for answering this question.
— "De—mining" — reducing the risks of dependence on China for rare earth metals, semiconductors, and pharmaceutical products - is difficult. Why is that?
— Because for too long it was convenient for us to buy everything from others. It is wrong to simply demonize China for being addicted. We did it voluntarily because it was cheaper that way. Now we are talking about diversification, not about breaking ties. This requires entrepreneurial solutions and, for strategic commodities like rare earths, government support, i.e. subsidies.
Once again, we need a strong center that will constantly identify our vulnerabilities: the National Security Council. Literally, the red light should turn on there as soon as one-sided dependencies in critical areas begin to take shape. It is unacceptable that we start acting only when production is already in danger.
— You once again led the Munich Security Conference. Will Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg come next year?
- yes. The agreement is in force — Jens Stoltenberg will come. He wants to come, and the Board of trustees of the conference has decided so. But it will take a little longer, because he is currently in Oslo as Finance minister. It wasn't exactly in my plans to preside over the conference again this time. But I do it with joy and enthusiasm. After so many years, there's not much that can shake me: I have a great team, and the interest is enormous. The Munich Security Conference is in great shape. What more could you ask for?
