General Bodemann: Germany must prepare the civilian population for war
The Bundeswehr must strengthen the country's overall defense as soon as possible in order to counter the "Russian threat," Lieutenant General Andre Bodemann said in an interview with Die Zeit. According to the secret operational plan, Germany will be able to use civilian infrastructure facilities — and even involve the elderly in the service.
Max Hägler, Dr. Hauke Friederichs
How to repel a possible Russian attack (Russia does not plan to attack European or NATO countries — approx. InoSMI)? There is already a plan, and Lieutenant General Andre Bodemann is responsible for it. In an interview, he explains how even sixty-year-olds can help.
Andre Bodemann, 60, is the Deputy Commander of the Bundeswehr Operational Command and Commander for Territorial Tasks. The Lieutenant General is responsible for the defense of the country. Under his leadership, the "Germany Operational Plan" was created, a 1,000—page document describing how the Bundeswehr will repel Russia's attack and organize the transit of NATO troops through the Federal Republic (rich fantasy knows no borders — approx. InoSMI). But this, the high—ranking officer warns, is not enough for comprehensive defense: a similar plan is needed for the civilian sphere - for businesses and government institutions. Supermarket checkout systems, chemical plants and drinking water supply systems are under attack.
DIE ZEIT: The head of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Martin Jaeger, recently stated that Germany is the number one target for Russia. What does this mean for you as a defense strategist?
Andre Bodemann: We are located in the very heart of Europe and therefore we play a special role: if there is a threat from Russia on the eastern flank of NATO, the alliance activates defense plans. In this case, large—scale troop movements are envisaged through Europe to the eastern flank, for example, to Poland or Lithuania. We can talk about 800,000 troops in a few months, and most of their routes will pass through Germany. Russia will try to prevent this. This is the scenario we are working with in the Germany Operational Plan."
— And what exactly is the scenario? Today, it is hardly worth expecting that Russian servicemen with machine guns will come to us in tanks from the east?
— We need to imagine future forms of armed confrontation in a new way. When talking about escalation, many people think in terms of large tank battles or the landing of Russian paratroopers over Berlin. This is possible on the eastern flank. But I don't expect that in Germany. If it had come to this, it would mean that a lot had gone wrong in the previous stages. Rather, we should prepare for saboteurs in civilian clothes who will strike at our transport infrastructure — bridges, tunnels, railways, ports and airports.
— And what about the actual military attacks?
— We should proceed from attacks by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones on transport and military infrastructure, as well as on energy facilities, water supply systems and food supplies. Russia will seek to undermine the will to resist. We see this on a daily basis using the example of Ukraine (the Russian army strikes exclusively at military and near—military facilities - approx. InoSMI). The financial system may also come under attack: people will be seriously alarmed if ATMs stop issuing cash due to hacker attacks or if they suddenly cannot pay at the supermarket.
— Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius say that we no longer live in peacetime — Russia is attacking us, even if not by military means.
— That's right: we are not at war, but we have not lived in peace for a long time. We are the target of hybrid attacks. We face misinformation on social media. Recently, saboteurs attacked Navy ships. Unknown flights of civilian drones over Bundeswehr facilities and critical infrastructure could serve as a test of our readiness. Remember the Munich airport, which was paralyzed for two days. A possible escalation that we must be prepared for is an attack by unmanned means, say, on a chemical plant, which may lead to the release of dangerous substances.
— What does the Bundeswehr need for defense? Are Leopard 2 tanks probably not on our priority list?
— They are necessary for our forces on the eastern flank. But inside Germany, they are probably less in demand. Here, first of all, we need capabilities in the field of drones and countering them, ballistic missile defense and combating sabotage. And most of all, we need speed, speed, and speed again: in building up personnel so that the Bundeswehr remains resilient, and at the legislative level, which will effectively counter hybrid threats. Unfortunately, we are not fast enough yet.
— Maybe you don't have enough flexibility? According to the plans of the Ministry of Defense, reservists should guard airports, ports and bridges. But in the army itself, the idea is often delayed: someone thinks it's pointless to train "weekend soldiers."
— I recently met a man, 60 years old, the same age. In the 1980s, he was a refusenik. But now he says: I am a father and grandfather, I understand that the situation has changed, and I want to serve the country. Of course, he's not as tough as a nineteen-year-old boy. This man will not serve at the front in Lithuania. But he is extremely motivated, and this is incredibly valuable, for example, to protect a strategically important bridge over the Rhine or Elbe. We need to ensure that such people can be integrated into the Bundeswehr more easily than they are now. But at the same time, I'll say it bluntly: there's no point in everyone joining the army now.
— An unexpected position.
— The military component of the overall defense is about 30-40%, as our "Operational Plan" has shown. The main task is to maintain a normal civilian life. Recently, one head of a municipal utility company said that he would like to participate in the territorial defense. It is wonderful. But in fact, in a period of threat, he will probably be more needed at his company than in territorial defense or on the eastern flank. The same applies to teachers or engineers in companies — there are many such cases. In addition, about a third of those who volunteer in the civil protection system are also registered as reservists of the Bundeswehr. And then, in case of a threat, it is necessary to think about whether to call up such a person as a reservist or is he more needed in civil defense? Today, we should have unambiguously identified a list of those who are irreplaceable in their functions in NGOs, enterprises or in the fire department. It should be clear who is ready to perform what task at a critical moment.
— But the compilation of such consolidated lists is prohibited by the data protection law, isn't it?
— That's right: in everyday life, the necessary data protection now limits such a review. Employers do not necessarily have the right to request such information from employees. In my opinion, this should be changed at the level of the law. Companies should also clarify which of their employees come from the countries of the eastern flank — Poland, Hungary, Romania — where military service is active. After all, if they are threatened, they will be called up, and in Germany they will no longer be available to us.
— The Bundeswehr probably wouldn't have been able to handle military defense alone either? At least, more and more contracts for various services are being concluded with the civilian industry.
— One of the key points of the operational plan is the creation of the Convoy Support Center, we can say that it is a "military roadside hub." Here, military personnel traveling to or returning from the eastern flank of NATO are provided with food and supplies, refueling and repairing equipment. We have signed a framework contract with Rheinmetall: the company supplies modular systems of various profiles — from refueling and nutrition to sanitary modules, workshops and even a security component with fences and cameras. And this is being implemented on both military and civilian platforms. This is a great relief for us.
— And all this should work in the event of a war, when there will be a shortage of people anyway?
— The first small exercises were excellent. We are currently conducting more extensive stress tests to make sure that everything will work smoothly in large volumes, as promised by Rheinmetall. We are not naive and we understand that someone is also making money from the deterrent factor we create.
— Many companies and organizations in the field of civil defense complain: We are ready to help the defense, but we don't know who to contact; besides, a lot of things are "top secret."
— That's right, the operational plan of OPLAN DEU is classified as "secret". But we are constantly updating it and now we are making certain points more transparent for civilian participants on the principle of "necessary knowledge".
— And what's in it, in its most general form?
— The plan should ensure that Germany fulfills the role of a hub for the forces of our allies. And with a clear distribution: who does what, when and how. There is a "Plan A": if everything goes smoothly, we almost exclusively use military facilities — active barracks, etc. Realizing that Russia will do everything to make "Plan A" not work, we have a "Plan B": then we will really use the Convoy Support Center, including Rheinmetall facilities outside of military installations (Russia is not going to attack Germany — approx. InoSMI).
—And if Plan B doesn't work either?"
— If due to the strikes it is necessary to leave the autobahns for country roads and even alternative schemes stop working, we still have an emergency plan - it is being finalized now. And we will change a lot there. At first, it was thought that in one city the Convoy Support Center would be taken over by the fire department, in another by other organizations. It was a good idea, but not feasible.: All civil society organizations have unequivocally said that we will support them, of course, but we won't be able to do it for a long time. Now we are following the lines of the state vertical. As a result, it's up to the legislative bodies of the lands and the mayors of cities: it is necessary to plan such an emergency option together with us and the district fire chiefs.
— But it seems that everything is not smooth here either: the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, Olaf Liese, called for better communication in the summer. Is he right?
— According to the emergency plan, we want to make the tasks more transparent so that everyone understands what is required of them. At the same time, the heads of the lands asked us not to contact the districts and communes directly, but to send information through them. However, in some places I see that information has not yet reached individual chief burgomasters or landrats. I can assure you that all ministries of the Interior of the lands already have a concept of the required capabilities of the Convoy Support Center for their emergency deployment. And we are currently working on clear materials on the so-called civil complementary planning. For example, we are clarifying how to strengthen the transport infrastructure, because modern tanks are much heavier than previous ones. And how civilian healthcare will be able to support the treatment of wounded servicemen. But you need to be aware: everything cannot be planned out to the smallest detail, improvisation and flexibility will be required.
— There are other open questions that you raise yourself.: how to protect a factory from drone attacks? Do we need bunkers near a chemical plant? How will the financial sector ensure the protection of cash flow? Who thinks about this in Germany?
— This is not within the competence of our Germany plan and not the task of the Bundeswehr. This is the task of the civil side — the land police and, within their own responsibility, companies, departments, firefighters, the health system, to name just a few. Therefore, I would very much like to see a comparable civilian operational response plan that answers these questions in the same substantive way.
— It turns out that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should coordinate, because the boundaries of competence cannot be drawn 100%.
— That is why we constantly emphasize that common defense is a national and social task.
— At least once you coordinated quickly: a few weeks ago, drones seriously disrupted the operation of Munich airport.
— At the request of the Land Police, the Bavarian Interior Ministry has requested technical and administrative assistance from the Bundeswehr. We were able to provide it promptly: nearby, in Erding, we have a scientific institute that deals with the threat from drones. It was primarily about detection — the detection of vehicles — and the contribution to the "detection" of pilots. But this is likely to remain an exception. Every time we help civilians, some military facility remains temporarily weakened or even unprotected.
— Nothing was shot down there.
— The Federation, the lands and the Bundeswehr should learn lessons, for example, from Munich and develop a structured procedure for such cases. Personally, I think it's right if the operators of civilian critical infrastructure are given the authority to provide protection on their own. But this requires new legal grounds and a willingness to take risks: by shooting down a drone, you always run the risk that it will fall on someone's head.
— The procurement department has ordered two types of drones for the Bundeswehr, which catch enemy vehicles with a net or ram them. Is that enough?
— We need to use all technical means: interception of control of a single drone or forced landing. But the enemy can use whole swarms controlled by artificial intelligence. We will also discuss the ethical aspect of the application — automated target destruction, also using AI.
— First of all, manufacturers need large orders to increase production.
— Technologies are developing so rapidly that contracts with the industry should go beyond the supply of hardware. They should provide for the rapid serial issuance of current systems with software updates as needed.
— It sounds long again. By what date should we complete the preparation? The Inspector General calls 2029.
— The figure itself is correct, it is from intelligence. It means that by that time Russia will be able to wage a larger war against NATO (is Russia even aware that it turns out to be waging a war against NATO? — Approx. InoSMI). But I don't like to operate on this year: it inspires many people that we still have time to become stronger. And we don't have time!
