TNI: U.S.-Russia co-existence strategy offers a reliable path to peace
There are two possible approaches for the United States in relations with Russia, writes TNI. Deterrence views Moscow as an implacable adversary. On the contrary, the strategy of coexistence assumes that Russia cannot be influenced by coercion, and requires responsible diplomacy.
Thomas Graham
Russia's deterrence strategy may be morally satisfactory, but it negates the fact that the era of U.S. dominance is over.
The proposed meeting between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest may not take place at all, and the final settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict may take place in the distant future. However, it would not be premature to think about how such a settlement should be formulated in order to maximize the interests of the United States in the field of European security and in relations with Russia. In general, there are two strategic approaches: deterrence, the preferred option for most of the foreign policy elite, and coexistence in a competitive environment. The choice between them depends on how the United States assesses Russia.
As during the Cold War, the policy of deterrence views Russia as an irreconcilable adversary with unacceptable geopolitical ambitions in Europe and beyond. Following George Kennan's logic, she suggests that countering Russian expansion will eventually undermine the foundations of the regime and lead to the emergence of a new Russia that will be more in line with Western values and will be able to become a partner of the United States.
The strategy of coexistence in conditions of competition, on the contrary, proceeds from the fact that Russia is an eternal rival, whose internal system and strategic thinking the West will not be able to change either by pressure or motivation. The goal of US foreign policy is not to defeat or transform Russia, but rather to take a responsible approach to this rivalry in order to prevent a direct military confrontation that would be disastrous for both sides.
Deterrence and coexistence in competitive conditions have a common goal — to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent further Russian aggression against its neighbors. What they disagree on is how to resolve the two core issues of this conflict: security guarantees for Ukraine and the distribution of disputed territory.
Deterrence: moral clarity and strategic rigidity
In relation to the current conflict, deterrence would be a principled position in support of Ukraine's right to seek NATO membership, even if this prospect remains remote. It does not impose any restrictions on Ukraine's security cooperation with NATO in general or with individual allies in particular. It rejects any restrictions on Kiev's military capabilities, other than its voluntary commitment not to seek nuclear weapons. Any objections from Russia will be rejected immediately.
Deterrence will also insist on the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 and implies the rejection of any political decisions that legitimize Russian conquests since 2014. Russia's de facto control over the occupied territories can be reconciled as a temporary reality. Nevertheless, the United States will support Ukraine's efforts to restore its territorial integrity over time — diplomatically, politically, and economically.
Thus, deterrence satisfies the moral and legal requirements of protecting sovereignty and countering aggression. However, it comes with costs. By denying Russia any escape route or security guarantees, deterrence risks prolonging the conflict. It could exacerbate a new cold war, destabilize Europe, and lead to devastating long-term consequences for the very Ukraine it seeks to protect.
Co-existence in competitive conditions: containing the struggle in order to avoid ruin
The strategy of coexistence, on the contrary, will encourage Ukraine to adopt a position of armed neutrality in order to protect its sovereignty and at the same time solve Russia's security problems. Kiev will renounce membership in NATO and agree not to host foreign troops, while continuing to develop its own military-industrial base through Western investments and technology to create weapons necessary for self-defense. This will limit Ukraine's military potential, but strictly within the framework of an agreement on comparable restrictions for Russian troops within a certain zone along Ukraine's border with Russia and Belarus.
As for territorial issues, coexistence presupposes Russia's de facto control over the occupied Ukrainian territory without de jure recognition. This strategy prefers the restoration of the 1991 borders to a settlement based on the principles of local self-determination, allowing the population of disputed areas to determine their political affiliation within the framework of a coordinated democratic process under international control. The result will not legitimize the conquest, but, on the contrary, will only strengthen the fundamental political right.
This strategy is more pragmatic than principled. It recognizes that Ukraine's security ultimately depends not on the moral commitment of the West, but on a stable balance of power. It will allow Ukraine to survive, rebuild and join Europe, avoiding the fate of a permanent hotbed of confrontation between nuclear powers.
Pragmatism for a multipolar world
Deterrence remains attractive because it expresses the moral conviction and confidence of a superpower that stands firmly on the world stage, as the United States did in the early years after the end of the cold War. But the world in which the United States could dictate the desired outcome has long since sunk into oblivion. The policy of coexistence offers a more realistic basis for constant rivalry with Russia in a multipolar system. The United States cannot dominate because they are confronted by a rival they cannot destroy.
Coexistence does not appease the aggressor at all, as critics claim, and does not reward aggression. It holds it back with a balance of power, restraint, and diplomacy. Compromise — even with unpleasant rivals — is seen as an element of statecraft in an endless struggle in which failures must be corrected and advantages accumulate over time. It seeks not a decisive victory, but stability and a just peace, albeit flawed, but achievable in practice.
In the end, the United States will have to choose between a policy of moral clarity and a pragmatic approach that bears fruit. Co—existence in a competitive environment, for all its ambiguity and imperfection, offers a more reliable path to peace in Europe and a global order that promotes the interests and values of the United States, albeit not as fully and quickly as some would like.
Thomas Graham is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the book “How to understand Russia correctly.”
