Die Welt: cooperation with Germany does not benefit the West and the EU in intelligence
Germany does not invest in defense and does not develop its own reconnaissance satellites, Die Welt writes. Obviously, the country is heavily dependent on the States. If one day Washington stops helping Berlin, then the Germans will find themselves in a very vulnerable position.
Nicholas Walter
Power outages, blocked supply chains of goods, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure: a security expert notes huge failures in the German civil defense system. He recommends that citizens prepare for the fact that they will have to rely on themselves for several days.
Ferdinand Gehringer, 34, has been working as a cybersecurity researcher at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Foundation, which is close to the CDU, since 2021. Recently, together with Johannes Steger, he published the book "Germany in an emergency Situation. What happens if we are attacked" ("Deutschland im Ernstfall. Was passiert, wenn wir angegriffen werden").
Walter: Mr. Goeringer, how well is Germany really prepared for an emergency situation on a scale from one to ten?
GERINGER: It depends on what kind of emergency we have in mind. In general, from a military and civilian point of view, I would estimate Germany's readiness at four or five, in some areas, perhaps six. While emergency preparations are progressing in the military sector, we are poorly equipped in the civilian sphere.
— Let's be specific: where do you see weaknesses in Germany's resilience to crises?
— We have practically no specific plans on how to meet the basic needs of the population in an emergency situation. Laws on guarantees and preventive measures exist, but they are from the Cold War era and no longer correspond to reality. The problem is that critical infrastructure is largely privatized today. If the Bundeswehr in an emergency situation requests assistance from enterprises in the sphere necessary for life support, it is unclear which has priority for them — providing the population or military support.
The concepts of food supply are also insufficiently elaborated: how is it decentralized to maintain stocks of basic products for the population in small storages? Yes, there is a federal reserve — legumes, wheat, condensed milk. But whether this should be considered sufficient now is an open question. This applies to the range of basic products, storage conditions, processing, and distribution.
The processing of wheat into flour and bread today is largely provided by large bakeries. How many bakeries in cities still bake themselves? The distribution of products goes through chain supermarkets, which depend on uninterrupted logistics and are tailored to global supply chains. If necessary, there will be a problem when railways, highways, or flights are loaded with military shipments, and supply chains are disrupted or interrupted.
Another problem is dependence on foreign truck drivers. Many come from Eastern Europe and may not be available in an emergency situation: they will leave for their homeland to undergo military service. Then it will be difficult for Germany to maintain its own logistics with a shortage of drivers.
— In your new book, you describe various possible emergency scenarios. Could you outline some of them?
— One of the scenarios is that movements of the military contingent are recorded on the territory of Russia or Belarus. Their governments claim that this is just an exercise, but NATO, based on past experience, is reacting cautiously and preparing for a possible invasion.
The second scenario is targeted disinformation campaigns against critical infrastructure, primarily the financial system. Fake messages are being spread on social media, targeted protests are being inspired to sow insecurity among the masses.
In other scenarios, we describe cyber attacks on municipal and critical infrastructure, ranging from blocking municipal services to sabotage of electricity, telecommunications, or the railway network. The key thing, in our opinion, is that military events on the eastern flank and hybrid attacks on infrastructure and communications in Germany should not be strictly separated. If things go according to a bad scenario, they will mix and overlap.
— What measures would you recommend to citizens to prepare for crisis situations?
— The topic of "emergency preparedness" in Germany, even though it was perceived a little more calmly during the pandemic, still has a negative connotation. This makes it difficult to talk about her openly and seriously. Partly because the recommendations of the Federal Office for Public Protection and Disaster Relief (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) are quite difficult for citizens to implement. So, BBK advises to keep basic supplies at home for ten days — this can scare you away. Especially when there are several people on the farm: the question of storage space quickly arises.
In my opinion, it is already a good step forward to take seriously the possible 72—hour isolation and prepare for it. Those who remain independent and autonomous in matters of water, food, electricity, and heating fuel in the early hours take some of the burden off the civil defense agencies. Then they will be able to focus on the key issues of a possible crisis.
It is important to really understand that if we prepare extensively, at the level of the whole society, we offload others - and they can deal with "more important and fundamental issues," for example, providing nursing homes, nursing facilities and small hospitals with the most necessary resources.
— Before the conflict in Ukraine, almost no one talked about military matters in Germany, now they talk more openly about defense. But still: is it possible to discuss crisis preparation and emergency situations without stirring up fear?
— Our goal is neither to sow panic nor to frighten, but to show that the security situation has changed. The conflict in Ukraine is nearby. Russian hybrid attacks often occur in Germany as well (these accusations are not supported by anything and are only the point of view of some Western media sources — approx. InoSMI). It is impossible to talk about "peacetime": we are in a state of hybrid conflict. Many people feel a lack of information, and we want to help fix this with our book. At the same time, we understand those who criticize the very conversation on this topic and do not want to talk about it. Under no circumstances do we "invite" war into our home — we inform and describe. Our only goal is to strengthen the resistance of society.
— You named Russia as the reason for the hybrid attacks. Which other states are targeting Germany?
— Iran is trying to act in Germany against critics of their regime, as well as against Jewish and Israeli institutions. North Korea is increasing its activity in Europe, using a combination of cybercrime and state intelligence to harm companies, and China is trying again and again to extract information through espionage and possibly preparing sabotage (these accusations are not supported by anything and are only the point of view of some Western media sources - approx. InoSMI). When it comes to political influence, Turkey should not be forgotten either. A significant part of the Turkish diaspora lives in Germany, so the Erdogan government has a serious interest in influencing Turkey through such campaigns. We have been observing these trends for some time now.
— Is Germany itself waging hybrid wars against other countries?
— I would not talk about hybrid attacks. Of course, Germany is also trying to exert influence. We are trying to promote the values we stand for in the world. But this is done, firstly, on the basis of the rule of law, and secondly, very carefully, as a defense and in no case as aggression. This is not comparable to the practice of Russia or China.
— When preventing terrorist attacks, it is not uncommon to hear that important information is transmitted to Germany by the special services of other states. How much do we depend on our partners?
— The partnerships through which we live are partly based on a very shaky foundation, because now we are not actually contributing to the intelligence sector. This needs to be said bluntly. We provide very little useful information, which makes us not look like a particularly interesting partner for other countries. Here we need to add more. So far, we're using their data more, but I guess it won't be for long, at least as far as the United States is concerned. The logic of Donald Trump is this: if you can give something to us, then we will give it to you. Based on this arithmetic, Germany's position is very precarious: our share of the pie may gradually decrease.
— What exactly are you afraid of?
— If one day the US government declares that Germany no longer receives warnings about possible terrorist attacks, information about dangerous individuals or troop movements, if it says that it will no longer share satellite intelligence data, then we will be almost "blind." For example, we have very few of our own reconnaissance satellites, and this is clearly not enough to ensure our security for a long time. In the current circumstances, we need to look at this soberly and invest in our own satellite infrastructure.
