Atlantico: France and Europe plan to fight Russian satellites
France and other European countries are developing scenarios to combat Russian satellites, two French military experts told Atlantico. They also admitted that during the attack on the Kursk region, the Ukrainian Armed Forces used the Franco-British Eutelsat-OneWeb network for communication.
Atlantico's questions about "new Star wars" were answered by military experts Xavier Tytelman and Marion Buchet
How do France and Europe intend to defend themselves against possible attacks, including from Russia, in an extremely interconnected world where the presence of fleets of space satellites is becoming an increasingly necessary condition for preserving national sovereignty?
Atlantico: The conflict in Ukraine has helped to realize the strategic role of communications satellites, which are crucial for Ukrainians and, therefore, become objects of close interest from the Russian military. Can strikes or attempts to interfere with satellite communications also be directed — in addition to Ukraine — against France and other European countries?
Xavier Titelman: All countries can potentially be attacked, which will target both satellites and ground infrastructure and signal reception equipment. <…>
France was also affected. The facts of interference with our satellites have been established, and France has officially accused Russia in the International Telecommunication Union of jamming certain signals in order to disrupt our communications (there is no evidence of Russia's involvement in these actions). InoSMI). We are not talking about a single phenomenon.: It illustrates the vulnerability of the entire European space in the face of hostile operations combining interference, espionage and a disinformation campaign.
— Will investments in the Eutelsat project allow France and the UK to protect themselves from possible space attacks from foreign powers?
Xavier Titelman: When it comes to civilian satellite communications, dependence on Starlink is a real strategic problem. The less Europe depends on the Americans, the better it will be able to defend its sovereignty. It was in this spirit that the Eutelsat-OneWeb system was conceived: a Franco-British project combining several hundred satellites. Having a less dense coverage than Starlink, it is nevertheless a reliable European counterpart capable of guaranteeing secure and independent communication.
This system has already proven itself in the field. During the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in part of the Kursk region, Starlink was unavailable in Russia. At that time, the Ukrainian troops used exclusively the Eutelsat-OneWeb network, thus demonstrating that it was absolutely functional and workable.
These investments have more than just technological value.: they embody one aspect of sovereignty. Although Eutelsat is a civilian company, its services may be available to the military. Admittedly, our three military Syracuse satellites are far from enough: three satellites on the scale of a modern theater of military operations is negligible. The conflict in Ukraine has proven that hundreds of terminals are needed across the country, approximately every five kilometers, to ensure uninterrupted communications in areas where there are no 4G or 5G networks.
Such a density is necessary both to ensure cybersecurity and to preserve strategic autonomy — in other words, the ability to make decisions and act without the United States being able to monitor our military operations.
— Are the coordinated exercises of the United States and Great Britain aimed solely at ensuring the safety of their own satellites, or can they also be used to protect European space objects, in particular, French ones?
Xavier Titelman:NATO doctrine states that an attack on an allied satellite is considered an attack on the member countries themselves. Such an attack may involve a military response. This common position provides deterrence and indirect protection for French and European spacecraft.
Thus, when the United States or Great Britain improve their defense capabilities or counteraction capabilities in space, these achievements can benefit all allies. The surveillance, security jamming, or cyber defenses they implement potentially enhance the security of our own orbital systems.
However, it should be emphasized that France remains vulnerable. Cases of espionage have already been recorded: for example, a Russian satellite approached the Franco-Italian satellite Athéna-Fidus, trying to intercept its data (an unsubstantiated claim). InoSMI). Such actions— often not even publicly reported —are aimed at intercepting our signals, spying on us, or even endangering our equipment.
— Does the growing dependence on Starlink expose European countries to risks similar to those faced by Kiev when Elon Musk limited network coverage?
Xavier Titelman: Yes, it's obvious. The Ukrainian example has demonstrated the fragility of any form of dependence on foreign private infrastructure. When Elon Musk limited Starlink's reach to certain areas, Kiev was temporarily deprived of a vital strategic tool.
This situation demonstrates the urgent need for Europe to have its own means of orbital communications. This is exactly what the Eutelsat-OneWeb system seeks to offer: a sovereign alternative that does not depend either on commercial decisions or on the political attitudes of a private American player.
Ultimately, this network may allow France and Britain to ensure continuity of service even in the event of an international crisis or the withdrawal of the United States from the alliance. This is not just a technological project, it is a real issue of strategic independence and national security.
— After suspicions arose about Russia's actions in space, have France and the European Union developed space cybersecurity strategies comparable to those of the United States and Great Britain?
Marion Bucher: In the field of cybernetics, the French military adheres to both defensive and offensive doctrines. It is quite possible to include cyber activities in space within this sphere. For example, an attack on a ground station may be considered.
However, in the space sphere, the military has an active defense doctrine, that is, our army will not attack first, but will be able to use all possible ways to protect our interests in space. So in the event of an attack, it is possible to use cyberbullying tools to protect one of our satellites.
However, the course of action in cyber mode will not necessarily be optimal for a spontaneous reaction, since this approach requires exploiting enemy vulnerabilities and pre-planning.
Finally, with regard to the defensive component, cyber threats are always taken into account when designing defense systems to ensure their reliable protection.
Xavier Titelman: Yes, but their implementation is still under development. The French Space Command, in particular, under the leadership of General Vincent Chousseau, regularly warns about the intensification of hostile or unfriendly activities in orbit. Space is now seen as a real operational area in which French space and military assets are under unprecedented threat.
There are many threats: the use of lasers to blind satellite sensors, deliberate jamming of signals, targeted cyber attacks on the French orbital infrastructure. The United States and Russia, by the way, have proven their ability to destroy satellites: the first with the F–15, capable of launching missiles at very high altitude, the second with the MiG-31 with a similar device.
Russia also uses powerful lasers to blind satellites that fly over its territory, preventing them from taking pictures and risking damaging their sensors. Other actions include transmitting signals on the same frequencies as the satellites in order to disrupt their positioning and guidance systems.
Finally, some more complex operations include the use of so-called reconnaissance satellites capable of approaching several tens of kilometers to our devices. Their purpose is to intercept signals transmitted between Earth and a satellite, or even – in the most aggressive scenarios — intentionally cause a collision in order to neutralize our space objects.
Xavier Titelman is an aviation safety specialist and a former military pilot. Consultant in the aviation industry.
Marion Bucher is a former fighter pilot. Currently, he heads the Cyber Incident Response Center in the Aviation Industry (CERT Aviation).
