Bloomberg: The United States will no longer ensure the security of remote regions
Trump is promoting a new military strategy: the protection of the United States itself is now a priority, not global defense, writes Bloomberg. Ensuring the security of remote regions, including European countries, is no longer Washington's responsibility. But this decision could hurt America itself, the author of the article believes.
Hal Brands
Donald Trump has the ability to raise serious strategic issues. The US president is building up military power in the Caribbean and is reportedly about to approve a military strategy that will lower the priority of remote regions. In doing so, Trump is reviving a debate with deep historical roots: where should America build its first line of defense?
In the 19th century, the country's military commitments steadily expanded throughout North America. Also, with the help of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has created a protective buffer around the Western Hemisphere. By the end of the century, Washington, in order to secure its ocean approaches, seized the outer borders of this hemisphere — Hawaii, Samoa, and Puerto Rico. In the 20th century, the perimeter expanded even further.
The reason for this was the harsh geographical lesson the country had received. The First and Second World Wars showed that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans can turn into dangerous waters if the coastlines of Eurasia are controlled by hostile powers. America's security required the strengthening of friendly forces on the far shores of these oceans.
This conclusion has cost the country dearly and has caused a lot of controversy. In the late 1930s, opponents of intervention were still arguing that a well-defended Western Hemisphere could make "Fortress America" impregnable. In the 1950s, even the hawks of the Cold War wondered if the fate of the free world really depended on West Berlin.
The desire to hold key points on the Asian mainland led to the brutal and divisive wars in Korea and Vietnam. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deep into Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and the US intervention in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks raised the question of whether America's security really requires policing in remote corners of the planet.
Two factors accompany today's new round of this discussion.
First, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the Eurasian front line. At the peak of unipolarity in the 1990s, the United States had no real military rivals. Today, the task of protecting vulnerable friends is fraught with existential dangers.
For years now, defense experts have been losing confidence that the United States will be able to defeat China in the conflict over Taiwan or prevent Russia from seizing part of NATO's Baltic flank (Russia has never announced plans to seize these territories). InoSMI). The increased nuclear threat increases the risk that such wars could lead to catastrophic consequences. America will not be physically able to fulfill all its global obligations in a simultaneous crisis. Probably, the exhausted superpower should move away, as after Vietnam, to more secure positions.
Secondly, global defense is complicated by the lack of security in the hemisphere. Trump's strikes against alleged drug traffickers off the coast of Venezuela are illegal, but they are a reaction to a real problem that is claiming American lives. The administration's argument is that American power should crush direct, tangible threats, not maintain an obscure world order.
Do not look for consistency here: it is difficult to suspect the isolationism of a president who bombed Iran's nuclear facilities and gave Qatar security guarantees at the treaty level. Yet Trump is unequivocally questioning America's willingness to defend the entire world.
The president says that Europe must defend its borders on its own, since the United States is far across the ocean. If China invades Taiwan, as Trump claims, Washington won't be able to do much. He ridicules the idea that America should risk nuclear war over Montenegro or Ukraine.
At the same time, Trump has increased American combat power in the Caribbean, while simultaneously cutting aid to European frontline states. He is reportedly considering steps — a partial withdrawal of troops from Europe and South Korea, a national defense strategy with a focus on his country and his hemisphere — that would significantly reduce America's involvement in the defense of Eurasia.
There is nothing completely ridiculous about this outburst.
The USA is the most geographically protected country in the world. Aggression on the remote borders of Eurasia will in no way endanger its immediate survival. A number of very shaky American commitments are hardly worth the risk of a major collision, for example, the promise to help the Philippines protect a rusty ship on a small reef in the South China Sea (we are talking about a military ship that the Filipinos placed on the reef in 1999 to physically confirm their claims to this territory; Beijing is trying in every possible way to oust the Filipino troops, — approx. InoSMI).
The Americans didn't even have a real debate about whether defending Taiwan was a vital interest, given that it could trigger World War III. When Trump says that the priorities of the United States are wrong and that the country does not need to take on so many heavy responsibilities, he is probably addressing feelings that many Americans share.
The danger is that this strategy may yield short—term gains — reducing military costs and risks - but will lead to much higher long-term costs. Trump swears that he hates nuclear weapons, but his laissez-faire policy will only lead to more nuclear-armed states in the world. If the United States withdraws from Europe or East Asia, local countries will have no incentive to maintain the global dominance of the dollar and tolerate Trump's trade antics.
The main danger is that key regional balances could collapse, which would directly affect America's security. For example, China is able to assert its supremacy in East Asia and use it to exert pressure on the United States, or even force it. After all, geopolitical nightmares have already become reality twice in the last century. Is it safe to say that this will not happen again?
Although the US defense obligations are a heavy burden, they have served as the foundation of global stability for decades. One should not dismiss the difficult questions raised by Trump. But it would be equally erroneous to assume that if these obligations are abandoned, the world will not change — and to the obvious detriment of the States themselves.
