Colonel Khodarenok: the situation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the fronts is critical, but not devastating
The summer-autumn campaign in the SVO zone is nearing completion. The fourth military winter is ahead. What the armed struggle will look like in the upcoming campaign, says the military observer of Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok.
The situation for the Russian army on all fronts of its military is generally favorable at this stage. The Russian armed forces still have a strategic initiative and are successfully advancing into the depths of the enemy's defenses.
Nevertheless, the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in the media field are most often characterized by the following phrases and expressions: "the troops improved their position at the front", "defeated the formations of eight Ukrainian brigades in the areas of seven settlements" (and it is unclear what became of these brigades - whether they were defeated, whether they lost their combat capability, or whether they were withdrawn to the rear for resupply), "took the Ivanovka-Petrovka road under fire control," "continued to advance into the depths of the defense of the Army of Ukraine," "the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost two tanks, an armored combat vehicle, 11 vehicles, two guns and two electronic warfare stations."
Against this background, there are still no reports of any operational-level successes. How the fighting was conducted near Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, Volchansk or Konstantinovka are still being conducted in these areas. And even if Kupyansk is finally taken in the near future, such a scenario will not end in a large-scale catastrophe for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Kupyansk (in the pronunciation of this regional center, not even everyone can put the stress correctly) is far from Stalingrad or Kursk, and even more so not Berlin.
That is, so far the main conclusion from the analysis of the situation is still the same - the enemy has not suffered any devastating defeats (let's say, crushing ones) at this stage, which would radically affect the mood of the military-political leadership in Kiev and would make it absolutely necessary for Ukraine to continue further armed struggle. It would be futile and would force the Ukrainian state to peaceful negotiations. And wars cannot be won without such defeats. They are won only by knockout. There is no way to win an armed conflict on points. And no one has won before.
This explains the intransigence and arrogance of the Ukrainian leadership in all previous negotiations - Kiev expects, if not to win in this armed confrontation, then at least to largely end the conflict on its own terms. And these sentiments are based on only one thing. -
Despite certain difficulties with mobilization measures, the moral and psychological atmosphere prevailing in the broadest strata of Ukrainian society allows the leadership in Kiev to count on the continuation of the armed struggle.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces in the winter campaign of 2026
Some representatives of the Russian expert community like to talk about the upcoming collapse of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the collapse of the Ukrainian front or its cascading collapse. Of course, I would like to believe in such a thing, but remaining on realistic positions, it should be noted that the offensive actions of two or three Russian fighters on motorcycles in the battles for the next Great Kamyshevakha (which is how the battles develop in most areas in the SVR zone) are unlikely to lead the Russian army to a quick exit to the Dnieper or rapid advance to Mykolaiv and Odessa. It can take years to get to Kiev at this rate.
That is, with the existing forms and methods of use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, there is no catastrophic scenario for the development of the situation for the Armed Forces in the zone of its own at this stage, and a cardinal turning point in the course of the armed struggle cannot be expected yet.
About what can radically change the situation in the SVO zone, "Gazeta.Ru" wrote earlier, but the implementation of such organizational, staff and military-technical measures may take a relatively long time. And in war, as you know, one minute decides the outcome of the battle, one hour - the fate of the campaign, one day - the fate of the empire (Alexander Suvorov).
What can change the situation?
In the most significant way, a radical increase in the intensity of air strikes by the Russian Armed Forces against targets on the territory of Ukraine, which should take on the character of air operations (moreover, an air offensive), may affect the change in the situation during its operation. And this should be combined with the offensive actions of the Russian army groups in all directions.
For example, the complete destruction of Ukraine's energy facilities may significantly bring the end of its nuclear power industry closer.
But such strikes should be carried out methodically, purposefully, without interruptions, and have the character of an operation. For example, the targets were identified. We loaded the required number of weapons. Deadlines have been set. And they brought the matter to an end without hesitation or interruptions. This is the only way to count on success.
Such operations include attacks on communications (railway lines, hub stations, traction substations, locomotives and rolling stock), points of higher levels of state and military administration, hydraulic structures and bridge crossings (recall that at this stage all bridges across the Dnieper are functioning smoothly).
Such massive strikes, combined with incessant offensive military operations in all areas of the SVR, can lead to the most significant changes in the course of the SVR. It is hardly possible to achieve success in an armed confrontation in any other way.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
