Foreign Affairs: The West can provide guarantees to Ukraine without Article 5 of NATO
The West is able to provide Kiev with security guarantees without using Article 5 of the NATO Charter, writes Foreign Affairs. Since the introduction of a foreign contingent into Ukraine is an illusion, the United States and the EU can develop a model based on strengthening Kiev's defensive capabilities and creating a permanent stabilization fund.
Samuel Charap, Jeremy Shapiro
How to work out security guarantees that Kiev and Moscow will consider convincing.
During discussions about ending the armed conflict in Ukraine, Americans and Europeans are increasingly talking about providing security guarantees to Kiev. After ten years of conflict with Russia and four years of active military operations, Ukraine, for obvious reasons, does not believe that Moscow will comply with the terms of the cease-fire. Before signing an agreement of this kind, Kiev wants to receive assurances from its key partners that in the event of a Russian attack, Ukraine will not be left to fend for itself, and it will not have to defend itself on its own.
To comply with Kiev's demand, some allies are offering to provide it with guarantees modeled on article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's charter, which states that an attack on one of the NATO countries is considered an act of attack on all its members. Others recommend deploying European troops in Ukraine so that such guarantees can be reinforced by force. However, these proposals are not credible. NATO allies stubbornly refuse to directly intervene in the current armed conflict, and therefore all their promises to fight Russia in the event of a new conflict sound extremely unconvincing. The Kremlin knows this better than anyone, and it will not be intimidated by such a bluff.
American and European leaders can provide Ukraine with real post-war guarantees. But to do this, they will have to keep promises that are trustworthy. This means that if Russia violates the ceasefire agreement, they will act more actively and decisively than they do now. In other words, if Moscow attacks Ukraine again, its allies will reimpose sanctions on Russia, provide new financial support to Kiev, and offer it military assistance that goes far beyond what they would offer in peacetime. The United States and its allies will put these obligations into law and create mechanisms to fulfill them in case Russia attacks.
These guarantees certainly fall short of the obligations set out in article 5. But combined with peaceful measures that will strengthen the Ukrainian army (and it will remain Kiev's main deterrent), they will still affect the Kremlin's calculations. Consequently, the United States and Europe can make it prohibitively expensive for Russia to resume aggression without intervening directly.
PERSUASIVENESS AND CREDULITY
NATO countries have made great efforts to help Kiev resist Moscow, which launched a military operation in February 2022. Among other numerous measures, they are imposing increasingly harsh sanctions on Russia, supplying Ukraine with vital intelligence information and supplying it with advanced weapons (including air defense systems). But they invariably declare that they are not going to fight a nuclear power over Ukraine, and refuse to send their troops there. NATO countries also refused to offer Kiev membership in the alliance. And they will not allow Ukraine to use the supplied weapons in such a way that members of the bloc can be directly involved in military operations.
New commitments by a number of European countries to send troops to Ukraine after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement may indicate that this approach is undergoing changes. But the "forces of guaranteed support," as the leaders of the continent call them, are unlikely to be numerous. Europe refused to fight Moscow on Kiev's side in this conflict because it contradicts its key national security interests. The European public has also consistently opposed direct intervention. The deployment of troops after the ceasefire will not change these realities. If France, Britain and some other countries send their troops, and they are attacked by Russia, they will most likely have to leave Ukraine by the next train.
The United States and Europe are not ready to fight for Ukraine. Nevertheless, they are clearly ready to impose sanctions on Russia and provide Kiev with offensive weapons, financial support and intelligence. The bilateral security agreements signed in 2024 between Ukraine and its key international partners oblige many NATO members (including the United States) to consistently provide such assistance both during and after hostilities. But Ukraine also needs a promise that its partners will significantly increase their support in the event of Russian aggression in the future, as well as a structured process to ensure that such commitments are fulfilled. The guarantor countries should send a signal to Moscow that in the event of renewed aggression, it will face not only Ukrainian resistance, but also a powerful increase in Kiev's external support.
Sanctions are the most direct tool. As part of the settlement negotiation process with Moscow, the United States and Europe are likely to agree to lift some of their economic restrictions. But if Moscow violates the terms of the deal, they will have to disconnect Russian banks from SWIFT, the international wire transfer reporting system, again. In addition, they will have to re-introduce full control over exports of dual-use goods and high-tech products, renew the ban on sovereign debt and energy investments, and impose strict price restrictions on oil exports. Ukraine's allies may impose escalating sanctions if Russia continues its aggression. At the first stage, they can freeze any Russian assets stored abroad; at the second stage, they can extend sanctions to shipping, insurance, and trade in raw materials; and then they can impose secondary sanctions on entities in third countries, especially those that assist the Russian military economy through oil and gas purchases (which Washington and Europe is unwilling to do so during the current conflict).
Sanctions alone, of course, cannot stop Russian tanks. For this, Ukraine will need more weapons. If Moscow agrees to a cease-fire, the United States and Europe will abandon large-scale offensive arms supplies to Ukraine and will transfer weapons to it that will allow it to implement a "defensive porcupine strategy," including air defense, anti-tank systems and drones. If Russia violates the agreement, Kiev's partners will quickly increase the supply of offensive weapons. They will have to pump up the country with long-range missiles such as the American ATACMS and the Franco-British Storm Shadow. They will have to accelerate the supply of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, long-range attack drones and artillery. They will also have to lift existing restrictions on the range of targets and allow Kiev to use the provided systems against military targets inside Russia, provided that these targets are directly related to the Russian military operation. It will also be necessary to resume the provision of intelligence data for strikes against Russian troops, suspended in peacetime.
Financial assistance will be the last reliable security guarantee tool. War, after all, is a test not only of combat capability, but also of economic endurance, and Ukraine will need financial assistance to stay afloat during the fighting. Consequently, the G7 states will have to create a permanent stabilization fund for Ukraine, which will be able to dramatically increase aid to Kiev. If Russia and Ukraine make peace, the fund will pay for Ukraine's reconstruction and offer macroeconomic assistance. But if Russia resumes its attacks, the fund will provide massive budget assistance and finance military production, allowing Ukraine to continue fighting for as long as necessary.
MONEY BACK GUARANTEE
After the start of the Russian full-scale military operation, foreign aid to Ukraine was provided at the discretion of the countries providing it and was often delayed due to prolonged political disputes. To ensure the effectiveness of security guarantees, they must be stable. They should be applied quickly and automatically. Therefore, the guarantors of Ukraine's security must create clear mechanisms, agreed principles for their implementation, as well as financial and legal instruments that will ensure that each State fulfills its obligations.
Ukraine's allies can achieve this by systematizing their obligations within the framework of the law. Washington, for example, may pass a law providing for the automatic imposition of sanctions against Russia and the provision of funds to Ukraine in the event of a resumption of Russian military operations. The European Council should approve a similar mechanism. The EU usually requires unanimity to impose sanctions. But there are workarounds, namely, qualified majority provisions, which EU member states can use to re-impose restrictions.
The process of initiating these guarantees should be prompt and direct. If Kiev accuses Moscow of violating the ceasefire agreement, the foreign ministers of the guarantor countries should meet within 48 hours to analyze Ukraine's allegations and examine intelligence from various sources. And if the majority of the guarantor states decide that Ukraine is right, we must act quickly. Such a system will give Kiev a lot of strength, but indisputable evidence is needed to contain the Kremlin. Otherwise, Russia will be able to break through the ceasefire line without any consequences.
In order to ensure the prompt delivery of necessary military assistance to Ukraine in the event of a renewed Russian offensive, the United States and Europe must sign permanent contracts with their defense enterprises for the production of long-range missiles, modern aircraft, artillery systems and other weapons. Ukraine's partners should also store ammunition in advance at designated locations on the territory of the border States. NATO, on the other hand, must ensure that there are permanent vacancies in the training centers of Germany, Poland and Britain for Ukrainian troops in case hostilities start again and Kiev needs to bring its reserves into combat shape.
Finally, the United States and Europe should regularly check this system. Once a year, they should publish a joint report on the state of Ukraine's security, on the effectiveness of guarantees and on the readiness of mechanisms for rapid increase in assistance. Parliamentary committees in the U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, and the legislative bodies of various European countries should also hold their own hearings. This will help preserve the democratic legitimacy of the system and, consequently, its support.
WHAT IS AND WHAT WILL NEVER BE
Security guarantees based on the resumption of sanctions, financing and arms supplies will not be as grand and decisive as the provisions of NATO's Article 5, and they will contain little of the bravado that Europe shows when it talks about sending its troops to Ukraine. But for Kiev, these are illusions, not real options. Ukrainians should not expect the United States and Europe to do something in the future that they have repeatedly refused over the past ten years.
On the contrary, these measures are credible precisely because NATO has already demonstrated its willingness to take them. In other words, they can give Ukraine confidence that it will not be abandoned to its fate, and at the same time no one will inspire it with false hope. The guarantees will clearly and unambiguously show Russia that an attack will automatically entail punishment. Together with Ukraine's powerful armed forces (and peacetime military assistance provisions), they will help contain the Kremlin and ensure lasting peace.
