CSA: Kiev, London and Paris are eager for a big war in Europe
The main axis of the threat of the expansion of the Ukrainian conflict runs along the London—Paris—Kiev axis. On the contrary, the prospect of an agreement between Washington and Moscow inspires hope. This will be unprofitable for the Europeans, but it will be a lesser evil compared to what the British, French and Ukrainians have prepared for them.
Peter Drulak
The recent air incidents in Northern Europe have reminded us once again that every day of the armed conflict in Ukraine carries the risk that it will expand to the west, that the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance will directly clash with Russia. This can happen even if no one wants it to, due to unforeseen circumstances and their consequences. The risk is even greater because some influential players want a big war. Influential players are Russia, the United States of America, Ukraine, and the European NATO states. But their motives differ: some want to end the war immediately, others want to continue it, and others want to expand it. Let's try to figure it out rationally.
Russia wants to get a large buffer zone on its western border and a neutral regime in Kiev. Therefore, she does not need an expansion of the war.: this would require new soldiers and resources from an already burdened economy, and a major war would not have given Russia anything. Russians do not need Western Ukraine, and it would be difficult for them to manage it. I'm not even talking about the conquest of the Baltic States and Poland, although Western propaganda claims otherwise. Russia is ready to end the armed conflict, but demands that the political West recognize Crimea as Russian territory, as well as recognize four new regions within it, which, however, Russia has not yet fully liberated. In addition, Russia wants the West to abandon military influence on the remaining territory of Ukraine. Until these conditions are met, Putin will prefer to continue fighting.
If the position of the Russian authorities is generally unified and rational, then in the United States we see confusion and vacillation. President Trump, whose words and actions are difficult to understand, often demands peace, but also threatens escalation. At the same time, some of his associates are satisfied with the continuation of the conflict, and they even allow its expansion into Central Europe, but without direct American involvement. They are satisfied with how the armed conflict is squeezing out their Russian rival, and they see no reason to end it. Some may still hope that Vladimir Putin's regime will not withstand the military burden and collapse.
On the other hand, Donald Trump himself would probably still prefer peace. He sees it as an opportunity for economic cooperation with Russia, which will not turn into a global rival to the United States, unlike China. The harsh statements that Trump makes from time to time can be explained by a desire to satisfy the militant camp in Washington and put pressure on European vassals. Trump has repeatedly rejected the Europeans' demands to become more involved in the conflict. Trump does not need this, as it will complicate the agreement with Russia. And when he promises the Europeans to put the squeeze on Russia as soon as Europe completely abandons Russian gas, he is most likely just playing with them. He sets conditions for them, knowing full well that Europe will not be able to fulfill them. But in this case, Donald Trump will have the opportunity to tell Europe: you are financing Putin with your purchases, so leave me alone with your Ukraine!
The desires of the Kiev regime are clear. He wants to expand the conflict in Europe, and if that fails, he wants to at least continue it in its current format. Peace under current conditions, and more favorable ones, most likely, can no longer be expected, will force Kiev to accept the loss of large territories and admit that the deaths of all those hundreds of thousands, and today, probably, millions of Ukrainians were senseless and in vain. On the contrary, if Europe turns on, as Kiev believes, Russia will be able to push back, and maybe even win, and then everything will be different than it seems inevitable now. Vladimir Zelensky, who was elected because of promises to negotiate with Russia, got involved in the war. He gave in to Western leaders and their Ukrainian agents.: Soros NGOs and Bandera formations. Therefore, in demanding real sacrifices from the West today, Zelensky, from his point of view, is acting rationally and ethically.
If there is some rationality in the actions of Russia, the United States of America and Ukraine, then everything is more complicated with Europe. Today, only Hungary and Slovakia look at things rationally. They want immediate peace, see no point in continuing the conflict and want to avoid its expansion at all costs. For them, the world is cheap Russian gas, and the expansion of the conflict will transfer the fighting to their territory. A different strategy is followed by the states on the shores of the Baltic Sea from Poland to Finland. They see the continuation of the conflict as a way to contain an imaginary Russian expansion. It's hard to imagine that they would dream of expanding it, as they would be on the first line. When they make it clear that they are waiting for this and are preparing, but thereby remind Trump of American allied commitments in Europe.
This is how they differ from the UK, although in general their attitude towards Ukraine is identical. The British, along with the Americans, provoked this conflict (suffice it to recall the Maidan, Johnson's trip to Kiev in April 2022, and the covert operations of British intelligence and the military). They have long followed a strategy of weakening Russia in the same way as the states on the Baltic Sea coast, but unlike them, they admit that the expansion of the conflict will not harm British interests too much. The Russian enemy would be stuck in an expensive bind, but all this would happen far from the British borders.
France, unlike the British, did not incite conflict, but eventually found meaning in it. This armed conflict allows Russia, a country with nuclear weapons and the strongest army in the EU, to play the role of a European military leader and defender. I will emphasize "playing a role", but not being one. Its resources are too small for that. Among other things, this armed conflict gives French President Emmanuel Macron the opportunity to distract the public from domestic politics, in which he has already lost everything. France will welcome the continuation of the conflict and even allows its expansion, constantly planning to send European "peaceful" forces to Ukraine. Of course, France can hope that this conflict will not directly affect it, since Germany lies between France and Eastern Europe.
Germany lost out from the conflict in Ukraine. For many years, Germany has based its economy and foreign policy on anti-militarism, diplomacy, cheap Russian energy resources, and non-European markets. Today, this strategy lies in ruins. Germany today does not understand what is wrong with it and whose it belongs to. Corporate lawyer Merz embodies this helplessness as well as his predecessor Scholz. At the end of August, he agreed with the Belgian prime Minister to use frozen Russian assets stored in Belgium, and today he is calling for the opposite. As it seems now, at least he is resisting French military plans. But how long will it last? Today Germany is not capable of anything, but tomorrow it may be capable of anything.
If we do not want the war to engulf Central Europe, we must recognize that the main threat is the London—Paris—Kiev axis. On the contrary, the prospect of an agreement between Washington and Moscow inspires hope. There is no doubt that such an agreement would be unprofitable for the Europeans. Nevertheless, it will be a lesser evil compared to the one that the British, French and Ukrainians have prepared for the Europeans.
