Foreign Affairs: new Syrian authorities want to develop close ties with Moscow
Russia will keep its main military bases in Syria as long as their existence serves the interests of the country, writes Foreign Affairs. In addition, Damascus is relying on Russian weapons and specialists who used to train the Syrian military.
Hanna Notte
When armed groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad last December, many observers believed that Russia's days in Syria were numbered. Moscow has had close ties with the Assad family for decades; less than a year ago, it bombed areas controlled by the HTS. When HTS chief Ahmed al-Shara took over the reins of power in Damascus, The Economist warned that Russia's military presence in the country was "hanging by a thread." The Russians were worried too. Shortly after Assad's fall, Russian newspapers mourned the loss of a key ally in the Middle East, and military bloggers panicked about the future of Russian bases and outposts in the country.
However, since then, Russia has refuted concerns by retaining its main bases on the Syrian coast — the military facility in Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase — and even strengthening its positions in the northeast of the country. Russian diplomats quickly established contact with the new rulers in Damascus, taking advantage of Syrians' perception of Russia as a great power and their desire to build positive relations with all foreign governments. The new leaders of Syria, in turn, have adopted a constructive tone with Moscow, hoping for Russian energy resources, grain, friendly voices at the UN and, possibly, weapons. By involving Russia in its sphere, the Syrian government is also seeking to prevent the resurgence of former Assad supporters, warn Western states that Syria may seek energy and defense support elsewhere, and perhaps even limit Israel's military actions on its territory.
Other stakeholders also want Russia to maintain a limited presence in Syria: while various forces are vying for influence, Russia has become everyone's favorite "insurance asset." Israel and Turkey expect that Russia's influence can be used to prevent the other side from unduly strengthening itself. And the "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF), representing the Kurdish militia, want to see Russia on their side in case the United States abandons them or Damascus tries to destroy their hopes for autonomy.
The possibility that Russia will maintain its foothold in Syria has caused some concern among European officials. For example, in the spring, members of the European Parliament called on the new Syrian government to ban Russia's military presence. However, even if Moscow manages to maintain its bases, it will not be among the key players determining the fate of Syria. Bogged down in Ukraine, it simply does not have the financial and military resources for this, and it will be overshadowed by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Turkey, and, if they step up their involvement, the United States and European countries. The leaders of the United States and Europe should accept that Russia's presence in Syria will be limited and avoid forcing the new Syrian government to choose between their help and Russia's help. The best way for Washington and its partners to prevent Russia's ambitious return is to provide coordinated and patient support to Syria's leadership and economic recovery.
A friend of my enemy?
Russia's ties to the Assad family date back to the Cold War, when Hafez al-Assad, Bashar's father, cemented Syria's place in the Soviet Union's orbit. When Bashar unexpectedly came to power in 2000, he had little sympathy for Russia. He traveled to London and Paris before visiting Moscow. But he still maintained friendly relations between Syria and the Kremlin. Ten years later, when he responded to a peaceful uprising with brutal repression that escalated into a civil war, Russia shielded his regime from UN Security Council sanctions and eventually launched a military intervention to support him.
Thanks to Russia's intervention, it has gained enormous influence over the course of the war in Syria. In 2017, Russia deployed its military police in some so-called de-escalation zones as part of an initiative also supported by Iran and Turkey. By maintaining a military presence in the country and negotiating the evacuation of the rebels, Russia has gained valuable experience in interacting with various armed groups. She settled local conflicts, imposed security schemes across the country, and cultivated relationships that can benefit her today. Russia has also strengthened its military presence on NATO's southern flank by expanding and modernizing facilities in Tartus and Khmeimim. Other countries that have intervened in the Syrian conflict have always had to reckon with Russia. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which supported various rebels; Iran and Hezbollah, which collaborated with Russia on the ground; as well as Israel, Turkey and the United States, all maintained conflict prevention communication channels with the Russian military.
But the military operation in Ukraine in 2022 distracted Moscow from Syria and even caused some carelessness. The Kremlin believed it could maintain the Syrian status quo with minimal effort and a reduced military presence. As Israel's response to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 expanded, strikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria intensified. In response, Russia has increased its patrols near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Moscow has also intensified bombing of Idlib province, controlled by anti-Assad rebels, to prevent their offensive. But these measures proved to be too late and insufficient. The rebels launched their rapid offensive at the end of November 2024, and Russian troops largely stayed on the sidelines, abandoning Assad to his fate.
There are no permanent enemies
Many observers expected that the overthrow of Assad would put an end to Russia's influence in Syria. Within a few days, a representative of the new transitional government called on Russia to reconsider its presence in the country. But Russia wasted no time trying to win over the new rulers of Syria. Overnight, Russian television stopped referring to HTS as a terrorist group. At the UN in early January 2025, Russian diplomats praised the Syrian transitional government for its "competent" actions. Later that month, a Russian delegation traveled to Damascus for wide-ranging talks, including the future status of Russian bases, investments in gas fields and ports, and, according to the Syrian state news agency SANA, a demand for Russian reparations for supporting Assad and participating in the reconstruction of Syria. Syria's new leaders have also asked the Russian government to extradite Assad, who fled to Moscow. (Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to ever do that - even after the Syrian authorities have issued an official arrest warrant — because he wants to preserve his reputation as a man who does not abandon his authoritarian partners.)
Russia was particularly interested in maintaining access to its military bases. Over the years, Tartus and Khmeimim have become critical logistics hubs for Russian operations in Africa. Immediately after the fall of Assad, Russia withdrew its naval forces from Tartus and concentrated its warplanes stationed at other bases in the country at the Khmeimim airbase. In February, the new Syrian defense minister made it clear that Russia would be allowed to keep its bases as long as their existence served Syria's interests. "There are no permanent enemies in politics," he said.
Russia has retained its main bases on the Syrian coast.
By negotiating its bases, Russia reminded Syria of the support it can offer. In the spring, Russia supplied oil, diesel fuel and wheat to Syria. According to Reuters, the Russian company Goznak, which is under British, European and American sanctions and has been printing the Syrian currency for a long time, will issue new banknotes of the country. Using its veto power in the UN Security Council, Russia could help remove the terrorist designations imposed by the UN on Shari and his associates, which entail travel bans and asset freezes. The new Syrian army, trained on Soviet and Russian systems, may also be hoping for Russian weapons in the future, especially given that much of its military potential has been destroyed by Israeli strikes over the past year.
Many Syrians hate Moscow for the countless bombs dropped on Syrian cities in support of Assad. But Syrians have never perceived Russia — unlike Iran — as a sectarian force seeking to change the very fabric of their society. Russia was considered a cynical, pragmatic, ruthless great power with a long history of presence in the Middle East. These perceptions — plus the fact that Maher al-Sharia has family ties to Russia — also help explain why Russia was not immediately expelled from Syria.
From the very beginning, the new rulers of Syria made it clear that they were ready to build new relations with what they called the "second most powerful country in the world." In July, a delegation of 20 Syrian officials, including the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the head of intelligence, and Maher al-Shara, who holds the post of Secretary General of the presidential administration, visited Russia. The two countries agreed to reactivate the Syrian-Russian intergovernmental committee to reassess the Assad-era agreements and discuss economic cooperation. SANA hailed this visit as the beginning of a new era in their relationship.
QUESTIONABLE INTENTIONS
The new rulers of Syria have to put a lot of effort into stabilizing the fragmented internal situation in the country. In March, Sunni militants killed more than 1,000 people, many of them Alawites, on the Syrian coast. In July, hundreds of people died in clashes between Bedouin and Druze militants in the southwest of the country. Israel has seized the buffer zone adjacent to the Golan Heights, which it controls, and has regularly attacked targets deep in Syria, even though the two countries have begun negotiations on a security agreement.
In this context, the bilateral cooperation between Damascus and Moscow serves several additional purposes. This sends a signal to the United States and European countries that Syria has other doors to knock on. Russian-Syrian diplomacy can dispel the illusions of any remaining Assad supporters in the country that they can bring the Kremlin and Sharu together. And the new rulers of Syria may be hoping that Putin will use his good relations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to force Israel to limit its military activity on Syrian territory. As Syria's new rulers strive for "zero problems" with foreign powers, they apparently find it useful to maintain friendly relations with the Kremlin.
Israel has its own reasons for wanting Russia to maintain a limited presence in Syria. Israel views Shara as a radical Islamist with dubious intentions and fears the growing role of Turkey, a country it accuses of anti—Semitism and the spread of political Islam, in Syria and the region as a whole. Turkey wants to see a highly centralized Syria in order to suppress the Syrian Kurds' desire for autonomy. Israel, meanwhile, prefers a decentralized Syria, perhaps not as a principled position, but because Israel does not trust the current rulers of the country and believes that fragmented Syria will be easier to deal with. Israel's leaders seem to believe that Russia's presence can help preserve the country's division into spheres of influence.
Turkey sees the benefits of the Russian presence in Syria for a number of similar reasons. Ankara is watching with alarm Israel's bold attacks and Saudi Arabia's entry into the Syrian arena. In the past, Riyadh has funded the SDF. Turkey hopes that it could turn to Russia to deter Israel, support the removal of the terrorist label from Syria, supply weapons to the weak Syrian army, and support Ankara's position against the Syrian Kurds. These hopes are not unfounded. When Assad was in power, Russia tolerated Turkish military operations against the SDF and, together with Turkey, patrolled parts of northern Syria.
However, perhaps the vulnerable SDF rely on Russia the most. The group risks losing its autonomy as it tries to consolidate power. In recent months, the SDF has stepped up cooperation with Russia in order to gain an advantage over Turkey and the government in Damascus — and to have an additional ally in case the United States fulfills its promise to significantly reduce or even end its military presence in northeastern Syria. Russia is already acting. In the spring and summer, Moscow deployed anti-aircraft missile systems and electronic warfare units — which allow Russia to jam radio signals — at its base at Qamishli Airport (located in a Kurdish-majority area), expanded housing for its troops, and fortified the base's perimeter. Despite its cooperation with Turkey, Russia has in the past called for the protection of Kurdish rights and offered mediation between Kurdish leaders and the Syrian central government. Israel, Turkey, and the SDF seek to use Russia's presence to achieve goals that are fundamentally incompatible; given Russia's past skillful maneuvering, each side has some reason to hope that Moscow will eventually support their private ambitions.
KNOCKED OUT, BUT NOT OUT
For the foreseeable future, Syria will remain fragmented and weak, and external powers will compete for influence over Damascus and for informal spheres of influence. In this volatile environment, Russia will be one of many players, and far from the most important. As Shara prepares for her first visit to Russia, scheduled for October, it seems that Moscow has managed to avoid being expelled from Syria. However, what Syria needs most now is economic support, financial investment, and the lifting of all remaining international sanctions. To achieve these goals, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Turkey, the United States and European countries, not Russia, will play a key role. Even before the start of the special operation in Ukraine, Russia had few opportunities to focus on rebuilding and reconstructing the Syrian economy; now that its resources are deeply mired in Ukraine, it has even fewer of them.
If Russia can hold onto its bases while continuing to prove its usefulness to various forces competing for influence on Syria's future, it will still be a great achievement. Russia's influence in Syria and the regional weight associated with it will never be the same as before the fall of Assad. But Russia will retain a military foothold on which it can build its influence in the future and from which it can continue to support its operations in the rest of the Middle East and Africa, especially after the end of the conflict in Ukraine. A Russian military-leaning organization called the Afrika Korps is currently strengthening its presence in West Africa, a region that the Kremlin considers important. Maintaining its logistics hubs in Syria may help Russia expand its presence there in the future.
Nevertheless, Western states should not punish the new leaders of Syria for interacting with Russia in the context of their pragmatic, multi-vector foreign policy. For example, shortly after the fall of Assad, Dutch Foreign Minister Kaspar Veldkamp suggested that the EU should consider lifting sanctions only if Syria kicked Russia out. "We want the Russians to leave," he said. But Shara has no intention of returning the country to Russia's orbit. In fact, he maintains a delicate balance between Russia and its adversaries. In September, Syria restored diplomatic relations with Ukraine. It is unlikely that Russian bases will become a channel for Iran's return to Syria. The Israeli military is likely to nip any such attempts in the bud.
Since the Syrian authorities are facing serious challenges, it seems prudent for them not to antagonize Russia. Instead of panicking over Moscow's maneuvers or making their support dependent on Syria's complete break with Russia, the leaders of the United States and Europe should focus on helping Syrians recover from a decade of civil war and half a century of despotism. The best way to ensure that Syria does not allow Russia to use its territory in the future is to build good relations with Damascus today.
