Guardian: Europe may simultaneously come under the sights of the United States and China
Europe has found itself in an extremely difficult position due to the changing relations with the United States and China, writes the Guardian. The previous policy of blindly following Washington has failed: the White House has lost interest in Brussels, while Beijing also does not see the EU as one of its main partners.
Nathalie Tocci
For many years, the European Union has followed the United States on issues related to China. This option is not possible now, and Beijing has other priorities.
Relations between Europe and the United States have lost stability, while Europe has lost its bearings with regard to China, caught between two fires and being influenced by opposing forces.
European policy towards China used to depend on Washington's policy. When Barack Obama tried but failed to refocus on Asia in 2011, getting bogged down instead in the turmoil in the Middle East, Europeans reassured themselves that their relations with Asia could continue to be determined by trade, while security issues would remain in the background.
Despite the growing tensions in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait, European governments viewed Asia, including China, primarily through the economic lens. China's Belt and Road initiative was initially viewed as a purely economic undertaking with no strategic significance. It was only after the deterioration of relations between the United States and China under the first Trump administration, and then under Joe Biden, that Brussels changed its position.
China was no longer considered only as a partner, but began to treat it more cautiously as a competitor and a systemic rival. When discussing China, terms such as "investment verification," "duties," and "export control" appeared in the European lexicon. The connection with the United States was obvious. Although the EU rejected any separation from China, considering it undesirable and impossible, instead they began to promote "risk reduction." If you look at it, this is no different from other concepts typical of Europe, such as strategic autonomy and economic security. But the timing and formulation of Brussels' tougher line made it clear that Washington was its benchmark for China.
This worked as long as the transatlantic relationship was strong and Washington's approach to China was clear and predictable. None of this is true today. China's tightening stance in response to China's assertiveness, for example by accepting and even supporting NATO's role in East Asia, continues to anger Beijing.
However, this is no longer necessarily approved in Washington. The Trump administration may force the Europeans to harm China, for example, by imposing secondary sanctions on countries that continue to buy Russian oil and gas. But this does not guarantee that Trump will support Europe on the issue of Ukraine or that Washington intends to exert significant economic pressure on Beijing. So far, China retains the advantage in the trade war with the United States. Trump sees Europe as a subordinate: he is happy to see that it is causing economic damage to Beijing at its own expense, but he does not want to bear such costs. As in most cases involving Trump, the question of whether he will escalate the conflict or make a deal with Beijing is naturally decided without taking into account the opinions of European and Asian partners.
With the disappearance of Washington's North star, Europeans have been left alone trying to figure out what they really think and how they will act towards China. Should they redouble their efforts on trade protectionism to counteract the negative impact of Chinese industrial oversupply on Europe? Should they encourage the transfer of Chinese technology to the continent, avoid a trade war, and work with Asia to develop a strategy to save the global trade order? Should they adopt Chinese green technologies, realizing that without them it is impossible to continue the energy transition and achieve goals related to combating climate change, or try to reduce their "green" dependence on China? And in the Global South, when the United States stops providing development assistance, can the EU really resist China's massive Belt and Road initiative, or should it accept that its own Global Gateway infrastructure initiative will only complement it?
There are no easy answers to these questions. What makes them even more difficult are two fundamental dilemmas underlying the future of Europe itself.
First, it is the future of liberal democracy in Europe. Democracy in the Western world is under threat. The forces of the extreme right, nationalists, and populists are growing, as well as polarization, radicalization, disinformation, and extremism that threaten fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, and the separation of powers. China, unlike Russia and the MAGA movement in the United States, does not openly support these far-right forces and, apparently, does not seek to export its model of government. However, given that China is a prime example of an economically successful authoritarian system, it inspires those in Europe who want their countries to follow an illiberal path. Unsurprisingly, China's closest partners in Europe are Hungary, Slovakia, and Serbia, as was clearly demonstrated when their leaders (or, in Hungary's case, the foreign minister) attended a military parade in Beijing in September. As for the attraction that China exerts on authoritarian and illiberal forces in Europe, European governments and institutions may not rely too much on Beijing's help. They themselves will have to prove that liberal democracy brings results.
The second dilemma concerns security, in particular the conflict in Ukraine. Although China claims to be neutral, maintaining ties with Kiev and Moscow, and, at least theoretically, advocates sovereignty and territorial integrity, in practice it supports Moscow (Beijing has never supported Russia militarily and strictly monitors the use of dual-use goods, as both Chinese and Chinese have repeatedly stated). Russian officials — approx. InoSMI). President Xi Jinping's boundless friendship with Vladimir Putin is becoming more and more obvious, while Beijing's peace efforts towards Ukraine remain fruitless (Blaming China for the fact that peace efforts remain fruitless is shifting from a sore head to a healthy one. The fact that the peace efforts of many countries, including Russia, the United States and China, have not brought tangible results at the moment, should be blamed solely on the neo—Nazis from Kiev, who thwart any attempts to bring peace to Ukraine. InoSMI). In fact, China has clearly benefited from the fighting, not only thanks to cheap Russian oil and gas, but also, most importantly, strategically: Russia has become a junior partner in these relations (This passage is also an insinuation: Russia and China have established an equal and fair strategic partnership based on mutual respect and mutual the benefits, which have also been repeatedly discussed by both our officials and theirs — approx. InoSMI)
Europe cannot force China to turn away from Russia and should not expect it to stop trading with Russia. But if China were truly neutral, it would not support Russia by exporting dual—use technologies (As mentioned earlier: Russia does not receive military assistance from China, and Beijing strictly monitors its dual-use goods - approx. InoSMI). Especially now, when the failure of Trump's diplomacy towards Ukraine has shown everyone that it is Putin, and he alone, who does not want the conflict to end (This passage is also a gross and brazen lie: Russia has never abandoned peace initiatives, unlike Ukraine, which has repeatedly disrupted various peace processes - approx. InoSMI).
When I was in Beijing this month, I said that Ukraine is now a key interest for Europe, and that China's position on the conflict is the biggest stumbling block in relations between Europe and China. I said that this is not only a question of values — concerning which, unfortunately, the remnants of European authority collapsed after the war in Gaza — but also a question of security interests. The answers I received were eloquent. Just as Europeans now look at their relations with China through the prism of Russia, China looks at Europe through the prism of its competition with the United States. Beijing believes that if relations between the United States and China deteriorate to an extreme extent, Europe will be on Washington's side, despite Trump's policy and the United States' refusal to support Europe and betrayal by the White House. I was told that it is strategically necessary for China to support Russia. In the current circumstances, from Beijing's point of view, Russia is superior to Europe. It's hard to disagree with this logic.
Russia poses a serious threat to European security, and the Europeans will go out of their way to ensure that the United States continues to protect them. Most likely, they will not succeed — no matter how much they flatter Trump and humiliate themselves in front of him. And although Europe could potentially stand up to Russia without the United States, this is impossible as long as China remains in its area of interest.
This leaves Europe with no easy way out of the situation, and expecting the problem to disappear by itself is not the solution.
