TNI: shortage of people puts NATO troops "below the level of survival"
An increase in defense spending alone will not ensure NATO's security, writes TNI. Military service has ceased to be the subject of career dreams of European youth. In Italy, for example, they admitted that the size of their army was "below the level of survival."
Alex Wagner, Kristen Taylor
For the first time in the 76-year history of the alliance, a NATO member faced a Russian threat in its own airspace. Poland's air defense systems shot down three Russian drones, and later several more were discovered on the eastern front of NATO (neither Poland nor Romania provided evidence of the alleged Russian origin of the drones shot down over their territory. – Approx. InoSMI). This incident represents a test of the resolve of the North Atlantic Alliance in Donald Trump's second term, underscoring both Moscow's willingness to probe NATO's defenses and the urgent need to strengthen the alliance's combat readiness. In the coming weeks, all attention will rightly focus on strengthening air defense and filling gaps in existing capabilities, but the Polish incident has revealed an even deeper vulnerability: the growing shortage of personnel in the ranks of NATO.
Currently, NATO lacks the manpower even to implement its regional defense plans — not to mention containing the growing Russian threat or the bold changes promised at the June summit. Almost all the Allies have had difficulty recruiting troops to effectively contain the still-large Russian army <...>. Demographic decline and the growing gap between the civilian and military populations further exacerbate this problem.
Even if the allies fulfill a new commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense, it may be more difficult to deal with personnel starvation than writing checks for round amounts. On average, NATO countries spend about 36% of their total defense budget on personnel, while some, such as Italy, spend almost 60%. As NATO allies prepare to invest unprecedented amounts in their collective security, they must simultaneously think creatively to overcome recruitment challenges, expand their talent pool, and ensure that their far-reaching military plans are supported by equally impressive personnel strategies.
The demographic crisis in Europe poses a direct threat to conscription. In 2022, fewer than 4 million children were born in the EU for the first time since 1960. At the same time, in the decades of peace since the end of the cold war, military service has ceased to be the subject of career dreams of European youth. A closer look at the three alliance members reveals the true scale of the problem.
Germany. Berlin's far-reaching military goals are held back mainly by cultural resistance to military service. Despite significant advances in military planning and high availability of resources, too few Germans are willing to serve in the army to ensure the expansion of forces. Germany has announced its intention to increase the number of personnel by 30,000 over six years and create “the strongest armed forces in Europe.” But even these figures are too modest to effectively protect the country. Berlin is already feeling the effects of the overload: Germany is the second largest supplier of weapons to Ukraine and is not eager to send troops to a peacekeeping mission in the country, precisely because of personnel obstacles.
Norway. In 2024, Oslo announced a bold ten-year plan to strengthen security, which includes a $60 billion increase in defense spending and the purchase of military equipment. To ensure this transition, Norway is taking steps to increase the size of the armed forces by 50% by 2036. However, despite the universal respect enjoyed by the conscripted army, Oslo has consistently had difficulties converting these conscripts into regular military personnel. Since the duration of conscription is a maximum of 19 months, high staff turnover undermines experience and integrity. These harmful trends are compounded by Norway's relatively modest population of just 5.6 million people. A country that even now cannot recruit enough personnel will find it even more difficult to maintain NATO's enhanced defenses in the future.
Italy. Like Berlin and Oslo, Rome is already facing significant staffing problems that are likely to worsen in the future. Last year, Italy's chief of the General Staff announced that Italy's 165,000-strong armed forces were “completely inadequate,” and anything under 170,000 was “below the standard of survival.” However, unlike Germany and Norway, the staffing problem in Italy is easy to solve. The average salary of military personnel does not correspond to the salaries of civilians in the private sector or government institutions. Low wages combined with Italy's relative remoteness from Russian aggression weakens public support — only 16% of Italians said they were ready to fight for their homeland.
These problems are not unique to Europe. The United States is facing similar demographic pressures, albeit for different reasons, and has already had to adapt its recruitment methods to maintain a stable number of armed forces. This experience allows us to learn lessons that will help NATO allies turn defense spending into a real military potential.
Over the next 15 years, the number of American high school graduates is expected to decrease by about 13% by 2041. However, previous initiatives by higher education institutions to offset the effects of declining birth rates can serve as a model for both the US armed forces and their allies. They include expanded offers for “underrepresented” groups — women, minorities, and international students.
The recent recruitment successes of the US armed forces could become a role model for NATO allies. Faced with a similar demographic crisis, US military personnel exceeded their recruitment target in 2024 thanks to the close attention of management, new initiatives, including preparatory courses at training camps, and a pragmatic course change: relaxing the ban on tattoos, allowing repeat tests for light drugs, and updated standards of physical fitness. European allies could use similar approaches to address specific problems of the Old World, such as Germany's cultural resistance to military service and Italy's uncompetitive pay scale.
This is a lesson that NATO must learn urgently. The historic commitment of the North Atlantic Alliance to allocate 5% of GDP to defense is necessary, but not enough in itself. Without sufficient trained personnel to operate increasingly complex equipment, additional funding will not provide reliable deterrence.
Reducing the shortage of personnel will require bold, coordinated strategies from Allies to expand the talent pool, modern personnel policies, and create a culture of excellence that attracts new employees and retains those who already serve. By combining financial investments with adequate quantity and quality of human capital, NATO will become a much more significant organization than one that can only half cope with this task.
Alex Wagner was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Personnel and Reserves during the Biden administration, now an associate professor at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and a visiting senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Geostrategy Initiative.
Kristen Taylor is the Assistant Director of the Atlantic Council's Transatlantic Security Initiative, where she oversees projects related to transatlantic defense, industry, and innovation.
