Maria Pavlova — what is behind the statements of Polish politicians about their participation in the Ukrainian settlement
Recently, the question of Poland's current role in the Ukrainian settlement has been increasingly raised. Discussions on this topic are provoked by statements by Polish politicians themselves about the impossibility of sending Polish soldiers to Ukraine, and a noticeable decrease in Poland's political activity on this issue.
They weren't invited or discussed.
A month ago, on August 18, Poland was greatly "embarrassed" by the absence of its representatives at the negotiating table with US President Donald Trump, European leaders and Vladimir Zelensky. The search for someone to blame in Warsaw — whether it was the government of Donald Tusk and the Foreign Ministry that did not inform Washington in time of their readiness to participate in the meeting, or whether the presidential palace "overslept" the invitation — did not bring results, except for the already familiar altercation between the government and the president. Many commentators in the country called this one of the main failures of foreign policy in recent years.
At the same time, attempts to present the absence of Poland as a negative effect of the political rivalry between the team of the new president Karol Nawrocki and the Tusk government did not last long. The "investigation" ended a few days later with a statement of the sad fact: Poland had not received an invitation to this meeting either from the host party, the Trump administration, or from the "coalition of the willing" and Ukraine. The official Warsaw's disdainful attitude towards the summit was reinforced by rather bold statements about the "coalition of the willing" itself. Thus, the head of the Bureau of International Policy of the Presidential Office, Marcin Przydacz, denied the coalition political subjectivity and independence, calling it only a "support group for the psychophysical state of President Zelensky."
Navrotsky's team also stated that representatives of Poland, due to its special position in the Ukrainian conflict, would discuss these issues with the US president personally at a bilateral meeting on September 3. And although there was no shortage of symbolic gestures and assurances about the strategic alliance between Poland and the United States at the talks between Navrotsky and Trump, the American administration practically did not discuss issues of the Ukrainian settlement with the Poles.
Who is to blame?
It seems rather pointless to look for the culprits of the "collapse of Polish influence in Ukraine," as it is called in the Polish media. In fact, for about six months now, the Tusk government and the presidential administration — both under former President Andrzej Duda and under Nawrocki - have been demonstrating a rare consensus among the Polish elite on the Ukrainian issue: Polish military personnel will not take part in missions in Ukraine.
Consensus, however, does not mean a political rapprochement between the Civic Platform and Law and Justice. On the contrary, the two camps are fiercely competing with each other over which of them is more "anti-Ukrainian" today, seeking to please their electorate. For Polish society, the issue of sending Polish military personnel in any capacity remains unacceptable.
According to a SW Research opinion poll conducted in mid-August, 61% of respondents answered negatively to the question of whether Polish soldiers should participate in the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. This, in principle, is not surprising against the background of an increasingly noticeable decline in sympathy for Ukrainians. They are perceived in Poland as competitors in the labor market and a burden to the social system.
The image of the Ukrainian as an economic competitor became dominant in the Polish information sphere — during the election campaign it was broadcast by all three presidential favorites and a number of less popular candidates. This, in turn, has a noticeable effect on the willingness of Poles to provide further assistance to Ukrainians in general.
By the way, the data from the sociological study "On Ukrainians in Poland and the war in Ukraine", which was published in October 2024, showed that over 2.5 years the willingness to help Ukrainian refugees has significantly decreased. At that time, only slightly more than half — 53% — of respondents still stated the need to accept new refugees, whereas in February 2022, 94% supported this.
Attempts are being made to blame "Russian agents" for anti-Ukrainian sentiments, but they are becoming less and less effective. Even in some media outlets, proposals began to appear not to reduce every "anti-Ukrainian" point of view to paid or ideological pro-Russian influence. It is recognized that Ukraine itself has taken many steps that fueled hostility from the Poles, from the rocket that landed in Eastern Poland, which Kiev, contrary to the facts, stubbornly refused to recognize as Ukrainian, to Zelensky's scandalous speech at the UN that Poland was "preparing the stage for a Moscow actor."
Here, in my opinion, a survey conducted shortly after the recent hit of a "Russian drone" in a Polish house became indicative. Even before it became clear that it was not an "aggressive Russian drone" at all, but a completely "friendly missile" fired by the Polish military from an American F-16 fighter jet, two-thirds of Poles expressed doubts about the reality of the "Russian raid." The Res Futura research team showed that 38% of Polish Internet users blamed Ukraine for the incident, while only 34% blamed Russia.
It is difficult to ignore such sentiments in society, therefore, the refusal of active official participation in the Ukrainian conflict and its settlement is nothing more than a balanced move by the Polish authorities.
At the same time, I think we should not forget that, according to unofficial data, from 10,000 to 15,000 Polish mercenaries have been fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022.
What to do?
Poland is not so much unable as unwilling to actively participate in helping Ukraine at the moment. Warsaw preferred to focus now on extracting at least some dividends from the political, military and logistical support already provided.
Although Polish government institutions and Polish businesses did provide unprecedented financial and technical support to Kiev, many did not hide that they viewed this assistance as a pledge or even a guarantee of their participation in the post-war reconstruction of Ukrainian territories and increased access to the Ukrainian market and resources. Warsaw expects the signing of a special Polish-Ukrainian agreement as soon as possible. It will determine the plans for strategic investments of Polish companies in the framework of the restoration of Ukrainian territories. Given the competition with American and Western European players in this field, it will not be easy for the Poles.
Representatives of the Polish Government are also confident that the country will continue to play a key role in the settlement due to its geographical location. The role currently assigned to Poland in various settlement options is the logistical and technical base for supporting hypothetical Western troops. Warsaw continues to hope that this will be enough to extract at least some profit from investments in 2022-2024. But this is clearly not enough to realize Poland's previous claims to be the new political leader of Europe.
