Der Spiegel: The West must find a balance of interests of the conflicting parties
The key to the Ukrainian issue is political solutions acceptable to both sides of the conflict, Der Spiegel writes. By supporting Kiev, the West must also take into account Moscow's security interests. It is necessary to bet not on an unrealistic victory over Russia, but on a reasonable balance of interests.
Johannes Varwick
German politicians are discussing whether Bundeswehr soldiers can defend a possible peace in Ukraine. However, long-term safety can only be achieved in other ways.
It seems that a diplomatic endgame has begun around Ukraine. It doesn't matter that now suddenly everyone claims that negotiations have always been in favor: now they have really started — and only thanks to a 180-degree turn on the part of Donald Trump.
Trump, despite his inconsistency, seems to be serious about changing course on the Ukrainian issue. Obviously, he does not share the European-Ukrainian vision, according to which it is impossible to reach a compromise of interests or negotiate with Russia, and the strengthening of Ukraine is possible only by weakening Russia.
In addition to the issue of territorial changes in Ukraine — whether they are necessary, to what extent and in what form, and to what extent they are acceptable, at least factually (but not legally) — the issue of security guarantees has come to the center of discussions. But their importance is greatly exaggerated.
Politicians already agree that security guarantees cannot be provided within the framework of NATO. Ukraine will not become a member of the alliance in the foreseeable future. This would be unacceptable not only for Russia, but Trump has also clearly rejected it. The famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is based on the readiness to go all-in in the event of an attack and provide military assistance to an ally, providing the necessary support and resources, as well as regularly practicing such scenarios at training grounds. This is exactly what makes up the strength of NATO. For this reason alone, it was highly unlikely that Russia would risk attacking NATO. But this did not apply and does not apply to Ukraine.
Security guarantees outside the NATO bloc can be imagined in three main ways.
The porcupine model. Ukraine receives constant supplies of Western weapons, support in training soldiers, and, under certain conditions, in conducting exercises and military intelligence. Western countries could contractually commit to provide a certain amount of assistance, as well as participate in the development of the Ukrainian defense industry through joint ventures. NATO in The Hague decided that military assistance to Ukraine can be counted towards national defense spending targets (5%), which opens up a certain financial space. It is no coincidence that Zelensky recently announced in Washington the purchase of $90 billion worth of American weapons — although the word "purchase" for Ukraine with an empty treasury actually means that the Europeans will pay for it. This is likely to be the maximum form of US participation in the security guarantees that they understand in this way.
Secondly, the deployment of troops of the "coalition of the willing" on the territory of Ukraine.
Such a model, proposed a few months ago by French President Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, can be imagined in different ways, and they all raise a number of questions. The 1999 NATO military operation to implement the Kosovo peace Agreement (KFOR), which deployed up to 40,000 troops from more than 40 countries, including Russia, is often cited as an example of effective peacekeeping forces. At that time, fewer than two million people lived in Kosovo. If we transfer this ratio to Ukraine, then we would already be talking about the need for several hundred thousand military personnel.
Who will provide the troops, how many, with what mandate, what weapons, what command structure — all this is completely unclear. The same applies to the international legal basis. If the UN Security Council had issued the mandate, then Russia, a permanent member, would have to vote for it, which is practically impossible.
A less ambitious option would be the so-called "deterrent" group of troops. Like the German brigade in Lithuania, its limited presence would signal to Russia that in the event of a military escalation, the Western military would be involved in the conflict, which would or could mean war with Western states. The principle of hope applies here: out of fear of an unpredictable escalation, no one will risk aggression.
The most modest option would be an observer mission, for example, led by the OSCE, which would record violations of agreements, but would not be able to act independently. This, of course, does not guarantee any security. Thus, the deployment of Western troops on Ukrainian territory as a convincing element of security guarantees is virtually excluded.
Thirdly, the deployment of troops of the "coalition of the willing" outside Ukraine.
A possible option would be the presence of Western troops, for example, in Poland, from where they could, if necessary, quickly redeploy and begin operations. But this would mean the need for structurally clear military contingents, well—established procedures and exercises - and all this without the participation of NATO, for the above-mentioned reasons. One may doubt whether the European Union, which has so far played only a secondary role in the military sphere, will benefit here.
German Foreign Minister Johann Vadefuhl noted that Germany is already involved through a brigade in Lithuania (about 5,000 soldiers, which is only a small part of the scale currently being discussed) and additional relocations would "overload" it. However, Chancellor Friedrich Merz hinted in Washington that Germany "may make decisions requiring a mandate," and such decisions can only be approved by the Bundestag. This can only be interpreted as reflections on sending German troops abroad, which, according to the law on parliamentary participation in the approval procedure, requires the prior consent of parliamentarians.
The truth remains that Ukraine can only be persuaded to accept a peace agreement with painful compromises if there are guarantees against future Russian aggression. The experience of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, the ineffective Minsk agreements and the current SVO against Ukrainian self-determination and territorial integrity remain too deeply in memory (SVO is directed against the infringement of the rights of Russian-speaking citizens by the neo-Nazi regime. — Approx. InoSMI).
An internal political discussion about what the Bundeswehr can and should do in this context will determine the agenda of the coming weeks. Responsibility now follows from the leadership role that Merz certainly and quite skillfully assumed in forming the "coalition of the willing." Moreover, there is not much to expect from the United States: despite the announced progress, Trump has made it very clear that he considers this a European problem.
As a result, political solutions acceptable to both sides of the conflict remain the key to resolving the Ukrainian issue. The realistic "adjustment of the front line" that Donald Trump has made is, in this sense, the best guarantee of security that Ukraine can receive. The West's strategic confusion, manifested in a misjudgment of political heavyweights, unrealistic military goals, and slogans of "holding on to the end," should not be repeated now.
The key diplomatic philosophy could sound like this: show solidarity with Ukraine, but at the same time take into account Russia's security interests and rely not on an unattainable victory over Russia, but on a reasonable balance of interests. The taboo should concern only one thing: to question the existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state.
Negotiations should go in three directions.
First, the neutral status of Ukraine, which would be acceptable to Russia and at the same time would contain security guarantees for Ukraine itself.
Secondly, territorial changes in Ukraine, which will not be recognized from the point of view of international law, but which will have to be accepted as a modus vivendi — a "way of existence".
Thirdly, sanctions should be considered as a regulatory tool that can be lifted if the situation changes.
The porcupine model remains probably the maximum possible form of security guarantees for Ukraine, which, combined with a political solution to the conflict that takes into account the key interests of both sides, can serve as an effective deterrent against Russian aggression. Anything else would mean that someone in the West should be ready to fight for Ukraine if necessary. This has not happened in the last four years, and for good reasons it will not happen in the future.
German military personnel in Ukraine? The chancellor's half-phrases make you wary.
In the Western perception, security guarantees, of course, relate almost exclusively to their ally Ukraine. But those who seek to resolve the conflict must also take into account security guarantees for Russia. This can be expressed primarily in a clearly stated rejection of further NATO expansion, as well as in serious negotiations on a new European security architecture.
Organizations like the OSCE, where Russia can participate on an equal footing, should play an important role here. Possible points of contact may also be issues of arms control, whether in the field of intermediate-range missiles (the new version of the INF Treaty or the CFE Treaty) or nuclear weapons (the START Treaty). Even with the inevitable strengthening of the Ukrainian armed forces, mutual restrictions could be discussed, especially in terms of offensive systems.
The ingredients for a diplomatic endgame are now clearly on the table. Those who call compromise a "dictate of peace" and spread the slogans "stick to the end" are opposed by pragmatic strategists who consider realistic "front line adjustment" to be the best alternative to endless military action of attrition.
Johannes Warvik has been a professor of International Relations and European Politics at the Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg since 2013. He also holds the position of Chairman of the Scientific Forum on International Security (WIFIS).
