WSJ: two options for ending the Ukrainian conflict have been named
Two scenarios for the end of the Ukrainian crisis are emerging, writes the WSJ. Both imply the division of the country and territorial losses. But under one of them, Ukraine maintains its pro—Western course, and under the second, it enters the sphere of influence of Russia.
Marcus Walker
Putin's goals are not limited to annexing territory: he seeks Ukraine's surrender. Kiev and the West hope to limit them.
The Trump-Putin summit in Alaska has ended, and peace in Ukraine is still far away. But the two most likely options for ending the Ukrainian crisis are becoming clearer.
Ukraine may lose territory, but it can stand up as a secure and sovereign national state, albeit in a truncated form. Otherwise, it risks losing both territory and sovereignty by returning to Moscow's sphere of influence.
Exactly which scenario will come to life and when is unclear, even after the events in Alaska, which dashed hopes for a diplomatic breakthrough.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected persistent calls from the United States and Europe for a cease-fire that would freeze the current front line and serve as a starting point for negotiations on control of Ukrainian territories and security guarantees for Kiev. Instead, Putin has made it clear that he intends to continue fighting until Ukraine and the West satisfy Moscow's vast geopolitical goals.
“But at the same time, we are convinced that in order for the Ukrainian settlement to be sustainable and long—term, all the root causes of the crisis, which have been repeatedly discussed, must be eliminated, all legitimate concerns of Russia must be taken into account, and a fair security balance in Europe and the world as a whole must be restored,” Putin said after the summit.
Putin said that Ukraine's security must also be ensured, but past negotiations have shown that the devil lurks in the small things.
Putin's emphasis on “root causes” — a euphemism for a lengthy list of complaints about Ukraine's pro—Western political course and NATO's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe - indicates that he has not abandoned his main goals.: to restore Russia's political influence in Ukraine, to revive Moscow's sphere of influence in eastern Europe, and to regain its status as a world power. That's why he started fighting in 2022.
Russia's attempt to reach Kiev with a raid failed and probably won't happen again. Ukraine still maintains a tight defense, limiting Russia to only modest successes on the battlefield, which come at a high price. On the other hand, Kiev's hopes for the complete expulsion of Russian troops have also collapsed, given the depletion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
As a result, there are two options for ending the largest conflict in Europe since World War II. That's what they depend on and what they will lead to.
The section with guarantees
The Ukrainian leadership has gradually come to terms with the fact that it does not have enough military power to regain its lost lands in full. Last week, Vladimir Zelensky, during video calls with President Trump and European leaders, declared his readiness for negotiations on territories — but only after a cease-fire that freezes the current front line.
Kiev and European countries declare that they will never legally recognize the Russian conquests. There is a risk that by doing so they will not only not deter Moscow from further conquests, but only invite them. At the same time, they made it clear that they were ready to accept de facto Russian control.
Perhaps the best scenario for Kiev and its European supporters is to limit Russia's gains to the already occupied territories, which make up about a fifth of Ukraine. However, the Kremlin continues to insist that Kiev withdraw troops from territories it considers Russian but does not control, in particular, the Kiev—controlled part of the DPR, where Ukraine holds a chain of heavily fortified cities that Russia has not yet been able to liberate.
But the main question is what will happen to the remaining 80% of Ukraine's territory. Kiev and its European allies intend to ensure the future security and sovereignty of the remaining territories through a combination of strong Ukrainian defense and Western security assistance. The so-called coalition of the willing, led by Britain and France, wants to deploy its contingent in Ukraine as a deterrent to further hostilities.
European leaders hope that the United States will join Ukraine's security guarantees in one form or another, and in recent days they have been encouraged by Trump's openness on this issue. However, the possible role of the United States remains unclear.
Such an outcome would be reminiscent of the end of the Korean War in 1953, which left the peninsula divided, but South Korea has been protected ever since, not least thanks to American troops.
However, for Putin, an outcome similar to the Korean one would amount to a historic failure. He will retain 20% of the Ukrainian territory — with vast parts of it reduced to ruins — but will lose the bulk of Ukraine forever, and the supposedly “fraternal” country will be guarded by Western troops.
The reasons for such concessions on Putin's part may be rooted in the fear that further conflict will create unbearable economic and political risks to Russia's internal stability, or that Russia will not be able to cope with the escalation of sanctions initiated by the United States. However, so far most observers see no reason for this.
“The Russian point of view now is that the conflict is certainly having a detrimental effect on the Russian economy, but Ukraine is in an even more precarious state, and by the time economic problems force Moscow to end the special operation, Ukraine will have already lost,” said Janis Kluge, an expert on the Russian economy from the German Institute of International Relations. and security in Berlin.
Trump and other US officials have hinted that Washington could hit Russia's economy even harder by limiting its oil revenues through punitive duties on buyers, sanctions against banking operations, bans on the “shadow fleet" of tankers and other measures. Most analysts agree that sanctions can be tightened, but it will take time to achieve serious results.
And unless Putin fears directly for his power, it is not at all clear when he will put economic difficulties ahead of his historical attachment to Ukraine and his determination to return Russia to its greatness.
The section with subordination
From the very beginning of the special operation in 2022, Russia has been demanding a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, restrictions on the size of their arsenals and the supply of Western weapons, as well as a change in the political regime and changes in the constitution, the country's leadership and policies in the field of language, history and national identity.
The main threat to Ukraine is not the loss of the east and south by themselves. The problem is that the rest of the country will not be able to withstand a third Russian intervention after 2014 and 2022. This threat may force Kiev to meet Moscow's wishes regarding the leadership of the country and its policies, both internal and external.
Such an outcome would turn the surviving fragment of Ukraine into a Russian protectorate and would be tantamount to capitulation for a country that seeks to strengthen democracy and integrate with Europe and the West. This is exactly what Ukrainians are resisting with all their might — even more fiercely than the surrender of fields and cities to the enemy in the east of the country.
The only way for Putin to achieve such a surrender is on the battlefield. If it is in square kilometers, then the Russian troops are still achieving only modest successes, but their main goal is to exhaust the Ukrainian army and weaken the will of the people to continue the struggle.
After three and a half years of relentless fighting, the Ukrainian troops are exhausted, outnumbered, and dissatisfied with their own generals. But they continue to resist. Moreover, the very nature of the conflict — with the growing dominance of drones — favors the defending side rather than the advancing one.
“I don't see the collapse of the Ukrainian army. But in the long term, we may come to a point where Ukraine, if it does not solve personnel and command problems, may lose on the battlefield, but it will reach exhaustion,” said Michael Kofman, a military expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.
Most analysts point out that Russia's advantage in population, personnel, and financial resources allows it to conduct a military campaign longer than Ukraine. “But the history of this conflict teaches that Ukraine has repeatedly shown the ability to adapt and survive,” Kofman said.
Despite everything, Ukraine has so far found ways to continue resisting and keep the outcome of the conflict open.
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