Military expert Dmitry Kornev — on how negotiations between Russia and the United States can develop
The question of the possible results of the negotiation process between the presidents of the United States and Russia in August 2025, where the main topic will be a special military operation in Ukraine, is extremely complex and includes many aspects. Given Donald Trump's previous statements, it can be assumed that the cessation of hostilities will be a key topic for him.
In large blocks, the parties can consider three components of this issue — on the ground, in the sky and at sea.
In the sky, Russia had previously proposed to stop attacks on energy infrastructure facilities. Then, in the spring of 2025, this unilateral moratorium was not supported by Ukraine. Now, with the heating season approaching, there is a chance for a second attempt. While for Russia, the issue of preparing for winter is not so acute, for Ukraine it is a matter of survival. The reserves of the Ukrainian energy sector have been exhausted, and a new series of strikes may become critical.
For Russia, the cessation of air attacks also has its advantages.: This will free up air defense resources, as well as create conditions for reducing sanctions pressure and expanding opportunities for exporting hydrocarbons and finished products.
There is a separate issue of limiting the operation of air transport. Drone attacks on Russian airports, although they do not cause catastrophic damage to the economy, bring losses and cause moral costs. Their termination will undoubtedly be appreciated by both business and the public. Thus, limiting air strikes on populated areas may be beneficial to both sides.
The main question is how such an embargo will be implemented. Will this be a list of localities where strikes are prohibited? What restrictions will apply to aviation? What about cruise missiles and MLRS like HIMARS? It is possible that no-fly zones or front-line lanes with a special status will be defined, as well as "red lines" that cannot be crossed. Theoretically, this is possible, but who and how will monitor compliance with these conditions? Trump is likely to assume the role of guarantor, and the United States, thanks to its means of control and influence on Kiev, will monitor the implementation of the agreements. It is Kiev's ability to negotiate that will obviously raise the most questions.
Restrictions on mutual strikes can and should also be introduced at sea. It could concern both attacks using naval means — ships, boats, drones — and attacks on marine facilities, including ships, ports, oil terminals and, for example, the Crimean Bridge. The cessation of naval operations should also affect the sabotage activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces west of Crimea.
The greatest difficulties, of course, will be caused by the discussion of the cessation of hostilities on land. Here, too, I would like to hope that the United States will be able to control Ukraine's actions. They have the technical capabilities for monitoring: space, aviation, and radio-technical means of reconnaissance and control. However, even with this level of oversight, it will be extremely difficult to ensure a moratorium on the use of certain types of weapons on earth.
Therefore, most likely, the option of separating the parties at a certain distance and declaring local cease-fire zones will be discussed. For example, around the Zaporizhia NPP or in certain regions. It seems justified.
On the other hand, the introduction of such restrictions in areas where active and successful military operations are underway may be unprofitable for Russia, as this will allow the enemy to transfer reserves from demilitarized areas. In conditions of an acute shortage of resources, the reduction of the front line is of critical importance. Thus, reaching an agreement on the cessation of ground fighting seems to be the most difficult problem.
If the cessation of hostilities is of a general nature and is subject to conditions that protect the interests of the Russian Federation, such an agreement seems possible in principle — at least between Russia and the United States. However, Kiev's position on this issue is still unclear. Ukraine will probably have to compromise.
Another set of issues that is likely to be identified in August, but not resolved, is the peacekeeping forces. Who will participate in them? The troops of the European NATO countries, what is unacceptable for Russia? Or the forces of third countries — India, China, Algeria, Turkey? Turkey is a NATO country, but its position often differs from the general course of the alliance. This issue is one of many that still needs to be discussed.
In any case, the negotiation process is only at the initial stage. The main thing now is to build trust between the parties or get guarantees. Without this, further movement is impossible.
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
