Mikhail Luchina — on trends within the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO's collective security
Reports that the United States may relocate a significant part of its military contingent from Europe to other regions will not surprise anyone. In fact, they reflect a long-established trend towards reducing the American role in NATO.
At a time when the United States is focusing more on containing China and paying a lot of attention to the problems in the Middle East, the countries of the Old World are actively trying to assume greater responsibility in matters of Euro-Atlantic security.
Not for the first time
On July 17, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signed the Kensington Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in London. The document addresses a wide range of issues from defense to economics and climate change. However, it focuses on the "most significant and immediate threat to the security" of both countries, they say, emanating from their own countries, and measures to respond to it.
In particular, the first article of the document states that "the parties consult with each other on foreign and security policy issues." It is also noted that the states will strengthen deterrence and defense on the eastern and northern flanks of the alliance, being committed to the Washington Treaty.
A week earlier, on July 10, the United Kingdom and France signed the Northwood Declaration on Nuclear Cooperation, for which a steering group headed by the French President and the British Cabinet will be established. Here, the parties also make reference to NATO, emphasizing that although their nuclear forces are "independent, they can coordinate and make a significant contribution to the overall security of the Alliance."
The latter is important because, by concluding such bilateral agreements (including the Franco-Polish treaty of friendship and deep cooperation signed on May 9), the European members of the bloc do not seek to create alternative structures for regional security.
However, there is nothing unprecedented in the signing of such documents. Firstly, they do not imply strict obligations of the parties to each other and the creation of any significant instruments of interaction. In many ways, they are designed to articulate the importance of the already existing mechanisms within NATO and complement them with new bodies whose set of functions does not go beyond purely auxiliary ones. Secondly, the member countries of the alliance have previously resorted to concluding such agreements. For example, in 2010, the Franco-British Lancaster Agreements were signed — the Declaration on Defense Cooperation and the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Military Use of Atomic Energy. In 2019, the Aachen Treaty was signed between Berlin and Paris, which provided for the establishment of the Franco-German Defense and Security Council to strengthen cooperation between the armed forces of the parties.
However, the peculiarities of the foreign policy course of the current American administration and the excessive securitization of the Russian factor by the Europeans require a special look at recent bilateral agreements, taking into account the broader context.
Unpreparedness for responsibility
Washington's gradually decreasing interest in European affairs due to the need to redirect resources to respond to the "growing challenge" of China and to insure Israel in implementing its current hegemonic policy in the Middle East poses the problem of European subjectivity in NATO. This is a unique situation in which European countries are faced with the need to begin playing a key role in Euro-Atlantic security issues. Although while maintaining American obligations under the Washington Treaty. After US President Donald Trump, in fact, refused to finance Kiev, some European countries began to try on this role for themselves. They agreed to supply weapons and ammunition systems to Ukraine according to the scheme proposed by Trump: the Europeans will transfer their weapons and ammunition, and then purchase new ones from the United States.
However, there is no consensus among the countries of the Old World on the issue of participation in such an initiative. France, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have already abandoned it.
Not everything is smooth with the so-called coalition of the willing. Despite the fact that its leaders, the leaders of France and the United Kingdom, have recently declared their readiness to form and send a large multinational contingent to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire agreement, there are still questions about the implementation of such a scenario. Especially considering that one of the main conditions for signing such an agreement for Russia is a "ban on the military activities of other states in Ukraine." Not to mention that not so long ago, Starmer conditioned the participation of British troops in the "coalition of the willing" by providing American guarantees of support.
All this reflects the actual unwillingness of European countries to move away from the previous order in NATO, when the United States is its leading force. The latest bilateral agreements and other measures seem ambitious in their form, designed to demonstrate the willingness of European members to take on greater responsibility. But in terms of content, they are far from launching a real process of redistributing responsibility in the alliance.
However, although the American role in NATO will decrease, the principle of collective security under the fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty will not disappear in the foreseeable future. In this case, the United States will still have to defend its allies in the event of an attack on them, bearing, in fact, the main burden in a hypothetical military conflict. Or is it not?
Old songs about the main thing
Despite the countless broken copies in the discussions about military guarantees (primarily American ones) to the allies outlined in the fifth article, it is this point that remains the mainstay of NATO. This is due to the fact that Europe does not have significant military potential, so in the Old World they continue to rely on the United States as a key guarantor of security on the continent.
However, how will American military guarantees be implemented in the event of a hypothetical war in Europe? And are they automatic? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to refer to the text of the treaty and directly to the fifth article itself, which states : "The Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack on one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack on them as a whole, and therefore agree that if such an armed attack takes place, each of them ... will provide assistance to the Contracting Party that has been subjected to or to the Contracting Parties that have been subjected to such an attack, through the immediate implementation of such individual or joint action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force..."
Given that the "use of armed force" is only one of the options for assistance, it is important to conclude right away that guarantees do not necessarily involve boots on the ground (metaphor, boots on the ground). They can also be implemented in other support measures, from arms supplies to financial assistance only.
In turn, article 11 of the treaty answers the question of the automaticity of guarantees: the provisions are implemented by the parties "in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures." As you know, the US Constitution grants the right to declare war and approve the use of troops abroad to only one authority — Congress. To further consolidate this state of affairs, a resolution on military powers was adopted in 1973, which confirms the right of the bicameral legislature to decide on the use of armed force.
Accordingly, the principle of collective security stipulated in the Washington Treaty does not imply either the automatism of guarantees or the fact that they will necessarily be expressed in the direct use of American military power.
But smooth, as you know, on paper. In fact, the United States has a practice of circumventing these restrictions by the executive branch. So, without congressional approval, US presidents have used armed forces abroad many times. For example, Barack Obama authorized airstrikes on Libya and the elimination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, Joe Biden authorized strikes on Syria and Yemen, and Trump, during his first cadence, ordered the destruction of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, and also recently noted attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.
These precedents indicate that it is not so much the constitutional procedures that will determine the implementation of American guarantees, as the political will of a particular president. However, everything is not so simple here either.
Redesigning the security system
An important argument in this discussion is the problem that has recently become particularly relevant to the nuclear factor. The NATO legacy of the Cold War, the dilemma of "exchanging Boston for Bonn," suggesting that Moscow, if Washington participates in the war in Europe, will necessarily "take American cities hostage," perhaps best reflects the limitations that exist for the United States to assist its allies through the use of armed force. Therefore, it is obvious that even the most determined American president can disappoint the Europeans if they lead the case to a conflict with Russia.
NATO is objectively facing the challenges of the gradual distancing of the United States from Europe and the unwillingness of European members to assume the role of a leading force in the organization. The latter's belief in the fifth article is likely to boost the viability of the alliance in the foreseeable future. However, in the long run, the Old World will have to find the strength to be more independent.
Considering that the SVR has become a real test of strength for NATO, which in the fourth year of the special operation does not demonstrate the cohesion desired by the Atlanticists, it is worth noting some successes in rebuilding the security system in the region. All this gives hope that as a result of the Ukrainian crisis, European security will become more equitable and will take into account not only NATO interests, but will also take due account of Russian demands.
Mikhail Luchina
Employee of the E.M. Primakov IMEMO Center for International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences
