Alyona Lisenkova — about London's goals and the role of Russia and the United States in them
The UK is actively concluding military agreements outside of NATO, but at the same time with the member countries of the alliance. This raises a number of questions: why is NATO not enough? Does London aim higher than its current position? Can the UK compete with the USA?
One by one
On July 17, 2025, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signed an Agreement on Friendship and Bilateral Cooperation. Despite the comprehensive nature of the agreement, the text places a special emphasis on security and defense issues.
A little earlier, on July 10, Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron — by the way, representatives of the only nuclear powers of the "collective West" in Europe — signed the Lancaster House 2.0 declaration, updating the relevant documents of 2010. The text is devoted to the coordination of nuclear deterrence forces in particular, as well as security and defense issues in general.
Finally, back in January of this year, Keir Starmer agreed to conclude a core agreement with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Andrzej Duda, representatives of one of the largest EU member states. The most pressing issues here were the "Russian threat," human trafficking, energy supplies, and so on.
The UK's activity can be interpreted as a kind of new stage in the "restart" of relations with the leaders of the European Union and with the union itself, which it itself left back in 2020. However, this is not entirely true.
Brexit is stalling
On May 19, 2025, the parties held their first post-Brexit bilateral summit. The EU was represented by the heads of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the European Council, Antonio Costa, while the United Kingdom was represented by the same Starmer. During the meeting, agreements were reached on expanding military cooperation. The EU-UK Security and Defense Partnership was concluded, which includes areas such as information exchange, exploring the possibility of participating in each other's defense initiatives, increasing military mobility, and the like.
In accordance with the "Strategic Compass" defense concept of 2022, the European Union is aimed at strengthening the ability to work mutually beneficial with partners on a bilateral basis. The UK is not the only example. In particular, at the 20th EU Summit on June 24, a Security and Defense Partnership was concluded with another NATO member, Canada (von der Leyen, Costa and Prime Minister Mark Carney).
However, speaking of the United Kingdom, it is worth remembering that since the 1998 summit in Saint-Malo (France, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac), representatives of the British side have actively sought to play a leading role in European affairs in general, in particular in setting the course and monitoring the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (formerly the European security and defense policy). At the same time, the country has never forgotten about NATO, giving the organization a leading role, saying that it should not duplicate its functions and undermine its authority.
In fact, in this vein, Brexit deprived the EU of the most influential supporter of Atlanticism. At the same time, the UK itself has lost the ability to control the problems of security and defense in Europe on a former scale.
A global failure
After the 2016 referendum, the conceptual vision of Britain's foreign policy was framed by the Conservatives, the traditional competitors of the Labor Party in power since 2024, in the form of the Global Britain program (by 2021). It stated London's interests in the Indo-Pacific region, Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and so on. Thus, this indicated a greater involvement in affairs outside of Europe. The text also spoke of "constructive and productive relations with our neighbors in the European Union, based on mutual respect for the sovereignty and right of the United Kingdom to act differently, economically and politically, where it suits our interests."
I think it would be strange to expect a different formulation immediately after the country's withdrawal from the union. However, several years have passed since then, the government has changed (even several times) and it has become clearer that there are no economic opportunities for the implementation of such ambitious plans during the times of colonialism (especially in the context of a series of international crises) and foreign policy influence.
At the present stage, there is a clear desire on the part of both the EU (and its leading members) and the UK to secure stronger allied relations in the European region. In addition to the signed agreements, the activity of Great Britain, Germany and France also boils down to a new strategic alliance known as E3.
Although recently signed documents (including those between Germany and France) contain references to commitments within the EU and NATO, the wording about the intention to "strengthen the European contribution to its own security" can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, we can talk about contributing to the activities of NATO itself — such obligations for mutual assistance are laid down, for example, in article 5 of the alliance's charter. On the other hand, one can see in these formulations a desire for greater European autonomy in security matters. References to the leading role of NATO look like a desire not to aggravate relations with the United States, but in the long term, European countries can hope for a more independent foreign policy course.
In this context, it is worth recalling the Treaty of Aachen, signed by Germany and France in 2019, almost 60 years after the 1963 Treaty of Elysee. It symbolized reconciliation and the beginning of close cooperation between the two countries. The Aachen Agreement does not focus on security issues, but highlights an important point: even as members of the EU and NATO, countries can develop bilateral relations and declare their foreign policy independence. This shows that the desire for sovereignty and independence in decision-making remains relevant, despite participation in major international unions.
And not a friend, and not an enemy, but — so
So in today's international situation, two key points can be identified that influence this kind of rapprochement.
They relate to relations with Russia and the United States.
After the beginning of the acute phase of the conflict in Ukraine, many European states consistently began to defend the position that they needed a response to the "Russian threat." In May 2025, Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron even visited Kiev together, where they were joined by Donald Tusk. Meanwhile, Ursula von der Leyen, in the context of the EU-UK summit, outlined the need for unity in the face of the "greatest threat."
In this vein, the United Kingdom, a geographically and culturally European country with close economic and historical ties to continental Europe, is (predictably) striving for strategic rapprochement with its former EU partners.
At the same time, the change of power in the United States has created a new challenge for the European powers. With the advent of Donald Trump, the old strategic and value understanding, as it was with the administration of Democrat Joe Biden, has disappeared. The current Republican policy is often inconsistent and unpredictable — Washington's tariff war against almost all countries of the world, including its allies, is a prime example of this.
On July 27, Trump finally announced the conclusion of a trade deal with the EU: 15 percent tariffs on European exports to the United States will be imposed. But, against the background of a series of contradictions, fears could not but appear in the West — there are no guarantees that the United States will come to Europe's aid in the event of a real armed conflict.
On the one hand, this raises the question not only of bilateral relations between each state and/or the European Union and the United States, but also revives discussions about an independent European army and the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance.
On the other hand, despite this, any semblance of full—fledged independence of these NATO member countries still looks unrealistic. However, of course, this does not exclude the possibility of steps to increase at least its activity in regional security and defense affairs.
Moreover, we should not forget that the NATO member countries have agreed to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. After all, this is exactly what Donald Trump insisted on in order to continue cooperation within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Although, of course, it is unlikely that the politician was seriously going to leave the bloc before that, thereby weakening control over European affairs.
Alyona Lisenkova
Candidate of Political Sciences, Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations of the Presidential Academy in St. Petersburg
