FA: The United States risks losing the battle for the Arctic
The struggle for the Arctic will become the new Big game of the 21st century, in which the United States risks losing, writes the FA. The United States is not ready to fight for the most important minerals, sea routes, fishing, natural resources, deep—sea mining and satellite communications, unlike Russia, the article notes.
Heather A. Conley
“The struggle for the Arctic and its vast resources will be the new Big Game of the 21st century,” Steve Bannon, a former chief strategist during Trump's first term, announced in a February interview. The struggle of the powers unfolding in the Far North really has a lot in common with the original "Big Game" — the 19th-century rivalry between the two great powers of that era, the British and Russian Empires, for access to strategically and economically valuable territories in Central Asia. In modern times, China, Russia, and the United States are similarly seeking to expand their territories and influence. Modern powers are once again greedy for economic wealth and buffer zones. And if the competition intensifies, all the military exercises of the players may be put to the same end as their predecessors: cold weather.
A timely and informative account of how the United States acquired and maintained its status as an Arctic power can be found in a recent book by former American diplomat Mary Thompson-Jones, America in the Arctic. Thompson-Jones warns that after the generally historically successful build-up of the US presence in the Arctic, Washington is currently paying insufficient attention to the region, which has become the focus of attention of the great world powers.
But even after the short time that has passed since the book was written, new events have raised the stakes. After taking office, Trump set his sights on the Arctic, often provocatively referring to Canada as the “51st state” and promising that the United States would “get” Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, “one way or another.” Cooperation between Russia and China, meanwhile, has continued to grow since 2022, when both countries declared an “unlimited partnership” that resulted in joint Arctic scientific, space and military operations, including coast guard and maritime patrols. And Washington's recent contacts with Moscow have led to an unexpected result: if negotiations lead to any major deal, the subsequent geopolitical permutations could completely change the course of the game.
Anyway, the struggle for the most important minerals, sea routes, fishing, natural resources, deep-sea mining and satellite communications is coming, and the United States is not ready for this. For years, Russia and China have been preparing to take advantage of new Arctic shipping routes, improving their underwater military and scientific capabilities and honing hybrid warfare tactics while the United States was distracted by other issues. In order to compete, the United States will need to significantly increase its military, economic, scientific, and diplomatic presence in the Arctic in close cooperation with America's allies. If Washington does not deal with the shortcomings and contradictions of its Arctic strategy in the near future, it may suddenly turn out that Washington will already be among the losers in the new big game.
The composition of the players
Thompson-Jones talks about the rich Arctic experience of the United States, including its active role in shaping the Arctic policy of Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden, and mentioning the life of each Arctic country. A former U.S. diplomat who worked in Canada, Thompson-Jones expresses her deep admiration for the people living in the Arctic and her understanding of the inexorable effects of climate change, the desire for security, and the value of friends and allies at a time when, as the Inuit proverb says, “the ice is breaking.” The book ends with a sharp but pointed critique of the apparent amorphousness of Washington's Arctic policy in recent years. Thompson-Jones, who wrote the book before last year's U.S. presidential election, recommends future leaders pay more attention to climate change and multilateral diplomacy as part of an extensive Arctic strategy — but with Trump's return, this advice quickly became outdated.
The President of the United States is most likely more suited to Thompson-Jones' assumption that the United States has what she calls a “Longyearbyen moment,” referring to an industrialist from the Midwest named John Longyearbyen, who sailed to the Svalbard archipelago in 1901 and “saw iron ore and great opportunities.” In 1906, Longyearbyen founded the Arctic Coal Company and tried to build and support industry in the Arctic. In the end, he was supported by the US government. Thompson-Jones writes that this venture marked a “profound conceptual shift” in U.S. Arctic policy: an era of heightened ambition had begun.
More than a century later, the United States needs to re—engage in the race for “great opportunities” in the Arctic if it wants to compete with its rivals, Russia and China. All three players invest in the region, but in different ways. For Russia, which owns vast territories in the Arctic, this region is vital for its military and economic survival. For China, the Arctic represents an opportunity to diversify its global economic interests. And for the United States, which secured its presence in the Arctic by purchasing the territory of Alaska from Russia in 1867 — a sale Dmitry Rogozin, a former deputy prime minister of Russia, called “a betrayal of the status of a Russian power” - this region is a defensive front in the north.
The Arctic has breathed life into the geopolitical strategy of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It aims to develop the Northern Sea Route, which runs through Russia's northern coastal waters and is dotted with new port infrastructure connected by rail to the country's subarctic regions. The new fleet of Russian icebreakers will escort registered vessels along the route, which will facilitate the export of Russian natural resources and the transportation of Chinese goods from east to west. In this large-scale project, Thompson-Jones traces the echoes of a brutal legacy: Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's brutal campaign to build infrastructure in the Arctic, during which roads, railways and mines were built using forced labor. Many of the workers died during construction. One of the roads was known as the “Bone Road” because so many workers were buried at its base that “for every meter of the road there is one corpse.”
Putin's economic and military buildup in the region is less violent than Stalin's, but just as ambitious: it is driven by Russia's chronic sense of insecurity and fear of losing control of its territory. After the collapse of the USSR, military bases in the Arctic were closed, the destroyed infrastructure was left without repair, and many Arctic residents, deprived of government subsidies, moved to other places. Today, the Russian authorities are trying to prevent further deterioration of the situation of the Arctic population. Polar camps are also a favorite place to send political prisoners who threaten the government, such as opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who died in suspicious circumstances in one of these prisons in 2024. Russia is building and rebuilding military bases in the Arctic, partly to improve its control capabilities as commercial activity along the Northern Sea Route grows. The sudden appearance of Russian flags, crosses, and Orthodox priests not only in the Russian Arctic, but also in the far north of Norway (a very disturbing sign) is a declaration of the lands belonging to Russia in the past, present, and future.
China has only recently joined the Arctic game. Despite the absence of any Arctic territories at home, China declared itself a “near-Arctic power” based on maps of the 15th century and its own interest in managing the region. Since 2004, when China opened its first research station in Svalbard, the Chinese have used scientific cooperation to expand their presence and knowledge about the Arctic. Later, China began to develop business relations with Canada and the Scandinavian countries, but these countries were wary of the investment conditions and, under pressure from Washington, gradually restricted Beijing's access to the region.
Another opportunity arose after the start of the Russian CBR in February 2022. Faced with the loss of European markets, the termination of partnerships with Western energy companies, and wartime budget constraints, Moscow welcomed Chinese investments, perceiving them as a way to make up for these losses. China has increased funding for Russian natural gas liquefaction projects in the Arctic and related infrastructure development along the Northern Sea Route, expanding its commercial presence in the region.
The United States, for its part, has been an Arctic power in the economic sense since the purchase of Alaska. It was acquired to ensure access to the natural resources of these lands. They first tried to acquire Greenland in 1868 for the same reason, and further attempts to take over the island in 1910, 1946, and 2019 were motivated by both economic and security considerations. After World War II, the United States expanded its presence in the Arctic through a network of regional alliances and infrastructure projects. In the 1950s, the United States built an early detection radar line, a chain of radar stations that crossed Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands. It operated until 1993 in order to protect against possible missile attacks from the USSR. In collaboration with Canada, the United States built a highway in Alaska and created an integrated air defense system known as NORAD. Together with NATO allies, the US military patrolled the waters and airspace of the North Atlantic, especially around Greenland, Iceland and Britain, in order to detect Soviet and then Russian nuclear submarines and bombers.
The Arctic remains vital to the U.S. economy and security. Anchorage, Alaska, is home to the fourth busiest cargo airport in the world. Almost all United States radar systems and ground-based anti-missiles are located in the state, whose high latitude makes it possible to detect approaching threats in advance. Recent bilateral defense agreements with all five Nordic countries and the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively, have strengthened collective defense in the Arctic. But Washington has neglected its own capabilities in the region. U.S. military officials often complain about the lack of port and aviation infrastructure, icebreakers, satellites, sensors, cold-weather equipment, and trained personnel needed to defend the Arctic.
Game board
The coveted prize for Russia, China, and the United States is control. As the American pilot Billy Mitchell said in 1935, “Whoever takes over Alaska will take over the world.” Control over the Arctic territories provides several advantages. Moving through the polar regions reduces the distances that cargo ships, planes, submarine cables, or intercontinental ballistic missiles must travel to reach their destination. The region is home to ground-based satellite communications stations and orbital launch pads, which are important for both civilian and military operations. High-latitude communications infrastructure, although limited, is vital for vessel tracking, weather monitoring, and surveillance system integration. Arctic lands and the seabed also contain vast amounts of crucial minerals and energy resources, and Arctic waters are becoming an increasingly important food source as rising ocean temperatures force fish to swim north in search of colder waters.
Thus, they will fight mainly for the bottom of the Arctic, international waters and for access to space.U.S. and Russian nuclear submarines are already patrolling areas where submarine cables connect Europe and the United States, and security measures are likely to be stepped up as Russian and Chinese vessels target the new cables. Countries will also strive to ensure their access to essential minerals. In 2023, the UN commission working under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea made recommendations that supported most of Russia's claims to expand its outer continental shelf deep into the central Arctic (and eventually Russia will have to negotiate with Canada and Denmark to resolve mutual claims). The development of deposits on the seabed in this area can increase Russia's commercial and military presence in international waters.
Disputes over the status of two Arctic shipping lanes, the Russian Northern Sea Route and the Canadian equivalent, the Northwest Passage, are likely to continue. Both Russia and Canada claim that these passages are internal waters, but the United States and other countries consider them international waters and, therefore, they are not subject to national laws or restrictions. As the polar ice melts, a third transpolar route may open, which runs almost entirely in uncontested international waters, and the United States will need additional maritime and surveillance infrastructure to prepare for its wider use. China has already begun testing the viability of this route by sending an icebreaker along it in 2012.
Finally, the deployment of ground-based satellite stations and polar launch stations into Earth orbit in the Arctic will be of critical importance for the space race. As Russia demonstrated during the conflict in Ukraine, a country that controls global navigation systems and can neutralize its opponents' satellites will gain a huge military advantage.
A game to win
Unfortunately, the United States is not ready for the emerging competition. Despite the efforts of Congress, especially the delegations from Alaska, Maine and Washington, to convince successive administrations to allocate the necessary resources to the region, the Arctic was a low priority for the US defense community. Insufficient funding and insufficient attention create a vicious cycle, giving rise to artless Arctic strategies that lack adequate budgets and clear command structures. To get back into the game, the United States needs to increase its military and economic presence in the Arctic, working closely with its Arctic allies to strengthen their scientific and surveillance networks to better identify and defend against threats.
The most notable sign of the US' lack of training is its aging icebreaking fleet. The U.S. Navy does not have surface ships with ice protection, a class of vessels that can navigate mostly in ice—free waters. The U.S. Coast Guard has only three icebreakers — more powerful vessels designed to clear passages through solid ice — but only two of them are in service today, and they must operate in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Only one ship, which is 50 years old, can break through a 20-foot (approximately six-meter. — Approx. InoSMI) a layer of ice. In 2024, Washington acquired a third commercial icebreaker, built in 2012, but work must be carried out on it before it becomes fully operational; work is expected to be completed next year. This is a vessel capable of piercing almost five-foot (about one and a half meters. — Approx. The ice layer is intended to replace old American icebreakers until a new, more powerful icebreaker is built, which the Trump administration first ordered in 2019. The planned deadline for the implementation of this project, currently 2030, has been postponed due to repeated changes in the project and the degradation of competencies on this issue in the United States, because shipyards have not built heavy icebreakers capable of breaking through ice 21 feet thick (about six meters. — Approx. InoSMI).
The problem goes far beyond icebreakers. The United States does not have sufficient military presence or maritime infrastructure, such as deep-sea ports, to protect the vast Arctic expanses. For example, the US armed forces can use the Pituffik space base on the northern coast of Greenland, but they cannot ensure the security of the entire island. The Trump administration is also jeopardizing crucial Arctic alliances. Its aggression against Canada and Denmark has pushed both countries to increase their capabilities: earlier this year, Canada announced plans to build two new icebreakers and three new military bases in the Arctic, and Denmark announced a two billion dollar increase in security spending in January and another 600 million dollars for surveillance vessels in April. but this threatens to damage relations with the United States in the long run. If Washington wants to compete with China and Russia, it needs its Arctic friends to be completely on its side.
Washington should also start investing serious money in developing the Arctic potential of the United States. Trump has repeatedly spoken about US interests in the Arctic, and since 2021, Congress has been pushing for the inclusion of multi-year funding for the Arctic security initiative in the Pentagon budget. The time has come to put this plan into practice. The U.S. Navy needs ships protected from ice. Trump has repeatedly called for the construction of 40 icebreakers, but they are not needed in such numbers, and this number is unrealistic. The Coast Guard said they needed eight or nine, and even to reach that number in a reasonable time frame, it would require most of the work to be done in foreign shipyards. Runways, radar systems, and other military installations damaged by melting permafrost need to be repaired and reinforced. To monitor the vast expanses of the Arctic and, in particular, to detect Russian or Chinese military activity, it is necessary to increase the number of personnel and long-range bombers, improve and increase the number of port facilities and sensors along the coast of Greenland, improve satellite communications, add underwater unmanned vehicles and map the seabed. As U.S. General Gregory Guillot, head of the U.S. Northern Command, told Congress in February, “You can't defeat what you can't see.”
The US military should also share responsibility for operations in the Arctic under a single regional command. In the current structure, developed in 2011, operational responsibilities are divided between the US European Command, which controls the European Arctic, the US Northern Command and the US-Canadian organization NORAD, which jointly control North America. The US Indo-Pacific Command, meanwhile, manages the bulk of the US Army units located in Alaska, which have forces that can be used in cold weather, as well as airborne troops. Since each command is focused on its own area, no unit controls the entire Arctic. Even the east and west coasts of Greenland are under separate military jurisdictions. The United Sub-regional Arctic Command of the United States would be able to detect and respond to enemy actions in the Arctic and support regional commands.
The United States can also take clear steps to gain access to the Arctic's most important minerals. One of them is for the Department of Energy and the Department of State to develop a special Arctic initiative based on the Mineral Security Partnership (bringing together 14 countries and the European Union, formed in 2022) to increase public and private investment in sustainable mining and related infrastructure in Alaska and Greenland. and in other Arctic regions. Another step is to expand the Arctic territory of the United States — not by buying Greenland or annexing Canada, but by expanding the outer continental shelf of the United States in the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Biden administration began this process in 2023, mapping an area of 151,700 square nautical miles as an extension of Alaska's landmass in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the fact that Washington has not signed this convention, it can still apply for these waters to the relevant UN commission. Moreover, the United States should ratify this treaty, which was signed by both China and Russia, in order to shape the future management of seabed mining and use its provisions to hold Beijing and Moscow accountable for violations of maritime law.
Over the past two decades, Washington has developed dozens of Arctic strategies, while at the same time its position in the Arctic has weakened, and Washington itself has recently alienated its own Arctic allies. But now is the time for concerted action.
Russia and China have already taken the first steps. The United States, having adopted as a guide to action a quote from Rudyard Kipling's book Kim, written in 1901, which is set in 19th-century Central Asia, must now “move further and further North, playing the Big Game.”
*included in the list of terrorists and extremists
