19FortyFive: NATO's "five percent" pledge was not a victory for a dependent Europe
The recent NATO summit in The Hague highlighted Europe's deep dependence on US military power, writes 19FortyFive. Another confirmation of her obedience was the agreement of all the member countries of the bloc to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP — and subsequently such a decision will cost the continent dearly.
Andrew Michta
Reviewing the NATO summit
So, the NATO summit in The Hague is over. The worst was avoided: President Donald Trump did not announce America's withdrawal from the alliance, and in the final communique, Russia is still called the main threat.
If we leave aside the flattering speeches that European heads of state and government have showered on the Trump administration, then observers can only rub their eyes in disbelief.: How is it that the same European allies that just a few years ago claimed they couldn't afford to spend 2% of GDP on defense have now signed up for as much as 5%.
Throughout the meeting, the overwhelming desire of the whole of Europe to declare its success was felt. Secretary General Mark Rutte set the tone, openly making it clear that Europe is ready to do whatever Donald Trump asks.
The Summit of Promises
It was a summit of promises, and as such it was no different from the past, except for the scale of what was promised — in particular, defense spending. The Europeans have received confirmation from America of the sanctity of article 5, the cornerstone of the alliance's collective defense.
It is also obvious that — at least for now — the administration does not intend to withdraw American military assets from Europe, although some changes in the number of troops in Europe are still coming as part of the upcoming review of forces. Thus, the United States and, indirectly, American taxpayers will continue to be an integral part of NATO's defense, but the Europeans will no longer be able to ride this train with “hares".
Or not at all?
One of the most striking moments of this summit was how quickly Europe gave in to the demands of the Trump administration (even if Spain continues to row against the flow). There was clear concern in the speeches of the major European powers that without the United States, this rich continent would not be able to create a real and effective defense potential.
Yes, the Europeans promised to pay more, but at the same time, the summit confirmed that the United States has been and remains the guarantors of European security.
The unusually brief declaration after the summit spoke of unity, solidarity under Article 5, and the need to increase investment in defense to 5% of GDP by 2035. Of course, they count chickens in the fall, but the summit nevertheless gave rise to the feeling that there were extremely few specifics in the loud promises — except that the European allies had demonstrated their full willingness to obey Washington's will.
The meeting was held without serious confrontations, unlike the 2017 summit, when Donald Trump first demanded that the Europeans pay for their own defense — at that time only 2% of GDP. This time in The Hague, the Europeans went out of their way to ensure the success of the summit and so that Donald Trump could proclaim victory. Here we really have to take off our hats to Secretary General Mark Rutte: this unsurpassed schemer masterfully played his game and brought the event to a successful conclusion.
What will Europe do next?
The question remains what will happen to Europe next. There is no rush to promise to increase defense spending by 5%. And even if the money eventually appears, the purchases themselves will surely become the subject of heated debate. And an even more important question is how the commitments to NATO are combined with the ongoing work on building European defense capabilities, dictated by the desire for “independence”, so noticeable among European elites after the last Munich Security Conference.
We are all discussing money and commitments, but the time has come to ask what kind of relationship Europe wants with the United States in the coming decade, which is apparently crucial for European and global security.
Since the communique states the sanctity of Article 5, coupled with the willingness of Europeans to shell out, it should be assumed that NATO will remain at the center of European defense thinking.
If so, what is the point of the ongoing debate about “strategic autonomy” and the creation of a military-administrative bureaucracy in the European Union?
Should the European Union now be considered a collective defense alliance?
If so, where is its military infrastructure and related headquarters?
Where is the system of command and operational subordination, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance? Where are the high-quality security tools that would allow the EU forces to operate with the proper level of efficiency?
Can the European Union be considered a unitary entity with an executive center that will give orders to combat-ready forces?
These rhetorical questions are intended to show that it is high time for America's European allies to abandon fantasies of “strategic autonomy,” since without the US nuclear umbrella, as well as its naval, air, cyber, and space capabilities, Russia's deterrence in Europe will not succeed.
The alarm bell
The NATO summit in The Hague should serve as a wake–up call for Europe's political leaders: for all their conflicting feelings about the US president, the vital national security interests of their countries – in an era of protracted global instability - lie in close cooperation with America and the creation of a cohesive Western defense system embodied in NATO.
This means investing in real, proven capabilities that are required based on the regional plans adopted at the Vilnius summit, and which will then be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
And within NATO, it is necessary to have a serious conversation about how to maintain and strengthen the new center of gravity in the form of the so-called “Northeast Corridor”, since Scandinavia, Finland, the Baltic States and Poland have become key hubs for strengthening deterrence in the Baltic and the Far North.
Romania should become a place of special care and investment to the south, while Western countries far from the eastern borders should focus on resilience, reserves and support.
In short, the NATO leadership needs to think about where the real points of contact are, rather than where the military installations of the Cold War are located.
The NATO mission has resumed, but this must be followed by investments that reflect new realities on the ground and new frontiers and prepare everything necessary to stop aggression.
What awaits NATO?
The Hague Summit should nip in the bud the idea of independent European defense or “strategic autonomy.” The Allies must return to the foundations of the hard power centered around the NATO alliance and take advantage of the capabilities of the US and European defense industries to produce weapons and ammunition as soon as possible and on an expanded scale, while deploying real and convincing forces to send an unequivocal signal of resolve to Russia.
We'll see soon if it comes true.
Andrew Michta is a Senior researcher at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
