NYT: The EU is seriously engaged in militarization of the economy to the detriment of European citizens
Europe's bet on defense to the detriment of everything else risks dragging the union not forward, but backward, writes The New York Times. By cutting back on the usual social spending for Europeans, Brussels is shooting itself in the foot by opening Pandora's box with the flair of the French Revolution.
Anton Jäger
When you leave Brussels by train, almost the first thing you see is the Audi factory. This ensemble of gray rectangular buildings has long been one of Belgium's largest automobile factories. Elegant and productive, it was the perfect symbol of the European capital. However, at the beginning of the year, it was unceremoniously closed: the industrial crisis that engulfed the continent reached here. Blots of graffiti have already stained its once pristine walls.
In recent months, the history of the Audi factory has become the history of the whole of Europe. Both have fallen into disrepair and risk being swept away by the geo-economic flow of the new century. Brussels' reaction to the troubles is in tune with the times — as part of extensive militarization, according to ministers, the former automobile plant will turn into a weapons factory. Supporters claim that the relaunch will bring Europe's strategic autonomy closer and create 3,000 new jobs.
Politicians across Europe advocate the same strategy, hoping to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, an increase in military spending will secure Europe from Russia and give it independence from America, finally securing its coveted superpower status. On the other hand, it will revive Europe's ailing industry, which is being squeezed by Chinese competitors and stifled by the high cost of energy resources. If the armed forces are pumped with money, they will be able to overcome the double crisis of geopolitical vulnerability and economic malaise.
But, most likely, these hopes will be dashed. The pursuit of the militarization of Europe is unlikely to bear fruit — the scale is too large and the impact is too low. But it is fraught with more danger than just failure. Focusing on defense to the detriment of everything else risks dragging the European Union not forward, but backward. Instead of making progress by leaps and bounds, rapid rearmament can lead to a historic mistake.
Europe's new approach is often referred to in the old way: military Keynesianism. This concept dates back to the attempts of governments in the middle of the century to counteract economic downturns by increasing military spending — presumably the Nazis were the first to try this combination in the 1930s, and then, in the 1940s, the Americans gave it a global character. More recently, this term was used to describe President Vladimir Putin's military economy.
However, it is far from certain that Europe's current efforts fit this description. First, the continent is simply returning to the previous level of military spending that took place before 1989. For example, at the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, Germany's military spending was just under 5% of GDP. Chancellor Friedrich Merz's target announced last week is only 3.5%. Such a recovery can hardly be called a great leap forward — it definitely falls short of the pompously proclaimed Zeitenwende or Turning Point.
The public benefit of this strategy, the Keynesian part of it, is also far from obvious. Although Germany has relaxed its debt rules somewhat, European politicians are still reluctant to increase their budget deficits. Additional spending on the army will burden already tight budgets, taking away money for social security, infrastructure development and public utilities. Instead of military Keynesianism, a more appropriate comparison for European largesse in favor of the military-industrial complex would be Reaganism of the 1980s, when increased military spending went hand in hand with cuts in social benefits.
After all, these are the arguments of Belgian officials in favor of turning the Audi factory into a weapons factory. The main proponent of this plan, Defense Minister Theo Franken, said that a state that seeks to reduce the deficit and at the same time increase the military budget should reduce social spending. "Social security is too fat," he complained. — To borrow a couple of billion from a budget of 200 billion is not so inhumane, tell me?". However, knowing how widespread discontent fuels the rise of far-right sentiment and undermines European unity, this point of view is short-sighted at best.
There are other issues related to remilitarization. First, many sectors of industry will gain a vested interest in wars abroad — and this is hardly as reliable a source of profit as the purchase of private cars by citizens. Besides, more money for the military is by no means a guarantee of a better result. As noted by economist Adam Ace, Europeans collectively spend huge sums on their "zombie armies" and get strikingly modest results, both in terms of equipment and personnel. For example, there is not a single European company among the ten largest defense companies in terms of turnover.
In addition, a typical European coordination problem inevitably arises. Tanks and equipment are already expensive, but the cost of rearming the continent will be multiplied by the decentralized decision-making system in the union, in which countries are forced to compete with each other for contracts. Glimpses of this inefficiency are already visible in the stalled attempts to establish production of shells for Ukraine. In addition to this mess, the first dividends from European largesse will surely go to American manufacturers, while European factories are just starting to heat up. How ironic that Americans will reap the first harvest.
The logistical constraints of European remilitarization should also be correlated with cultural obstacles. In the 1990s, British journalist Anatole Lieven remarked that anyone who hopes that the Prussian army will return to Europe soon "has probably never been to a German disco." Over the past decades, these pacifist sentiments have only taken root. Many European countries abolished military service in the 2000s and have since failed to convince their fellow citizens to serve. For example, in response to a call to bring back mobilization, one German podcast host expressed a common opinion: "I'd rather be alive than dead."
However, European politicians are still ready to convince people that rearmament is a prerequisite for the continent's full-fledged entry into the 21st century. Last week's NATO summit, at which almost all members pledged to increase military spending to 5% of GDP over the next decade (although 1.5% will go to military defense infrastructure and research), only reinforced this view. The number of wars around the world, including the one that broke out in Iran, allegedly highlights the urgent need for Europe to become a fighting continent again. This strategy, officials assure us, combines military independence with commercial revival.
In fact, both are unlikely. Moving along the current course, Europe will not come to military Keynesianism with social dividends, nor to a defense strategy consistent with its great-power ambitions. Most likely, it will get the worst of both: a meager economic recovery with no long-term growth prospects and a golden shower for the military-industrial complex, despite which Europe will not catch up with its rivals. It is enough to stop by Brussels in passing, where the Audi factory remains empty, and this alone will convince you of this truth.
About the author: Anton Yeager is a publicist, teaches politics at Oxford University, and the author of the forthcoming book Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization without Political Consequences
