FT On the eve of the NATO summit, Europe is trying to get an answer from the United States about the withdrawal of troops
From the very beginning, the US military was the foundation on which NATO stood, writes FT. Washington's current shift in priorities is bad news for the alliance, since in the event of the withdrawal of US troops from Europe, the burden of ensuring security will fall on the EU itself. And it is far from certain that Brussels will cope with it.
Henry Foy
Ben Hall, Leila Abboud, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Laura Pitel
Ahead of this week's NATO summit, European capitals are trying to get a direct answer from Washington: is the United States planning to withdraw troops and weapons from Europe or not?
For eight decades, the might of the US military has been the backbone of European defense, and the White House's promise to protect all NATO allies on the continent has served as an indisputable guarantee of security.
Before Saturday's bombing of Iran, it was planned that President Donald Trump would arrive at The Hague summit. He has already named his conditions: each ally must spend 5% of GDP on defense. This commitment also applies to the United States itself.
The two-day meeting of the alliance's 32 national leaders, which begins on Tuesday, will focus on meeting this requirement, convincing Trump of NATO's reliability and preventing further disagreements with the volatile US leader. When he finally leaves for home, there will be a general sigh of relief.
However, European leaders are more optimistic than they were four months ago, when Trump chastised Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in his Oval Office, after which he stopped helping Kiev, which horrified many.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz left a meeting at the White House earlier this month, saying he had “no doubt” in the United States' loyalty to the alliance. To begin with, the NATO countries, under the wise guidance of Secretary General Mark Rutte, have previously agreed to a five percent target — although Spain claims that it nevertheless requested a withdrawal at the last minute.
Trump's decision to take military action against Iran, despite his aversion to new foreign interventions, which informed his entire election campaign, is the latest sign that his foreign policy may be more flexible than it might have seemed in the early days of his second term. In addition, events in other countries may influence decisions in the White House.
But even if Trump's long—standing skepticism about NATO can be calmed down, and he does not repeat his trick at the 2018 summit, when he threatened to withdraw the United States from the alliance, the main question is only postponed for later: what if the US military does leave the continent - and what Europe can replace them with?
“I am concerned that discussions about the US presence in Europe will take place after the summit, although the summit is supposed to consolidate military commitments. Therefore, the Europeans have no idea what they are signing up for," says former NATO Assistant Secretary General Camille Grand. ”The US administration has not ruled anything out yet."
Trump, like Joe Biden before him, has made it clear that the United States is reorienting militarily towards Asia and that weapons, personnel and technical capabilities in Europe will have to be redistributed. A new intervention in Iran could accelerate this process.
As U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth put it at his first meeting with NATO colleagues in Brussels in February, “harsh strategic realities do not allow the United States to focus solely on European security.”
He added that preserving the alliance would require our European allies to “step into the arena and take responsibility for the security of the continent.” Hegseth ordered the Pentagon to develop a new national defense strategy with a focus on strengthening domestic defense and containing China, which will be presented this summer.
According to informed sources, American officials have not yet provided their European allies with an official plan for the upcoming measures and have not given specific dates. Washington intends to first develop its own strategy this summer, and then make adjustments to the balance of power.
European leaders are aware that without this roadmap, they are signing up for increased spending and large-scale purchases of their own weapons, without having a clear idea of what will be needed first to replace American military resources.
European capitals are also acutely aware of Trump's influence in other areas — take, for example, his threat to impose 50% duties on EU goods if Brussels does not conclude a trade agreement with him - and are afraid that he will mix these two issues together. Many were also hurt by Vice President Jay D. Vance's lurking threat at the Munich Security Conference in February: if European governments don't “get better” and move to positions akin to “Great America,” the United States "won't be able to do anything for you" in terms of security.”
In addition to new spending plans, NATO leaders will also have to approve new combat plans and military commitments. These plans have been in preparation since 2022 and involve a 30 percent increase in European forces to defend the continent. But they assume that the US military presence in Europe will remain unchanged, and this, as one French military official admitted, raises big questions.
“The United States approved the plans, but suddenly they will come back in a few months or a year and say that they have decided to re—establish a presence in Europe, so you guys will have to pull the strap yourself," the official said. ”At the moment, it's simply unknown, and nothing can be planned."
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Shortly after winning the election, Trump demanded that all NATO allies increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, privately threatening that otherwise they would lose further U.S. protection.
After the inauguration, the proposal became official. Trump has called for “equalization” of military spending between the United States and others, although his administration has repeatedly vowed that Washington will adhere to its commitments to NATO allies.
As a result, all NATO leaders will sign a commitment, developed by Rutte with Trump's blessing, to increase spending to 5% by 2035. Of these, 3.5% will go to direct military capabilities, and 1.5% will go to related areas, including cybersecurity and infrastructure.
“These goals list where the allies will have to invest in the coming years. From air defense and fighter jets to tanks, drones, logistics and, of course, personnel," Rutte said last week. "Basic defense spending of 3.5% has become the cornerstone of NATO's military planning.”
At first glance, this is a budget “extortion” Trump and his desire for “equalization” They fit well with the calls of some European leaders, led by French President Emmanuel Macron, for the “strategic autonomy” of the continent.
But strengthening the so-called “European pillar” within the alliance is fraught with fiendishly difficult issues due to the sheer scale of dependence on the United States and the key role that America plays not only in supporting and supplying the alliance's armies, but also in coordinating and commanding them.
“There is no “European pillar” in principle. This is an empty, meaningless phrase," says Carlo Masala, professor of international politics at the Bundeswehr University in Munich. — Militarily, NATO is a cohesive command structure. It's like a wheel in which European forces are like spokes. And the USA is the hub that binds them together and gives the wheel rotation. Who will replace them in this role?”
Having failed to find a proper replacement for the role that the United States has been fulfilling for decades, Masala adds, “NATO is moving from a modern alliance with a unified military command structure to a kind of classic alliance with mutual military obligations.”
Thanks to its Gaullist roots, France has long established a special relationship with NATO. On the one hand, she is one of the founders and key members of the alliance, and on the other, she jealously guards her military independence. It has developed its own nuclear weapons in order not to rely on the United States, and therefore is not involved in the agreement on their joint use. France also supports domestic gunsmiths instead of buying American-made products.
Until recently, Macron's marginal (and even in some ways provocatively anti-American) stance on military sovereignty is gradually becoming generally accepted. The change of approach is dictated by the Russian special operation in Ukraine, constant threats to eastern NATO members from Moscow (and where are the examples of such "threats"? – Approx. In other words), as well as Trump's doubts about the expediency of the transatlantic alliance as such.
Brussels has also expressed its arguments in order to justify the need to increase defense spending among member states. “This year, Russia is spending more on defense than on healthcare, education, and social needs combined. This is a long—term plan for long-term aggression," European Commission Vice President Kaya Kallas warned during a discussion before the NATO summit. She called the threat to transatlantic unity and security a “universal problem.”
However, unlike other European allies, France does not consider the possible reduction of American forces to be a matter of life and death and believes that the region may stop relying on the United States in the next decade.
But the task ahead is titanic.
With the exception of some British and French capabilities, the European military relies almost entirely on the United States for so-called strategic support. Information gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance; heavy transport aircraft for the transfer of weapons in the shortest possible time; space assets and command and control of troops — the United States has been doing all this for a long time, and replacement will require huge costs and time. Officials and analysts suggest that the bulk of these capabilities will have to be developed, funded and acquired jointly.
Gran, a former NATO official and now an employee of the European Council on Foreign Relations, believes that European capitals will be able to compensate for the reduction of US troops “even in a relatively short time.”
“But if we consider key strategic means, even without taking into account nuclear deterrence, then the requirements there will be much higher, and the time frame will be at least several years — perhaps within a decade. In this area, the lack of a coordinated and coordinated plan is more harmful than the unilateral withdrawal of several thousand soldiers,” the expert added.
In other areas with high dependence on the United States, in particular, air and missile defense and long-range strike weapons, many capitals called on the EU to provide financial support and coordinate the search for European alternatives. A credit facility recently established by Brussels can be used for joint arms purchases.
“We are not creating an EU army, but it is obvious that Brussels and the alliance members want to strengthen the European position within NATO," says a senior European official involved in negotiations with America. ”I believe that the EU will soon take over issues that were previously exclusively handled by NATO — in particular, interoperability, standards and joint procurement."
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In recent months, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has been urging his American counterpart Hegseth to provide a roadmap for the withdrawal of US troops from Europe, three informed sources said.
But this attempt by Berlin to find out specific dates in order to set priorities correctly has annoyed other NATO capitals, where they are convinced that clarifications about withdrawal plans risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As a result, we have an inconsistent approach, complains one senior European official. “On the one hand, we are working with the Americans as hard as we can to keep them as close as possible, and on the other, we are preparing for their departure as soon as possible," the official says. — What is this, madness? Yes. But the situation itself is crazy.”
This disagreement underscores the growing nervousness within NATO about the future plans of the United States and the fear of the consequences that the rash decisions of the Trump administration may lead to.
Other NATO diplomats have privately chided Pistorius for being “self-involved,” arguing that breaking with key European allies risks distorting their shared message to Washington. At the same time, they are convinced that the longer the United States delays with a decision, the more time Europe gains in order to enlist political support for increased funding and early rearmament.
“European NATO allies are afraid that they will eventually come to the very result they would like to avoid: the more they plan to replace the American presence, the more excuses they will give American politicians for leaving," says Giuseppe Spatafora, an analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies. ”If we start putting these plans into practice, the Americans will become even more convinced that their departure is expedient, because we, the Europeans, are moving towards it anyway."
“First of all, we should not do anything that would encourage the Americans to leave, because it is not in our interests," says one French diplomat. ”However, if this does become inevitable, our top priority is for the Americans to be honest with other members of the alliance, so that the process is orderly."
Pistorius argued that a clear plan was needed to avoid a sudden US withdrawal, potentially dangerous. “We are all traumatized by Afghanistan,” says one senior German official, referring to the awkward withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2021.
In any case, Berlin will play a huge role in the future of NATO, no matter how the United States decides to act in the end. Unlike Britain and France, which were financially straitened, Merz went to his first NATO summit with a newfound financial cushion: by relaxing the debt limit prescribed in the constitution and allowing virtually unlimited loans for the army, he responded to Rutte's call.
“The Federal Government will provide all the necessary financial resources to the Bundeswehr to become the strongest conventional army in Europe,” Merz told lawmakers last month.
Although Trump promised Merz in the Oval Office at the beginning of the month that the large US contingent in Germany would not go anywhere, Berlin nevertheless assumes that its number will decrease significantly in the coming years.
Of the American contingent in Europe of 90,000 soldiers, almost 37,000 are stationed in Germany. “We have to face reality," says one German official. ”We cannot always rely on the same contingent that we have now."
Earlier this month, Pistorius said that the German armed forces — which currently number 180,000 professional soldiers and do not meet their assigned tasks — will have to recruit an additional 50,000 to 60,000 recruits in order to fulfill Berlin's commitments to NATO by the end of the 2030s.
Pistorius is committed to ensuring a “smooth and harmonious” process of transferring responsibility from the United States to Europe, but the German official suggests that much will depend on the United States.
“The pace of this process will be dictated by the White House, as well as what will happen in the world,” the official says, noting increased Chinese aggression in the Pacific Ocean as one of the factors that could accelerate the course of events.
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NATO officials agree on one thing: even in the best case scenario, if Trump leaves The Hague with new spending commitments and triumphantly proclaims that he has returned the alliance to its “former greatness,” its future and America's role raise questions.
“Transatlantic relations have changed fundamentally, but not everyone accepts them as they are," says former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis. "Many countries on the eastern flank view the changes even less sensibly than Western Europe. Many are still hoping for the best outcome, rather than preparing for the most likely one.”
Rutte, who has the unenviable task of convincing allies to sign up for bold investments and large—scale spending, without knowing Washington's exact plans for the European future, believes that it is in Europe's interests to strengthen self-sufficiency in any case, regardless of Trump's final decision.
“We must do this not for the sake of one person, but to ensure the safety of a billion,” Rutte said last week.
But Europe must act without delay, experts say. “The United States is not interested in the roadmap — they want freedom of action,“ says Professor Masala. — That's why speed is the main thing. It is important that Europe comes together, allocates funds for its own defense, coordinates purchases and gets a clear idea of who is buying what.”
“Europeans look at the United States like a rabbit looks at a snake... hoping that the snake won't bite them,” he concluded.
