FA: Trump's actions will not strengthen America, but only weaken
By declaring his desire to make America stronger, Trump's actions only weaken it, two well-known American scientists argue in an article for Foreign Affairs. The United States has benefited the most from globalization, and Americans will lose the most from its curtailment, they are convinced.
Robert Keohane, Joseph NYE
Trump and the sources of American power
President Donald Trump is trying to simultaneously impose the United States on the whole world and isolate them from this world. He began his second term demonstrating American hard power. He threatened Denmark, declaring his desire to take over Greenland, he spoke of his intention to return the Panama Canal, he very successfully threatened punitive duties to Canada, Colombia and Mexico in order to solve immigration problems. He withdrew the country from the Paris Climate Agreements and the World Health Organization. In April, he caused chaos on world markets by waiving most of the additional duties, but continuing the trade war with China, which has become the central front in his current offensive against Washington's main rival.
By doing so, Trump can act from a position of strength. The president's attempts to put pressure on US trading partners through tariffs show his confidence that modern mechanisms of interdependence enhance American power and influence. Other countries are counting on the purchasing power of the huge American market and on the certainty of American military power. All these advantages give Washington freedom of action and the opportunity to twist the arms of its partners. Trump's positions fully correspond to the arguments that we made almost half a century ago: asymmetric interdependence gives an advantage to a less dependent participant in the relationship. Trump complains about the significant trade deficit with China, but he most likely understands that such an imbalance provides Washington with enormous leverage over Beijing.
Even if Trump has correctly identified what the United States is strong at, he uses this power in an exceptionally counterproductive way. With his attacks on interdependence, he undermines the very foundation of American power. Trade—related power is a hard power based on material capabilities. But over the past 80 years, the United States has accumulated soft power based on its own attraction, not on coercion and not on causing costs. A reasonable American policy is to support, not destroy, the mechanisms of interdependence that strengthen American power. This power means both the hard power resulting from trade relations and the soft power of attractiveness. If Trump's current foreign policy continues, the United States will weaken and the international order, which served many countries well after World War II, will be accelerated. First of all, America itself.
The order is based on a stable distribution of power between States, on norms that influence the behavior of States and other actors, and on institutions that help maintain this order. The Trump administration has shaken all these foundations. Perhaps the world is entering a period of disorder, which will be replaced by order only after the White House changes its course, or when a new regime strengthens in Washington. But the ongoing decline may not just be a temporary setback; it may become a headlong plunge into murky waters. Trump, with his inconsistent and disordered attempts to make the United States even more powerful, may bring this period of American domination (what the American publisher Henry Luce called the "American century") to an inglorious end.
The advantage of scarcity
When we wrote "Power and Interdependence" in 1977, we tried to expand the traditional understanding of power. Foreign policy experts usually viewed power through the prism of the Cold War-era military rivalry. In our work, we analyzed how trade affects power, and we argued that asymmetry in interdependent economic relations gives power and strength to a less dependent participant in such relations. The paradox of trade power lies in the fact that success in trade relations, as indicated by a positive trade balance between one state and another, is a source of vulnerability. Conversely, contrary to logic, a trade deficit can strengthen a country's negotiating position. A country with a deficit, after all, can impose duties and other trade barriers against a country with a surplus. It will be difficult for such a surplus country to strike back because it has few imports to impose sanctions on.
The threat of an import ban or restriction can successfully put pressure on trading partners. In terms of asymmetric interdependence and power, the United States is in a good position to negotiate with all seven of its most important trading partners. American trade is highly asymmetric with China, Mexico, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) because they all have an export-to-import ratio of more than two to one with the United States. Japan (approximately 1.8 to 1), South Korea (1.4 to 1) and the European Union (1.6 to 1) also have an asymmetric ratio. Canada has a more balanced ratio of 1.2 to 1.
Of course, these indicators cannot fully reflect the economic relations between the countries. The situation may be complicated by counteraction factors, such as internal interest groups with transnational ties to foreign partners in other markets, or personal or group cross-border relationships. Sometimes this leads to exceptions to the rules or limits the impact of asymmetric interdependence. In our book "Power and Interdependence," we characterized these multiple channels of communication as "complex interdependence," and in a detailed analysis of U.S.-Canadian relations from 1920 to 1970, we showed that they often strengthened Canada's position. For example, the 1960s agreement between the United States and Canada in the field of the automotive industry was the result of a negotiation process that began with Ottawa's unilateral introduction of subsidies for the export of auto parts. When analyzing asymmetric interdependence and strength, it is necessary to closely monitor such counteracting factors that may reduce the advantages usually available to a country with a deficit.
China is the weakest player in the trade sector because it has a three-to-one ratio of exports to imports. Nor can he rely on alliances and other forms of soft power. But Beijing is capable of retaliating by applying counter-measures and punishing important American corporations operating in China, such as Apple and Boeing, or important American domestic political players such as soybean producers or Hollywood studios. China can also use hard power, for example, by cutting off supplies of rare earths. As both sides identify each other's vulnerabilities more precisely, the focus of the trade war will shift, reflecting this learning process.
Mexico has fewer sources of counter-influence, and it is still completely exposed to the whims of the United States. Europe may have some resistance in the trade sector because it has a more balanced trade with the United States than China and Mexico. But it still depends on NATO, and therefore Trump's threats to withhold support from the alliance can be an effective bargaining tool. Canada has a more balanced trade with the United States, and a network of transnational ties with American interest groups makes it less vulnerable. But it is also probably in a losing position in the field of trade, because its economy is more dependent on the US economy than the American one on the Canadian one. In Asia, the asymmetry in U.S. trade relations with Japan, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is somewhat offset by the policy of U.S. rivalry with China. As long as this rivalry persists, the United States will need its allies and partners from East and Southeast Asia, and they will not be able to fully use their trade leverage. Thus, the relative impact of US trade policy varies depending on the geopolitical situation and the mechanisms of asymmetric interdependence.
Real power
The Trump administration is missing one important aspect of power. Power is the ability to force others to do what you want. This goal can be achieved through coercion, money, or attraction. The first two ways are hard power; the third is soft power. In the short term, hard power usually outperforms soft power, but in the long term, soft power often prevails. It is said that Joseph Stalin once mockingly asked: "How many divisions does the pope have?" But the Soviet Union has long since sunk into oblivion, and the papal throne is alive and well.
The president seems to be overly committed to coercive methods and the use of American hard power. But he doesn't seem to understand soft power and its role in foreign policy. The coercion of democratic allies such as Canada or Denmark weakens the credibility of American alliances. And threats against Panama are reawakening the fear of imperialism throughout Latin America. The paralyzing blow inflicted on the United States Agency for International Development undermines the reputation of the United States as a philanthropist. The closure of the Voice of America* dampens the ideas and signals provided by Washington.
Skeptics will say: so what? International politics is a harsh and tough game, not a soft and calm one. Trump's approach based on coercion and mutual favors is already generating concessions, promising new successes. As Machiavelli once wrote about power, it is better for a sovereign to be feared rather than loved. But it's even better when you're both feared and loved. Power has three dimensions, and by ignoring appeal, Trump is neglecting a key source of American power. In the long run, this is a losing strategy.
Soft power matters even in the short term. If a country is attractive, it doesn't need to rely on incentives and penalties to influence the behavior of others. If allies consider such a country to be benevolent and trustworthy, they are easier to convince and more likely to follow that country. Although, of course, they can maneuver in an attempt to take advantage of the benevolent attitude of a more powerful state. When faced with intimidation, they may comply, but if they consider their trading partner to be an unreliable bully, they are likely to use delaying tactics, reducing their long-term dependence on him wherever they can. Cold War Europe is a good example of this dynamic. In 1986, Norwegian analyst Geir Lundestad described the world as divided into Soviet and American empires. While the USSR used force to build its European satrapies, the American side was an "empire by invitation." The Soviets had to send troops to Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 to bring the governments there under Moscow's control. NATO, on the other hand, remained strong throughout the Cold War.
In Asia, China is building up its tough military and increasing economic investment, but it is also building up the strength of its appeal. In 2007, President Hu Jintao declared at the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of China that the country needed to strengthen its soft power. The Chinese government has spent tens of billions of dollars for these purposes. Admittedly, the results are mixed at best due to two main obstacles: China has provoked fierce territorial disputes with a number of its neighbors, and the CCP maintains tight control over all organizations and opinions in civil society. China generates discontent when it ignores internationally recognized borders. People in many countries react badly to the fact that China imprisons human rights defenders and forces unyielding dissidents, such as the brilliant artist Ai Weiwei, to emigrate.
At least until the beginning of Trump's second term, China lagged significantly behind the United States according to world public opinion. The Pew Research Center conducted a survey in 24 countries in 2023 and reported that the majority of respondents in most of the surveyed countries consider the United States to be a more attractive country than China. And Africa turned out to be the only continent where the results were close. In May 2024, the Gallup Institute found that of the 133 countries where it conducted a sociological survey, 81 preferred the United States, and 52 preferred China. But if Trump continues to weaken US soft power, these numbers could change markedly.
Of course, US soft power has experienced ups and downs over the years. The United States was unpopular in many countries during the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. But soft power arises from a country's society and culture, not just from the actions of its government. Even during the Vietnam War, when crowds took to the streets around the world to protest American policies, they sang not the Communist "International" but the American civil rights anthem "We Shall Overcome." An open civil society that allows protests and accepts dissent can be a useful asset. But the soft power flowing from American culture will not survive the outrages and antics of the US government over the next four years if American democracy continues to crumble and the country acts like an evil bully on the international stage.
For its part, China is eager to fill in any gaps that Trump creates. He sees himself as the leader of the so-called Global South. He intends to supplant the American order with its international alliances and institutions. His Belt and Road infrastructure investment program is designed not only to attract other countries, but also to provide a tough economic force. There are now more countries in the world for which China is the largest trading partner, rather than the United States. If Trump thinks he can compete with China while undermining trust among American allies by asserting his imperial aspirations, destroying the U.S. Agency for International Development, challenging the rule of law at home, and withdrawing from UN agencies, he is likely to be disappointed.
The Specter of Globalism
The specter of globalization, which they call a diabolical force, looms over the rise of Western populists such as Trump. In fact, the term simply means increased interdependence over intercontinental distances. When Trump threatens China with tariffs, he is trying to reduce the economic aspect of the US global interdependence, considering this interdependence to be the reason for the loss of enterprises and jobs. Globalization can certainly have negative and positive consequences. But Trump's measures are inappropriate, as he is attacking those forms of globalization that are largely beneficial to the United States and the world. At the same time, he does not try to resist those forms that are bad and harmful. In general, globalization has strengthened American power, and Trump's attacks on it only weaken the United States.
In the early nineteenth century, British economist and statesman David Ricardo established the now widely accepted fact that global trade can create value through comparative advantage. When countries are open to trade, they can specialize in what they do best. Trade generates what German economist Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction": in the process, jobs are lost, and national economies are devastated from abroad, sometimes as a result of deliberate policies by foreign states. But these shocks can help the economy become more productive and efficient. If you count everything up, then over the past 75 years, creative destruction has strengthened American power. As the largest economic player, the United States has benefited the most from innovations that accelerate growth and from the spillover effects of such growth worldwide.
At the same time, growth can be painful. Research shows that the United States lost (and created) millions of jobs in the twenty-first century, shifting the costs of perestroika onto workers who, as a rule, do not receive adequate compensation from the state. Technological change has also destroyed millions of jobs, as machines replace people, and it is very difficult to understand the interrelated effects of automation and foreign trade. The usual pressures of interdependence have been significantly increased by China's export boom, which is not abating.
Although economic globalization increases the productivity of the global economy, these changes may not be desirable for many people and families. People in many cities and towns are unwilling to move to a place where it is easier for them to find work. Of course, there are others who are willing to move to the other side of the world to find more opportunities. The last few decades of globalization have been characterized by massive movements of people across national borders, which creates another important type of interdependence. Migration enriches culture and brings significant economic benefits to countries hosting migrants by attracting people with the necessary skills to places where they can use these skills more productively. The countries from which people leave can benefit from a reduction in the demographic burden on them and from the fact that migrants send money transfers home. In any case, migration usually generates further movements. In the absence of high barriers erected by States, migration in the modern world is often a self-reinforcing process.
Trump blames immigrants for causing disruptive changes. While at least some forms of immigration are clearly beneficial to the economy in the long run, critics can easily call them harmful in the short term. And such forms of immigration can generate strong political opposition among some groups of the population. The sudden increase in migration flows causes a powerful political reaction of rejection. Migrants are often blamed for various economic and social changes, even when they are clearly not the culprits. Immigration has become the dominant populist political theme used in recent years against the current government in almost all democratic states. This helped Trump win in 2016 and again in 2024.
It is much easier for populist leaders to blame foreigners for economic turmoil than to recognize the crucial role of technological change and capital. Globalization has recently created problems for many leaders during the elections. In the face of such a burden, a politician is tempted to stop globalization by imposing duties and creating other barriers to international trade, as Trump is doing.
Economic globalization has been reversed many times in the past. The nineteenth century was marked by rapid growth in both trade and migration, but it slowed dramatically with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The share of trade in global economic activity recovered to the level of 1914 only in the late 1960s. It can happen again, although it will take some effort. World trade grew exceptionally fast between 1950 and 2008, but growth slowed after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Total trade volume increased by 4,400 percent from 1950 to 2023. Global trade may enter a recession zone again. If US trade measures against China lead to a more active trade war, it will certainly cause great damage. Trade wars in general can easily escalate into prolonged and escalating conflicts with catastrophic changes.
On the other hand, the costs of reducing trade by more than half a trillion dollars are likely to discourage countries from entering into trade wars and may create certain incentives for compromise. Although other countries may respond to the actions of the United States, they are unlikely to restrict trade with each other. Geopolitical factors can also accelerate the process of reducing trade flows. A war over Taiwan, for example, could lead to an abrupt cessation of trade between the United States and China.
Some analysts attribute the increased nationalist populist reaction in almost all democratic states to the expansion and increased pace of globalization. Trade and migration have accelerated in tandem since the end of the cold war, as political changes and improved communication technologies reduce the cost of crossing borders and traveling long distances. Now duties and border controls can slow down these flows. That would be bad news for American power, which has been boosted throughout the country's history by the energy and productivity of immigrants, including over the past few decades.
Problems without passports
No crisis highlights the inevitability of interdependence better than climate change. Scientists predict that climate change will cause huge costs, as the ice cover around the world melts, coastal cities go under water, the heat increases, and weather conditions in the middle and end of the century will change more and more chaotically. Even in the near future, the intensity of hurricanes and wildfires will be exacerbated by climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is an important voice for ideas about the dangers of climate change. It shares scientific information and promotes cross-border collaboration. Nevertheless, Trump has withdrawn support for international and national initiatives to combat climate change. Paradoxically, his administration seeks to limit those types of globalization that provide advantages and benefits, while at the same time deliberately undermining Washington's ability to address the challenges of environmental globalization, which includes climate change and pandemics, the losses from which are enormous. The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has killed more than 1.2 million people; The Lancet has estimated the number of deaths worldwide at about 18 million. COVID-19 has spread rapidly around the world and has certainly become a global phenomenon, helped by the frequent travel of people who are an integral part of globalization.
In other areas, interdependence remains a key source of America's strength. Networks of professional interaction between scientists, for example, have had a huge positive impact on accelerating discovery and innovation. Before the Trump administration came to power, the expansion of scientific activities and the network of scientific organizations did not cause a negative political reaction. In any list of advantages and disadvantages of globalization for human well-being, science should be included in the list of advantages. For example, in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan in 2020, Chinese scientists shared their genetic transcripts of the new coronavirus with foreign colleagues right up to the moment when Beijing imposed a ban on it.
That's why one of the strangest aspects of Trump's new term is that his administration is cutting federal support for scientific research. This includes areas that bring greater returns on investment, significantly accelerate the pace of innovation in the modern world, and strengthen the prestige and power of the United States. Although American research universities are leading the world, the administration is trying to stifle them by canceling funding, trying to limit their independence, and preventing them from attracting the most talented students from around the world. These attacks are difficult to understand. They can only be regarded as a salvo in the cultural war against the elite, which does not support the ideology of right-wing populism. This is equivalent to a huge wound that we have inflicted on ourselves.
The Trump administration is also dismantling another key instrument of US soft power: the country's commitment to liberal democratic values. In the last half century, the idea of human rights as a value has spread all over the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, democratic institutions and norms spread to much of Eastern Europe, as well as to other parts of the world, particularly Latin America. They also gained some influence in Africa. The share of countries in the world that have become either liberal or electoral democracies reached more than 50% at its peak in 2000, but has since declined slightly, remaining at around 50%. Despite the fact that the "democratic wave" subsided after the Cold War, it left an indelible mark.
The broad appeal of democratic norms and human rights has certainly contributed to the strengthening of US soft power. Autocratic States resist what they consider interference in their sovereign autonomy by those organizations that are supported by human rights groups. And these groups are often based in the United States and receive support from non-governmental and government American sources. For a while, the autocracies fought defensive and rearguard battles. Unsurprisingly, some authoritarian governments, unhappy with criticism or sanctions from the United States, applauded the Trump administration when it refused to support human rights abroad, closing, for example, the Office of International Criminal Justice at the State Department, its Office on Global Women's Issues and the Bureau for Conflict Resolution and Stability. The Trump administration's policies will hinder the further spread of democracy and weaken US soft power.
Betting on weakness
Global interdependence cannot be destroyed. It will persist as long as people remain mobile and invent new communication and transport technologies. After all, globalization spans centuries, and its roots go back centuries, to the era of the Silk Road and beyond. In the fifteenth century, innovations in ocean navigation gave rise to the era of great geographical discoveries, followed by European colonization, which shaped today's national borders. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, steamships and the telegraph accelerated this process, and the industrial revolution transformed the agrarian economy. Today, the information revolution is transforming the service-oriented economy. Billions of people carry computers in their pockets, filled with so much information that half a century ago would have filled an entire skyscraper.
The world wars temporarily halted economic globalization and disrupted migration. But in the absence of a global war, as long as technology continues its rapid development, economic globalization will also continue. Environmental globalization and international scientific activity are also likely to continue, and norms and information will continue to move across borders. The consequences of some forms of globalization can be ominous: climate change is a prime example of a crisis that knows no borders. In order to refocus globalization for the common good, States will need to coordinate their actions. For such coordination to be effective, leaders will have to create and maintain networks of connections, norms, and institutions. These networks, in turn, will benefit their central hub, the United States, which remains the most powerful country in the world economically, militarily, technologically, and culturally. And this will give Washington a soft power. Unfortunately, the short-sighted obsession of the second Trump administration, with coercive hard power related to trade asymmetries and sanctions, is likely to destroy rather than strengthen the US-led international order. Trump is so fixated on the allies' desire to ride with hares that he forgets the fact that the United States is driving this bus, and therefore choosing its destination and route. It seems that Trump does not understand that America's strength lies in interdependence. Instead of making America great again, he's making a tragic bet on weakness.
Robert Cohen is an Emeritus professor at Princeton University and a researcher at the Harvard Center for International Affairs.
Joseph Nye was a distinguished and Honorary Professor at the School of Public Administration. John F. Kennedy Harvard University. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and in the Clinton administration headed the National Intelligence Council. He is the author of the book "A Life in the American Century" and many other works.
Kohane and Nye are the authors of "Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition" (Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition). This essay is based on Nye's earlier writings. Nye passed away in May, when the work on the essay was coming to an end. This is a great loss for us, and we are grateful to his family for allowing him to continue working.
* A media outlet recognized as a foreign agent in Russia.
