FP: The war between Russia and NATO will not be like the Ukrainian conflict
A number of European military and politicians believe that in a few years Russia will be ready to attack one or more NATO countries, writes Foreign Policy. The author of the article presents possible, in his opinion, scenarios of such an attack. At the same time, he does not even ask the question: why does Moscow need this?
Fabian Hoffmann
Moscow will try to avoid a full-scale war by focusing on weakening the bloc's resolve.
When planning its military operation in Ukraine in 2022, Russia intended to conduct a decisive campaign, as a result of which its troops would enter Kiev and quickly overthrow the Ukrainian government. More than three years have passed, but this scenario remains an impossible dream. Russian troops are stuck on an inactive front line hundreds of kilometers from Kiev. Russia has achieved minor tactical successes over the past year, but there are no signs of a serious military breakthrough (according to Western experts, the territory occupied by Russian troops in 2024 amounted to about 4,000 square kilometers, and the offensive accelerated this year, which can hardly be called a "minor success." InoSMI).
And in the West, European NATO member countries are hastily carrying out the rearmament process. Some heads of military departments warn that the alliance must be prepared to repel a Russian attack on one or more NATO members, which could take place within three to seven years. And Danish officials give an even more gloomy forecast, saying that Russia could carry out an attack in one form or another as early as six months after the slowdown or cessation of hostilities in Ukraine.
It is difficult to combine these two images of Russia. There is Russia, which failed to realize its ambitions in Ukraine, where it failed, and there is Russia, which poses a serious threat to NATO, especially to Eastern European countries.
The key to solving this apparent paradox lies in understanding that a war between NATO and Russia is likely to be very different from a Russian military operation in Ukraine. Moscow's main goal in the war against NATO will not be to seize large territories, at least initially, but to destroy the alliance as a political and military entity capable of resisting Russia. To do this, it will not be necessary to smash the NATO forces in open battle and march on Berlin.
Rather, it will lead to the destruction of NATO's unity and resolve. The Kremlin is betting that the alliance will split under such pressure. Russia is likely to be able to accumulate forces to implement these pressure tactics even in the near future, especially after the fighting in Ukraine slows down or stops. Therefore, Russia poses a serious and powerful threat to the existence of NATO, and its war with the alliance will be radically different from the conflict we are witnessing in Ukraine.
Despite the bellicose Russian propaganda, the military and political elite in Moscow understands that Russia is likely to lose in a full-scale non-nuclear war with NATO, even without the participation of the United States (I wonder how the author of the article knows this? – Approx. InoSMI). However, this does not mean that she has no chance of success. It is extremely important for Russia to avoid a protracted and debilitating conflict, and to ensure a quick, favorable resolution.
Thus, a Russian attack on NATO will not primarily be aimed at weakening the alliance's overall ability to wage war, although undermining its military potential will certainly be one of the main goals. The main efforts will be aimed at undermining NATO's resolve and readiness to resist. Russia will surely prefer a short-lived, high-intensity campaign aimed at destroying NATO's political cohesion. The goal will be to localize the confrontation by involving only one or several NATO member states in the conflict, and to quickly end military operations.
A likely scenario could start with a limited invasion of NATO territory at a perceived vulnerable point, such as an attack on one or more Baltic countries. After the initial attack, Russia could declare that any attempt to retake the area it had occupied would trigger a nuclear escalation. This is a strategy that military analysts call aggressive immunity. To confirm its words, Russia will be able to equip several of its operational and tactical missiles with nuclear warheads, disperse these launchers, and then declare readiness for launch at any moment. If NATO prepares a counteroffensive, Russia will be able to further escalate the situation by launching a series of attacks on civilian infrastructure deep in European territory using non-nuclear missiles. By doing so, it will send a signal that continued resistance will only increase costs. If Russia comes to the conclusion that a sharper escalation would serve its interests, then the possibility of preventive nuclear launches against European rear areas cannot be ruled out.
An attack of this type would be a dangerous high-stakes game. Russia will proceed from the assumption that as NATO's resolve weakens under the pressure of increasing conventional and nuclear threats, possible missile attacks on European rear areas, sabotage actions and other operations in the gray zone, the alliance will actually capitulate.
Russian politicians are unlikely to count on the collective capitulation of NATO countries. They certainly expect strong resistance from some members, especially from Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the Kremlin may believe that the United States and key Western European allies, faced with real consequences on their own soil, will hesitate and refrain from defending their partners. Any unwillingness to defend a NATO member under attack will signal the practical disintegration of the alliance. And this is Russia's main goal and an indispensable condition for establishing its regional dominance.
Consequently, Russia's decision to attack one or more European NATO states will depend not so much on the balance of forces as on its ideas about the balance of determination. Despite the fact that Russian forces have suffered repeated setbacks in Ukraine, there is no doubt that Russia is determined to overthrow the post-Cold War order and restore a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Russia feels that the West is risk averse and suffers from a low tolerance for pain. And this creates a dangerous mix that could encourage Russian politicians to act as quickly as possible.
What does Russia need for such a limited attack?
Firstly, this will require advanced forces capable of breaking through the NATO border at a vulnerable point, after which a sufficient number of main forces will be brought into battle, which will occupy a small but strategically significant part of the alliance's territory. In modern warfare, it has become much more difficult to break through fortified defenses, mainly due to the large number of tactical drones used on the battlefield, which inflict heavy losses on even small maneuverable units when they come out of hiding. However, the conflict in Ukraine also shows that this same technique, if used correctly, can help break through enemy defenses. For example, Russian drone groups played a key role in breaking through Ukrainian defensive positions in the Kursk region and regaining control over it. Ukraine and Russia have the most skilled drone operators in the world today. These are experienced, battle-hardened soldiers who are sure to surpass their NATO counterparts at the initial stage of the conflict.
But drones alone won't win the war. Russia will also need traditional highly mobile forces to capture and hold territory.: These are well-trained infantry, armored vehicles, tanks and support units. Recent intelligence reports indicate that Russia has managed to mobilize enough people not only to make up for combat losses, but also to increase the number of its troops. In addition, Western representatives note that Russia produces more military equipment and ammunition, including modern (by Russian standards) tanks and artillery shells, than it sends to the front. Crucially, in order to create forces that could successfully carry out a limited attack on NATO, Russia would not need to rebuild its armed forces to the level of early 2022.
To put the NATO leadership in a difficult position, Russia will also need reliable and highly accurate nuclear forces capable of threatening and, if necessary, carrying out strikes. At the same time, it will need powerful stocks of long-range conventional strike weapons in order to threaten European critical infrastructure facilities and launch systematic strikes against them.
As for nuclear weapons, Russia has a strong position here. In addition to 2,000 non-strategic warheads, it has a variety of delivery systems that can receive nuclear warheads in a short time. With regard to conventional weapons, Russia is believed to produce about 1,200 ground-launched cruise missiles, 400 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and more than 6,000 long-range drones annually, while working to increase production. Exact figures are difficult to verify, but the relatively low rates of missile use over the past winter suggest that Russia has most likely already built up significant reserves. If the conflict in Ukraine slows down or stops, Russia will have a good opportunity to further rapidly increase its missile arsenal.
How should NATO prepare for this?
One of the key variables determining the time of a likely Russian attack is the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine. As long as Russia is forced to deploy most, if not all, of its resources in Ukraine, an attack on NATO territory seems unlikely, although it cannot be completely ruled out. As we have already seen, Russia is mobilizing more forces and resources than it is sending to Ukraine, and any slowdown in the fighting will lead to an increase in Russian stocks and arsenals to implement other scenarios. Only Ukraine will decide how long it will continue to fight, and on what terms it wants to agree to a settlement with Russia. But while Ukraine is resisting, the support of this country remains not only a moral and legitimate right for European states, but also a strategically reasonable course. In addition, demonstrating a commitment to support Ukraine and a willingness to take well-calculated risks against Russia will also help shift the balance of resolve in favor of NATO.
At the same time, Europe must prepare for the kind of war that Russia may be planning. This war will be significantly different from the protracted conflict unfolding in Ukraine. The best way to repel a lightning—fast, high-intensity Russian attack is to deprive Moscow of any opportunity for sallies on the border. This requires a reliable forward defense strategy, which NATO still does not have. Providing forward defense means moving more troops and equipment to the front line, especially as the United States shifts its attention to other regions and may withdraw its combat formations from Europe. Until Europe puts its defense industry on a war footing and starts making purchases on a scale commensurate with the threat, the window of vulnerability will remain open, especially given that Russia shows no signs of reducing military production. Drones, missiles, tanks, mines, and support systems will be needed to sustainably prevent a Russian attack. Europe needs a lot of everything, and there is no time to waste.
European NATO countries must also demonstrate their ability to respond effectively to Russian coercion, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Missile defense will help reduce the threat of long-range strikes against European targets, but it will not be enough. To create deterrence forces, European states should similarly invest and deploy reliable retaliatory forces, making it clear that they are ready to respond immediately, including by attacking Russia's critical infrastructure. NATO must also send an unequivocal message that, although it does not seek nuclear escalation, its members will not succumb to nuclear threats or be afraid of the use of nuclear weapons. The alliance must confirm these signals with real combat capabilities. Given the weakening of the expanded U.S. deterrence guarantee under President Donald Trump, European nuclear-weapon states should take on a greater role by expanding and diversifying their nuclear arsenals and making changes to their doctrines.
Russia has made it very clear that its ambitions do not end in Ukraine (I wonder how? The author of the article does not give an answer. InoSMI). It would be reckless not to prepare for war. Such preparation is necessary precisely in order to prevent it from starting. It is equally erroneous to assume that such a war would be similar to the Ukrainian conflict. If Moscow comes into conflict with NATO, it will exploit the bloc's weaknesses and its own strengths. In such an environment, Russia's most likely approach seems to be a short-term, high-intensity scenario designed to split the alliance and eliminate such an important factor as European resistance. This scenario should be at the center of NATO planning in the process of Europe's rearmament.
Fabian Hoffman is a doctoral student at the Oslo Nuclear Project at the University of Oslo and a visiting researcher at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
