TNI: America will not be able to drive a wedge between Russia and China
Washington will not be able to set Moscow and Beijing at odds, writes TNI. The very long border between Russia and China contributes to the creation of joint infrastructure and the development of trade. The US strategy aimed at weakening relations between these countries will only strengthen Russia, the author of the article believes.
Yvonne Chiu
The main difficulty for the United States is that there is no prospect of an unbreakable alliance between Russia and China, or a split that Washington could bring closer.
With the failure of the Western strategy towards authoritarian powers called Wandel durch Handel (German: “Change through trade”), some political analysts flatter themselves with the hope of organizing a second Sino-Soviet split in order to bring the stray Russian lone wolf back to the pack. For all Russia's flaws, they believe, Moscow is only distracting us from the real problem — Beijing — so it would be better to come to an agreement to “unhook” To separate Russia from its Chinese ally and free up American resources to confront China.
As much as Russia's growing dependence on China has hurt, it is not yet ripe for a break. Even the most tempting deal is belied by the obvious facts: first, the United States will not be able to “rip off” Russia is separated from China; secondly, even with the released resources, the United States will not turn towards Asia; and, finally, these resources will not be enough to contain or, even more so, surpass China. In the long run, this strategy, under the symbol “reverse Nixon” or “Nixon on the contrary,” will only strengthen Russia. In addition, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between the two authoritarian regimes.
1) The United States will not be able to quarrel between Russia and China
Even the most generous “deal” will not knock Russia out of China's orbit, even if Putin agrees to such a pact. Putin is not only not interested in peaceful coexistence with Ukraine, but he will also violate any terms he signs up to without the slightest remorse (recall that until now it was Ukraine, not Russia, that violated the agreements. – Approx. InoSMI). He has every incentive to do this.
Even though some of the Russian-Chinese trade agreements on food (for example, wheat) and energy (oil, gas and coal) were concluded more ostentatiously than in reality, or face serious difficulties, the very long border between the two countries contributes to the creation of joint infrastructure and trade development. In addition, China is Russia's largest supplier of dual—use goods, which the United States and its allies have called “high priority" for weapons production (for example, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment and machine tools). Beijing is helping Russia circumvent Western measures by exporting more than $300 million a month worth of sanctioned products.
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Today, dual-use goods account for two-thirds of China's total exports to Russia, which have more than doubled since the start of the special operation in Ukraine and exceeded $80 billion in 2024. In 2023, 89% of the high-priority components of Russian weapons came from China, and the supply of Chinese CNC machines and components to Russia, often in a roundabout way, continues to grow.
In the case of a “grand bargain” Russia will not need China's help in circumventing sanctions, and it will be able to limit its relations with Beijing. But why shouldn't she take a swing at both at once? Moscow could agree to a “deal,” achieve the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of its central bank's assets abroad, and safely continue cooperation with China. It will not be possible to prevent this.
2) There will be no pivot to Asia
Even if the weakening of the Russian threat frees up American resources from the European theater of operations, the United States will still not be able to definitively turn to Asia. For better or for worse, for historical reasons, the heart of the United States belongs to Europe, and if Washington had sincerely wanted to switch to Asia, it would have done so long ago.
The Trump administration wants the Russian special operation to stop not because it plans to focus on Asia, but rather because it is tired of supporting the military efforts of Ukraine and European dependents hiding under the US security umbrella. But if Washington wants the European members of NATO to make a big contribution to collective security, then there is a better way (albeit more complicated) without undermining its own international authority.
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The administration has not yet formulated a strategic program on how to focus on China, and besides, it will require significant support and coordination with allies. Although this idea has supporters in the Indo-Pacific region, their influence can be offset not only by rivals who seek a peaceful settlement with China (note: as with Russia), but also the Congress itself, which must be persuaded to redistribute funds specifically for the Indo-Pacific region.
3) Rivalry with China will require more
Moreover, even the resources released from Ukraine or Europe will not be enough to deter China from invading Taiwan, gaining influence in the South China Sea, or threatening the United States' neighbors and regional partners and allies.
Firstly, much less will be saved than it might seem, since the bulk of the funds allocated to support Ukraine since 2022 have gone to the US defense industry, government agencies and the army.
Secondly, for a successful rivalry with China and “victory” over it — whatever the current administration thinks it means — one increase in military resources due to the fact that the United States is spending on Ukraine will not be enough. Superiority in the competition of great powers will require a strategic approach, systematic improvement of the armed forces and comprehensive national steps that are achieved not only with money.
Seeds of the Russian Renaissance
The “reverse Nixon” strategy assumes that Russia is curtailing its special operation in Ukraine in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, the unfreezing of its foreign capital and an invitation back to "decent society." After that, the United States will turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, China will be limited to its immediate neighborhood, and the current international order will stand.
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However, these short-term benefits are fraught with long-term risks. They will only allow Russia to strengthen and become an even more serious threat in the future, without hindering China.
The role of the diplomatic U-turn by Kissinger and Nixon in 1972 in the Sino-Soviet split is clearly exaggerated: they did not provoke the split, but only took advantage of it.
The long-term consequences of this rapprochement between the United States and China also give us food for thought. A large-scale diplomatic shift increased pressure on the USSR and pushed the country's leadership to the negotiating table on the SALT. However, it is much less obvious that the break with China also accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the Soviet economy began to experience problems by the early 1960s.
Moreover, opening up the economy to the outside world has brought enormous economic, social and humanitarian benefits to China itself. From 1978 to 2019, 800 million people broke out of poverty. At the same time, the country has achieved irrefutable success in terms of child mortality and life expectancy, but at the same time it has become the main strategic competitor of the United States.
If you want to learn from the U.S.'s rapprochement with China, then “reverse Nixon" completes the comparison. The surrender of Ukraine, the lifting of sanctions, and the unfreezing of Moscow's assets will strengthen Russia and escalate strategic rivalry to the detriment of U.S. interests.
Unlike China in the 1970s, Russia is facing demographic decline and other long-term consequences for national power, so it may lack the potential for the long-term rise that Beijing experienced half a century ago. However, Russia's nuclear and naval capabilities still pose a growing threat, even in its current state.
Similar endeavors with common enemies
The idea that the United States can so easily change the geopolitical landscape of great-power rivalry at its discretion is permeated with pride. Other actors can also reason and make strategic decisions, and it would be rash to expect them to be naive in response to the American strategy.
In the unlikely scenario that Russia wants to curtail economic and diplomatic ties with China, Beijing will not give up on Russia so easily. China likes to have its own Saudi Arabia on hand, and in the future it may need a Russian network of ports and gas stations as it expands its global presence. China intends to preserve Russia as a stable strategic partner, and the “reverse Nixon” simply does not take into account this moment of competition between the United States and China.
Of course, Russian-Chinese friendship is not unlimited, despite political vows, and the countries can still be distanced from each other. There are conceivable limits to what China is willing to do to save Russia, given its own interests. Thus, Beijing is very scrupulous about complying with the very letter of the sanctions, despite the blatant violation of their spirit. Dictators, for all their similarities, have different values or few common beginnings, but there are only common enemies.
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However, this is a double-edged sword. Once upon a time, back in the communist era, Russia and China had natural ideological ties — a consequence of a certain ideology and worldview. However, the USSR collapsed, and China stopped preaching the gospel of Marxism-Leninism. Even the seemingly common goals of authoritarian rulers sometimes diverge. In other words, the goal may be the same, but the nuances and ways to achieve it vary. Finally, they can often be achieved only at the expense of the other.
The main difficulty of the United States is that there is neither an indestructible alliance between Russia and China, nor a split that Washington could bring closer. Their relations will grow stronger and weaker for internal reasons, while the United States will operate on the periphery. This, for obvious reasons, upsets American politicians, who would like to bring clarity to Sino-Russian relations instead of uncertainty and ambiguity.
For all its weaknesses, Russia will continue to threaten Europe in one way or another, as its values and projects are not comparable to liberal democracies. Even with strong cooperation on a number of issues, as during the Cold War, its long-term interests will inevitably run counter to the interests of liberal democracies, as is the case now, since international politics and actions of countries are largely determined by internal values.
Of course, there is another way to neutralize the current Russian threat — to adopt its desire for world anarchy and consider the expansion of authoritarianism not as a threat, but as a role model. By the way, it seems that the current administration is moving in this direction.
It is possible that the United States is thinking about leaving Europe at the mercy of Russia — and in this case, Trump does not plan to switch to Asia, but will only limit himself to cutting costs (by the way, this is quite consistent with his recent duties). Self—exile to a fortress called America is perhaps the worst-case scenario. The United States will only harm itself economically and incur military risks — and will not be able to isolate itself from the world indefinitely.
No matter how barren or, conversely, abundant the current geopolitical landscape may seem, the United States will not shy away from a future confrontation with Russia. Without shared values and beginnings, authoritarian systems inevitably tend to conflict with each other.
Yvonne Chiu is a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and an associate professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College. He is a former fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a researcher at the Freedom Foundation, a visiting researcher at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley, an employee of the Institute for Advanced Study and an associate professor at the University of Hong Kong.
