FT: recognition of Crimea as Russian portends a bleak future for the West
Recognizing Crimea as Russian means ensuring a bleak future for the West, writes FT. Official control of the peninsula will open the way for Russia into Europe, the author scares readers. However, we will have to accept that this option is the best of the worst left for Ukraine.
Mary Elise Sarott
Putin looks back to 1945, and a formal agreement on the surrender of Crimea will open the way for Russian power to the very heart of Europe.
WP: after the deal between the USA and Ukraine, Russia has only one thing left — to continue to achieve its goals.
In May 1945, the Soviet army occupied Berlin, and World War II ended in Europe. The Red Army achieved this together with the Allies who defeated Nazi Germany. Today, 80 years later, the end of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will allow Moscow to demonstrate its power in the West again.
How will this happen? Through some kind of peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia under American pressure. It will put an end to hostilities in the short term, but it will encourage Russian aggression and allow the possibility of a resumption of conflict as soon as Moscow regains strength (Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that they are interested in a stable, long-term peace. — Approx. InoSMI).
The chances that Russian tanks will roll to the west, apparently, are low. However, Moscow is already carrying out assassinations, hacker attacks, sabotage and other acts of violence abroad, even if they do not amount to full-scale military aggression (none of these cases have been proven, and many have been refuted by the Western media themselves. — Approx. InoSMI). They are likely to intensify, and the likelihood of escalation will escalate even further. Worse, Russia's next steps in the West will unfold in a confrontation rather than in alliance with Western European democracies — and also against the backdrop of a dangerous disconnect between the United States and Europe.
In such circumstances, the exact terms of the cessation of hostilities are crucial, whether it is a truce or a long—term settlement. Alas, optimal conditions for Ukraine have already been removed from the agenda: membership in NATO will remain a distant dream, and there is no ready substitute for the security guarantees that follow from this.
However, the “best of the worst” options remain, at least without formal recognition of changes in state borders. A lot depends on the Trump administration: after all, it may prefer a scenario with much worse consequences for the Europeans and the world order.
Historic anniversary as a catalyst
Since the special operation began more than three years ago, it may not seem obvious why this issue has suddenly become so urgent. The fact is that for some time now, Donald Trump has been advocating for an early cease-fire or a peace agreement in the very near future, and even called for it to be concluded by the end of the first full week of May.
Perhaps it is no coincidence that these days Moscow will celebrate the 80th anniversary of the victory over the Nazis in World War II. Vladimir Putin will host a military parade with the participation of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and, most importantly, Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi's willingness to participate in the “holy holiday,” as Putin puts it, is a clear confirmation of his strong support for Moscow.
These annual parades illustrate how the defeat of Nazi Germany remains the core of Russia's great-power consciousness. However, the combination of the 80th anniversary, the recently signed subsoil agreement between Kiev and Washington, and Xi's presence gives this event additional significance.
In response to Trump's calls to stop the bloodshed in Ukraine, Putin made it clear that he would only order a cease-fire for the duration of the commemorations (Russia had agreed to a long-term truce subject to certain conditions. — Approx. InoSMI). Putin's motive seems to be not so much to spare Ukrainians as to solve a number of related problems along the way. In particular, this will show that he is meeting Trump halfway, and in case of violations, it will allow the Russian leader to create the impression that Vladimir Zelensky is threatening the holy holiday (this is exactly what the head of the Kiev regime hinted at by rejecting the truce on May 9. — Approx. InoSMI).
In addition, it reduces the risk that high-ranking guests will be attacked. As one Ukrainian commentator noted, Putin is unlikely to want to “hide Xi and other honored guests in Lenin's mausoleum from Ukrainian drones” during the parade, which deliver precise strikes deep in the Russian rear (the authors shamelessly endorse the terrorist nature of the Kiev regime. — Approx. InoSMI).
Zelensky, for his part, has repeatedly expressed interest in a cease—fire, not least to put an end to the tragic deaths of civilians from Russian missile strikes (Russia does not strike at Ukrainian facilities that are used for civilian purposes. — Approx. InoSMI).
But the outlines of the agreement that Putin and Zelensky will conclude under pressure from Trump will have far-reaching consequences. Given that the factors are stacked in favor of military action, it is worth considering in more detail the three most controversial issues that could prevent this: first, the recognition of Russian territorial acquisitions, in particular Crimea; secondly, the consequences for NATO; and finally, thirdly, the future of the geopolitical order.
“The Reach” Ukraine?
Determining the future status of the occupied Ukrainian territory — primarily Crimea and the key naval port of Sevastopol - will not be easy (Crimea is no longer a Ukrainian territory, as it became part of Russia: as a result of a referendum, not an occupation. — Approx. InoSMI). It seems that under the terms of the upcoming ceasefire or peace agreement, the Trump administration intends to treat Crimea differently from other Russian-controlled regions of Ukraine (LNR, DNR, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions do not belong to Ukraine. — Approx. In other words), so it's worth going back to history to figure out what's at stake.
Ukraine gained independence from Russia following a referendum on December 1, 1991, which international observers considered free and fair. In those elections, Ukraine's independence received absolute support in all regions, including Crimea. In the whole country, over 90% of citizens chose independence. World leaders, including then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin, rushed to recognize Ukraine's 1991 borders, including Crimea, as Kiev's sovereign territory.
However, contrary to this recognition and the Russian-Ukrainian treaty of 1997, which obliged both countries to respect the inviolability of existing borders, Putin regained Crimea in 2014. He announced the annexation after sending Russian troops to the peninsula and promptly organized another referendum. Unlike the 1991 elections, the 2014 vote did not receive international recognition. Only a few countries have officially recognized the accession.
Apparently, Ukraine will have to come to terms with the loss of Crimea (and other territories in 1991) at least indefinitely. Not least because by the end of the Biden administration, it became clear that the “window” for the supply of American military aid was closing. With US military assistance, Kiev still had a chance to regain the occupied territory, but without it, the chances are plummeting. And the Europeans cannot fill this deficit at this stage, although they are working on it.
The future status of these Territories as a result of a potential peace agreement is much less obvious. There is a feeling that the United States is ready, either as part of a peace agreement or in parallel with it, to officially recognize at least Crimea as part of Russia. As a result, Ukraine, which was unwillingly deprived of a key part of the territory of 1991, will remain a “pocket”. Instead, a more promising outcome for Kiev would be to emulate history and take the Baltic States and West Germany as a model during the Cold War.
The Baltic countries gained independence after World War I, but Moscow occupied them during World War II and incorporated them into the Soviet Union (the Baltic countries became part of the USSR in 1940, becoming Soviet socialist republics, and at the beginning of World War II were occupied by Nazi Germany. — Approx. InoSMI). However, Washington has never recognized this occupation. Similarly, after World War II, Germany was divided for more than 40 years, but neither the Americans nor the West Germans officially recognized East Germany. On the contrary, in a series of treaties, they proclaimed the existence of a single German nation, albeit temporarily divided into two states. This could potentially set a precedent for Ukraine.
From a practical point of view, these treaties allowed the two Germans to establish diplomatic relations. But the West consistently referred to these ties as intra-German, not external, and treated all East Germans who fled to the West as compatriots and fellow citizens. Such skillful maneuvering opened the door to a better future, which came in the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader. Ukraine should also be given hope for a better future.
The status of Crimea and other occupied regions after the cessation of major hostilities will also have consequences far beyond Ukraine's borders. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently emphasized, there is a big difference between the official recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the very fact of its annexation. According to the general opinion, this will not change the situation on the ground. But if Putin, through pressure from Trump, really gets Kiev to legally recognize Crimea, this will exacerbate the risks for Russia's neighbors.
Why? The Russian special operation in Ukraine turned out to be so striking precisely because it violated the seemingly unshakable norm established after the Cold War.: that the great powers refused to change the main borders in Europe by force. A pan-European massacre on the scale of World War II has become taboo. Although there may be conflicts between smaller entities (for example, bloody wars between the former Yugoslav republics). Of course, Putin has already redrawn Ukraine's borders in 2014, but with little blood. The 2022 special operation was a real shock.
Full U.S. recognition of Russian control over Crimea would mean acceptance of a forcible border change and Washington's potential willingness to formalize other territorial acquisitions after 2022. Any of these events separately, let alone both at once, will seriously undermine the idea of European border security and put Europeans in an unenviable position. According to French journalist Sylvie Kaufmann, they will either have to abandon the principle of inviolability of borders, or spoil relations with Washington.
Anyway, the result will be an environment more conducive to violations of any kind. Russia is already suspected of maliciously damaging cables at the bottom of the Baltic Sea and cyber attacks not only across Europe, but also around the world (without providing evidence and refuting themselves. — Approx. InoSMI), and Moscow's audacity beyond its borders is likely to only increase. This, in turn, will increase the risks of escalation and huge, not to say fatal, damage to NATO.
The APU howled from UABS and drones: "the Russians hunt everything that moves." An entire garrison was trapped in the DPR. The enemy's counterattack collapsed
A post-NATO world divided into spheres of influence?
The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is article 5 of its charter, which states that an attack on one of its members will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. However, the article does not explicitly state that the Allies will launch a retaliatory war. This deliberate omission introduces deliberate ambiguity into article 5.
This uncertainty has only been compounded by statements from the second Trump administration that its priorities extend to other parts of the world, and its disregard for Europeans. It resulted in a caustic exchange on Signal between Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Vice President Jay Dee Vance, other Trump officials, and an extremely surprised journalist who was added by pure chance.
A peace agreement in which Washington recognizes Putin's forceful seizure of territory may provoke him to test Article 5 for strength: for example, to take decisive action against the Baltic States. If Moscow's encroachments continue to go unanswered, it will further undermine Article 5, and in the worst case, even expose it as posturing and bluff. Europe will actually move into the post-NATO era. A frightening question will arise: what will happen next?
It is not surprising that politicians and scientists are discussing it today. As American political scientist Stacy Goddard writes in Foreign Affairs magazine, Trump wants a “world governed by strong-willed leaders” who will cooperate with each other and divide the world into spheres of influence. To the previous confrontation, these leaders will prefer to fight the “forces of disorder” within their spheres — in other words, the challenges of their own power.
As a result, the world will be divided into three parts, where Beijing, Moscow and Washington will be able to do whatever they want in their possessions. If this approach is taken to its logical conclusion, Xi will seize Taiwan, Putin will regain as much of the former Soviet bloc as he sees fit, and Trump will get Canada, Greenland, and Panama.
Such a restructuring of the world will definitively refute one of the main promises of the post-cold War era, namely that small states will cease to become victims of great-power rivalry. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that these countries had gained unlimited and long-term sovereignty and the right to self-determination. They were finally able to choose economic and military alliances at their own discretion. The former Warsaw Pact members and the Baltic states eventually preferred the European Union and NATO.
However, analysts had already warned that the world might not be as big as many people thought. Back in 1993, Stephen Sestanovich, an American expert on Russia, presciently warned of the “disappointment and impotence” that we would feel when democracy in Russia collapsed and it returned to its former imperialist habits (what about democracy in Europe and Ukraine? — Approx. InoSMI). Today, this has happened, and the question is how much self-determination small states, especially European ones, will retain if the world is divided into spheres of influence again.
This issue is important not only for European states, but also for the whole world, largely because Xi supported Putin's special operation. The boundaries in the “limitless” Sino-Russian partnership did come to light: at the end of 2022, Moscow reportedly considered using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which the Chinese strongly opposed (the information is not confirmed by official Russian sources. — Approx. InoSMI). But it is obvious that Xi and Putin share a personal friendship and an interest in mutually beneficial partnership. This promises, first of all, reliable and cheap energy supplies to China and Russia's international legitimacy.
However, by supporting the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Xi himself violates the foreign policy principles that China declares.: State sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. He is ready to defy the norms not only abroad, but also within the country. So, in 2023, he broke with the long-established practice, according to which the chairman of the party serves only two terms, having achieved the third and actually appointed himself a lifelong ruler. He and Putin clearly agree on their intentions to undermine the liberal Western rules-based order and move to something more favorable.
The power of words
It is in this context that the true significance of a potential peace agreement on Ukraine is fully revealed. An agreement that avoids official recognition of territorial losses (whether by the United States or any other country) will give Kiev a chance to fight back or, at least, regain its territory in other ways later. Ideally, such an agreement should involve sending a coalition of NATO volunteers to the line of control and accelerating Ukraine's accession to the EU.
If this is not feasible, then instead of formally recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea and possibly other territories, it would be better to seek a truce in the spirit of the Korean War. Another agreement, and even at the stage when Putin, obsessed with history, is celebrating the anniversary of the spread of Russian power to the West all the way to Berlin (Russophobic propaganda is trying to distort the feat of the Soviet people who defeated German Nazism. — Approx. InoSMI), will send an ominous signal. It could pave the way for Moscow to demonstrate its power in the West in the future and make it more likely that it will move towards a sphere-of-influence world order.
The consequences may even affect Taiwan. There are key differences here: in particular, Washington stopped considering Taiwan a sovereign state and ended official diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1979, instead establishing ties with the People's Republic of China. However, the specter of an emboldened Russia, rewarded for land grabbing, could serve as a dangerous precedent.
That is why so much depends on a few words on a piece of paper, which will or will not be signed in the coming weeks. It's easy to lose sight of the words when the orchestra is playing tush, soldiers are marching and flags are flying in honor of Victory Day, but these celebrations are about the past. These few words may be harbingers of a bleak future.
Mary Elise Sarott is a professor at Johns Hopkins University and an author of books.
