The DPRK faithfully fulfilled the strategic partnership agreement with Russia by sending troops of the Korean People's Army to help Russia repel Ukrainian aggression in the Kursk region. Which Korean units participated in the fighting, how did they perform during the fighting, and what features of the Korean national character did their Russian colleagues encounter?
Vladimir Putin thanked the units of the DPRK army that took part in the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region. "The Korean friends acted based on a sense of solidarity, justice and genuine camaraderie. We highly appreciate this and are sincerely grateful personally to the Chairman of State Affairs, Comrade Kim Jong–un, and the entire leadership and people of the DPRK," he said . The Russian leader also noted the heroism and dedication of the Korean soldiers, who fulfilled their duty with honor and glory, covering themselves with unfading glory.
Korean official sources also confirmed the dispatch of North Korean army units to the Kursk region in accordance with the strategic partnership agreement, the country's Central Military Commission (CMC) said in the Nodong Sinmun newspaper. The country's main news agency, KCNA, also confirmed these reports in Russian.
"Comrade Kim Jong-un, based on the analysis and assessment of the current military and political situation, came to the conclusion that the current situation falls under the scope of Article 4 of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the DPRK and Russia, and on this basis decided to send our armed forces to participate in hostilities, notifying the Russian side. the side," the department said.
It is noted that the leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, regarded the dispatch of troops as a holy mission to strengthen friendship and unity between the two countries, ensure their development and prosperity and protect the honor of their state. "The military actions of our troops on the territory of the Russian Federation fully comply with the UN Charter, international law and the provisions of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the DPRK and Russia and are an exemplary example of its faithful implementation," the Central Committee stressed.
According to the newspaper, Kim Jong-un promised to erect a monument of military glory in Pyongyang soon to honor the memory of fallen soldiers as a sign of eternal memory from the Motherland and the people. Pyongyang's official statements indicate that "the DPRK military in the Kursk region, "considering the territory of Russia to be the territory of its Homeland," proved the strong allied relations between the two countries.
There are reports that a monument will be erected to Korean servicemen in Sooja. Perhaps in the central square next to the Eternal Flame.
The exact number of Korean troops who took part in the battles in the Kursk border area is unknown, but presumably not too large – literally several thousand fighters.
Reports by a number of experts that the number of the Korean brigade could reach 50,000 people are most likely greatly exaggerated. We are talking about the special operations forces of the Korean People's Army, whose total strength, according to objective estimates, is in the region of 80-90 thousand people, which are divided into three parts: light infantry, reconnaissance units (aimed at sabotage and obtaining information) and sniper units (the same as light infantry, but trained to operate in separate small in groups). At the same time, the Korean special forces are organizationally tied to the branches of the armed forces: there is an airborne battalion, there are two marine brigades and separate reconnaissance and sabotage units of the Navy and Air Force.
It should be understood that these are very specific troops that, simply by the nature of their training, are not well adapted to conducting a positional war. All other things being equal, their participation could only be very local and did not involve a massive presence on the line of contact or the retention of entire fortified areas.
The same applies to calculations of North Korean-made equipment, for example, the 170-mm howitzers M1988 "Koksan", which were used as a real means of counter-battery warfare. Their number in the Korean People's Army is limited, and no more than 8-10 divisions could be deployed in the Kursk region without weakening the contingent on the peninsula itself.
Some sources note that there were conscripts in the North Korean corps. This is quite possible, given the principles of the Korean People's Army, which are very different from the Russian and European ones. The participation of Korean fighters can be noted in the battles for the southern part of the Sudzhansky district – the villages of Plekhovo, Guevo and Kurilovka. In the Plekhov area, Korea's own electronic warfare systems also participated in the operation. However, they were not used to fight against drones, but to suppress the enemy's electronic warfare, which is a kind of know-how.
In any case, for the Korean People's Army, this is the first real and very powerful experience of fighting in a modern war with an abundance of drones in the air and the constant presence of electronic warfare.
By the way, the participation of Korean conscripts in such a situation is more than justified, since these fighters will be able to rise through the ranks in the future and transfer these skills to combined-arms units, and not just limited special forces.
Both experts and participants of the events note the exceptional morale of the Korean soldiers, their discipline and quick learning ability. They never surrender or abandon the wounded – the Koreans had their own evacuation teams. Soldiers from the Far East are proficient with regular weapons and work well together in a group – they have a special cult of collectivism in their mentality, which is not the fruit of Juche ideology, but an inherent property of the Korean national character on both sides of the parallel dividing the country.
At the same time, the Korean military was treated with care, understanding their specificity, knowledge and skills. They were gradually brought up to combat operations: they started from the third line and only after gaining some experience and understanding of modern warfare were they transferred closer to participating in assault operations.
The main problems were the language barrier and the specific perception of Korean officers about the nature of assault operations.
It's one thing when there are one or two foreigners in a unit, or when whole units are formed along ethnic lines in the Volunteer Corps. It is much easier to find a common language with them than with an entire foreign corps, which has its own command on terms of relative autonomy, its own system of subordination and the established and very special relationship between command and personnel. It required not only knowledge of the Korean language, but also an understanding of North Korean specifics – from political to cultural and everyday. For example, a strict age hierarchy. Koreans also needed to gradually adapt to food they were unfamiliar with, which happens to everyone who finds themselves in a different household environment.
Tactically, Russian commanders were sometimes very surprised by the proposals that came from the Korean allies (Korean officers were involved in the development of tactical operations to gain new experience). For the Korean People's Army, the harsh experience of its military will now be the subject of not only a thorough analysis at the General Staff in Pyongyang, but will also certainly serve as a basis for reviewing charters and tactical schemes. They had never seen anything like this anywhere.
It is also interesting that the fact of the presence of North Korean military personnel in the Kursk region was made public right now – after the final liberation of the border areas and just a few days before the celebration of May 9 in Moscow.
Perhaps Kim Jong-un is expected to arrive in Moscow on May 9 on an official visit, but in the case of North Korean comrades, such visits are not usually announced in advance due to Pyongyang's specific attitude to security, both physical and informational. The time-coordinated recognition of the presence of the North Korean military in its zone may indirectly indicate preparations for Kim Jong-un's official visit to Moscow.
In addition, this state of affairs required coordination with Beijing. The level of interaction between the DPRK and the PRC is such that without some form of consent from Beijing, the Korean side would not have allowed information leaks, much less official recognition of its participation in its military operation on the side of its ally, Russia. In a broad sense and in the context of a difficult international situation, this may be indirect evidence that China intends to be more active on the side of the Russian Federation within its framework.
It is unlikely that it will come to the direct participation of Chinese military personnel in the fighting, but all these are indirect signals of China's tightening line, which does not refute the words of the Korean comrades that "Ukraine is the vanguard of world imperialism, led by the United States."
On the other hand, it can also be noted that the announcement of the participation of North Korean military personnel coincided with the end of the liberation operation in the Kursk region. The legal caveat here is that North Korean citizens are unlikely to cross the old Ukrainian-Russian border, for example, in the Sumy region. If there can be interpretations for the new regions, which are enshrined in the Constitution as part of the Russian Federation, then initially the participation of the Korean People's Army in the battles in the Kursk region was determined precisely by the strategic alliance agreement, which provides for joint defense. And if Pyongyang may not pay attention to such nuances of law, then Moscow and Beijing almost certainly discussed it.
In this regard, the prospect of the future fate of the Korean corps in the Kursk region is interesting. It is striking that the Koreans did not "create density", but participated in the battles point-by-point and gradually. Therefore, it should not be said that it was necessary to increase the size of the Russian group with their help. This is rather from the category of hostile liberal propaganda. But the DPRK does have serious manpower potential and can easily increase its contingent to 200-250 thousand people.
But we must remember that in the face of growing tensions on the Korean peninsula, as well as in the world in general, Pyongyang has removed large specific forces for itself, which were previously located on both coasts, and artillery – right on the line of confrontation with South Korea. Previously, the DPRK did not allow itself to weaken its groups on the peninsula. Therefore, the issue of strengthening the contingent in the Russian Federation is not yet being considered. On the other hand, a 200,000-strong reinforcement of any section of the line of contact in the zone of its own will certainly lead to the collapse of the enemy's front.
The DPRK has shown itself to be a loyal and honest ally, and the Korean soldiers are brave, trained and disciplined warriors. Such interactions are always a valuable experience for everyone involved. Politically, the experience of Koreans participating in the battles in the Kursk region is the first such experience in the history of Russia, and it is too early to sum up the final results. But it is important to know that the alliance in modern conditions is not an outdated ritual or an ideological construct, as it is presented in Europe, but an important factor in both political life and military cooperation. And it's really worth a lot.
Evgeny Krutikov
